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ABSTRACT
The work presented in this thesis has been carried out in the support of the 
specification of a solution monitoring system to assist United Nations’ inspectors 
performing nuclear materials, primarily pertaining to the chemical separation areas of 
nuclear reprocessing facilities. The system is designed to provide assurances over 
hours and days, other methods are more appropriate for the provision of assurances 
over weeks. The impetus for this system derives from the fact that conventional 
material accountancy methods are unable to satisfy the protracted loss detection goal 
specified by the International Atomic Energy Agency when applied to large 
commercial reprocessing plants.
Based on the concept of model-based reasoning, the system estimates the distribution 
of plutonium throughout the plant via simulation, and then attempts to justify any 
discrepancies between the estimated distribution and the observed distribution.
Because the simulation’s structure is fixed the process of justification involves 
hypothesising additional forcing functions and parameter changes, which result in the 
simulation predicting that observed. The simulation inputs are largely in the form of 
flow rates and concentrations, which are obtained via indirect measurement.
Plant operators discourage invasive measurement systems on the grounds of the 
expense of maintenance and plant containment. For this reason tne direct measurement 
of material flow rates is not possible. However, the volume and density of liquor in 
process tanks is measured, so it is possible to obtain the flow rates indirectly by 
analysing the measurements, a process known as inverse modelling. Concentration 
measurements are obtained from the laboratory analysis of samples.
Inverse modelling is not just confined to flow rate estimation, because one of the aims 
of the system is also one of inverse modelling: to hypothesis a set of forcing functions 
and boundary conditions which, when input into the simulation, predicts the observed 
distribution. Thus inverse modelling is required at two levels, locally for flow rate 
estimation and more globally for distribution estimation over the entire plant.
Inverse modelling is problematic because inverse solutions have a propensity to be 
non-unique and unstable. Furthermore, since the solutions are obtained by analysing 
the measurements, they are adversely affected by the presence of noise and/or biases. 
This thesis describes some of the tools that have been developed as part of this system. 
A  number are based on common statistical process control algorithms such as the 
Shewhart Control Chart and the V-mask, others involve more novel algorithms such as 
simulated annealing. Different tools are used over different time-scales: the short-term 
and the medium-term
Over the short-term, disagreements between the simulation and observations are 
analysed to generate forcing function hypotheses by using banks of observers to 
generate a list of the possible causes. The most likely hypothesis is chosen on the basis 
of user specified subjective possibilities. These probabilities reflect the view that some 
events are more likely to be acceptable to the operator than others are.
The problem over the medium-term is more difficult. The inverse modelling process is 
imperfect so the model diverges from the real plant over time with the net effect that 
quantities of material are predicted to be in the wrong place. This imperfection can 
stem from both the simulation and the plant data. The possible causes are biases that 
may exist on the plant and inaccuracies in the estimation of flow rates that affect the 
simulation. A method is proposed for identifying and estimating the gross 
multiplicative biases. If no bias is found an event is created describing the 
redistribution necessary to achieve parity. A method is proposed to correct flow rates 
with the net effect that is a redistribution that would minimise the divergence. If a 
large redistribution is necessary to achieve parity, then an incident may have occurred 
on the plant.
The emphasis in the design of the algorithms is on the development of a practical 
system, one that could easily be adapted for use on a real plant. A number of different 
activities were needed to convert the conceptual design into a practical additional 
safeguards system
A considerable amount of work has been spent designing and testing on real data 
virtually identical algorithms. This activity is not central to the work described in this
thesis, and has been relegated to Appendix 1. However, it is evidence of the credibility 
of the algorithms on their ability to work in a real situation, and cannot be stressed too 
much.
In the absence of real plant data, the system has been tested using data from a 
hypothetical chemical separation area. These studies have demonstrated that the 
additional safeguards system described has the potential to be a valuable aid for 
inspectors responsible for nuclear materials safeguards.
Although unlikely to be implemented in its current form because of the lack of testing 
of the system on real data, the development of the system and the design of the tools 
presented in this thesis provide a set of guidelines for future developers. The 
importance of the data collection system has been underlined. As the foundations of 
any safeguards system, the collection of appropriate data at a satisfactory rate is 
crucial to the entire procedure.
The tools themselves are best thought of as examples of what would be required and 
certain of their component algorithms have previously been employed in analysing 
real plant data. The method developed for estimating gross multiplicative biases 
should provide a useful grounding for future development; again the development of 
the algorithm has been curtailed by the lack of real data.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.0 Overview
The operation of high throughput commercial nuclear reprocessing facilities has led to 
well-documented problems in the safeguarding of fissile material in the chemical 
separation areas (LASCAR 1992). In the case of the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant 
(RRP), Burr & Wangen (1996b) have demonstrated that the annual material balance 
standard deviation based upon traditional monthly accounting will be of too great a 
magnitude to satisfy the protracted loss detection requirement specified by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thus there is a need for additional 
systems that enhance conventional accountancy and containment and surveillance 
systems.
One possible additional system has been proposed by Howell and Miller, (2001a), 
which is provided as an addendum to this thesis. The system performs something akin 
to dynamic fissile material accountancy, utilising dynamic mass balances to represent 
the progression of plutonium through the plant. This facilitates the detection of 
diversions of fissile material, providing additional assurances. One benefit of such a 
system is that it provides indirect verification of the conventional safeguards system.
At this juncture it should be stressed that the system is not intended to be accurate, 
being designed to have a resolution of the order of a kilogram rather than a gram of 
fissile material. The reason for this is twofold: firstly it would be very expensive to 
develop such a precise system, and secondly the false alarm rate has to be low to 
promote confidence in the performance of the system.
This thesis describes the underlying philosophy of this system and focuses on the 
development of several of its component tools.
1.1 Need for the System
1.1.1 Nuclear Safeguards
The International Atomic Energy Agency, one of the world’s nuclear watchdogs, is 
responsible for policing The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(IAEA, 1992). If fissile material is diverted from a peaceful nuclear program for 
weapons purposes, the IAEA is supposed to detect the diversion in time to permit an 
international response before the diverted material is used to manufacture a device.
Therefore a basic goal of the Agency and thus by definition of nuclear materials 
safeguards is to declare with high confidence that a significant quantity or more of 
plutonium has not been diverted and if any diversion is detected, it is done so within a 
short period of time. The exact definitions of the period of time and a significant 
quantity are determined by various government policies, (see, for example, Islam et al, 
1993). In general, the period of time would mean the order of a week. A ‘significant’ 
quantity is the same amount of material irrespective of the capacity of the plant in 
question, and is an extremely small proportion of the inventory in a large facility like 
THORP (see, for example, The Health and Safety Executive, 1995). For the Rokkasho 
Reprocessing Plant, the proportion is approximately 0.1%.
1.1.2 Practical Considerations
In order for the International Atomic Energy Agency to comply with the safeguards 
requirements set out in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, most 
countries in the world have agreed to permit inspections of their nuclear facilities. 
IAEA inspectors visit facilities to assure themselves (and in turn the Agency) that 
material has not been diverted.
Although the countries have agreed in principle, conflict can occur between the 
inspectors and the plant operators caused by this imposition. Operators, although also 
concerned about safeguards, have different motives from inspectors; namely the 
efficient and safe operation of the plant on a commercial basis.
Inspectors may have to deal with what could be best described as information poor 
plants: for reasons of confidentiality and of cost, plant operators may be unwilling to 
disclose certain plant data or plant design information. Existing plants are often 
lacking certain instrumentation that would be desirable in an ideal case. The 
integrating of additional instrumentation into planned facilities is also problematic due 
to funding etc. Thus any additional safeguards system must be designed to utilise a 
minimum of instruments. Where available other instruments may then provide 
supporting evidence that the plant is running as intended.
1.1.3 Safeguards Systems
Conventional safeguards are based on two separate procedures: material accountancy, 
and containment and surveillance. Containment and surveillance is suitable for 
‘closed’ areas like ponds and stores but is not appropriate for high throughput facilities 
that have a large number of identifiable paths that cross its external boundary. 
Accountancy is more appropriate for these areas. Accountancy has evolved into two 
different techniques.
1.1.3.1 Conventional Accountancy
Conventional accountancy compares the throughput of the plant with the change in 
physical inventory of the plant at set time intervals (Tsutsumi et al, 1982). Note that 
the balance is in mass of plutonium and that it does not take into account the flows of 
material. Using the nomenclature that any symbol with a is a measured variable 
whereas any symbol with a ~ is an estimated variable, the balance can be written as:
MUF. = /  KMP^ ~ ^  O k m p , ) -  (M . -  M /-I ) (1.1)
where: MUF. - material unaccounted for at the end of time period i
2  K^MP, ■ mass in during time period i
^  ^KMP, - total mass out during time period i 
M . - physical inventory of plant at end of time period i
The total mass of plutonium transferring in and out of the plant is measured in 
accountancy vessels, which are therefore known as key measurement points (KMPs). 
This is done whilst the plant is in operation. For the physical inventory to be known 
accurately, all the material within the plant has to be flushed from unobservable 
process units to tanks, whose inventories can be measured accurately. Due to this 
inconvenience conventional accountancy is only performed infrequently. The 
emphasis is on very accurate but infrequent measurements. The inventory 
measurements are based on a knowledge of the volume or mass of the solution 
contained in the tank, combined with a knowledge of its plutonium gravimetric 
(gm/gm) or volumetric (gm/1) concentration. Accurate estimates of these 
concentrations can only be obtained by taking samples, which are carefully analysed in 
laboratories.
Burr & Wangen (1996b) have shown that this approach is inadequate to meet IAEA 
goals.
1.1.3.2 Near Real Time Accountancy
Near Real Time Accountancy (NRTA) is an evolution of conventional accountancy 
with the balance being closed every five to ten days (Lovett et al, 1982). Others refer 
to NRTA balances of a month (Burr & Wangen, 1996b). Again the balance is in mass 
of plutonium and it works on the overall account; but now it is impractical to flush the 
physical inventory to tanks whose inventory can be measured, so the physical 
inventory remains in-si tu. Again concentrations are derived from samples and it is this 
that largely limits the frequency at which the account can be closed. Because some of 
the inventory is impossible to measure, assumptions have to be made about the 
unmeasured inventories and the system must be designed to avoid a rise in false alarm 
rates. The MUF equation is then
MUF i = ( ^  /  KMP, -  ^  O KMP, ) -  ^  AM J (1.2)
y-i
where: MUF - material unaccounted for at the end of time period i
2  K^MP - total mass in during time period i
2) ^ KMP ~ total mass out during time period i
n ______ '' " _
^ A M  J = A M ]  +  A M 2 +  A M 3 +  A M 4  +  A M 3. .
AM  J - change in physical inventory of unit j 
(plant contains n units)
NRTA sacrifices accurate measurement of the physical inventory of the plant for an 
increase in the frequency of balance closure and hence in the timeliness to detect and 
resolve issues. Thus sensitivity is lost at the expense of the provision of a capability to 
detect and resolve an issue soon after it has arisen. Unfortunately, being based on a 
single MUF statistic, NRTA capabilities are limited to detection, these is no provision 
to diagnose. This is its major limitation.
1.1.4 Dynamic Accountancy
If it was to exist, dynamic accountancy might be considered to be the final evolution 
of the conventional accountancy approach. Put simply it is the continuous form of 
NRTA:
M U F (0 = M f/E (0 ) +  (J  J k m p - J  O K M p ) ~ y A M  j (1.3)
where: M U F  - material unaccounted for
KMP - flow of mass through inlet
^KMP ■ f^ow of mass through outlet
A M  j - estimated total change in physical inventory of unit over the 
time period
Note that AM j would have to be used instead of A M  j because, as will be discussed 
in the next sub-section, tank inventories are rarely measured directly because of the 
difficulties of measuring process concentration in-process. Estimation would then 
have to be based on an understanding of the flow of nuclear material through the plant. 
This would require an understanding of what actually constitutes a reprocessing plant,
so to go any further it is important that the reader has a reasonable understanding of 
those aspects that are important here. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 are therefore provided for 
this purpose. The concept used here is that of inverse modelling, an introduction to 
which is given in section 1.4. The thesis returns to the main story in Section 1.5.
1.2 Plant Description
A nuclear reprocessing facility has five main areas: fuel disassembly and dissolution, 
chemical separation, product storage, conversion and waste handling. The work that is 
described here largely pertains to the chemical separation area although related work 
on the product storage area is described in Appendices 1 & 2.
The chemical separation part of a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility is normally 
operated continuously. Due to the lack of suitable on-line instrumentation, the 
separation of plutonium nitrate from other chemicals obtained when spent fuel rods are 
dissolved in nitric acid is controlled manually. To achieve this the various process 
stages are separated by sets of tanks consisting of a receiving tank (if fed from a 
continuous process), one or more buffer tanks and a feeding tank (if feeding a 
continuous process). Most of the inventory of the plant resides in these tanks and 
samples are taken from the buffer tanks for purposes of manual control. This results in 
an arrangement like that illustrated in diagram 1.2.1.
AC AC
D ectsasing Voluitie
Decreasing plutonium  
concem tailon
AC -Accountancy Tank P -  process stage  
F -  feeding tank R -  receiving tank B -  buffer tank
Figure 1.2.1 Arrangement o f chemical separation area o f reprocessing plant.
There are two main types of process stage: the solvent extraction plant (commonly 
known as a solex plant) and the concentrator plant. In terms of plutonium flow, the 
process stage transforms the plutonium concentration, [Pu], upwards with a
corresponding reduction in flow rate, f, so that [Pu]f is maintained. Each plant 
component will now be discussed separately.
1.2.1 Tanks
1.2.1.1 Buffer Tanks
Buffer tanks are characterised by their short duration import and export flows. This 
results in their square wave volume profile (figure 1.2.1.1). Buffer tanks are usually 
situated between receiving and feeding tanks or at the head or tail of the plant.
Tima, mlnutaa
Figure 1.2.1.1 Bujfer tank volume profile
1.2.1.2 Feeding Tanks
Feeding tanks are characterised by their short duration import and continuous 
(although not necessarily constant) export flows. This results in their reversed saw­
tooth wave volume profile (figure 1.2.1.2). Feeding tanks are usually situated before 
any process stage that requires a continuous feed.
Figure 1.2.1.2 Feeding tank volume profile
1.2.1.3 Receiving Tanks
Receiving tanks are characterised by their continuous (although not necessarily 
constant) import and short duration export flows. This results in their saw-tooth wave 
volume profile (figure 1.2.1.3). Receiving tanks are situated after any process stage 
that has a continuous flow out.
I
Figure 1.2.1.3 Receiving tank volume profile 
1.2.1.4 Accountancy Tanks
Accountancy tanks at the boundaries are also known as key measurement points. 
Accountancy tanks are a variant of the buffer tank. The main difference is that the 
accountancy tank has additional and more accurate instrumentation, and means of 
homogenisation. Samples taken from the tank are analysed more closely. This means 
that any measured variable (including flow rates) are usually known to a higher degree 
of accuracy.
1.2.2 Solvent Extraction Plant
A solvent extraction plant consists of two or more cycles. In the first cycle plutonium 
and uranium is extracted from highly active waste, the plutonium is then separated 
from the uranium. Solvent extraction plants are operated in a continuous manner. 
Further cycles then improve the purity of the recovered plutonium.
A solvent extraction cycle consists of a number of pulsed columns. A technical 
description is given in Benedict, Figford and Levi (1981). Each column has a separate 
function, e.g. oxidation, extraction, stripping but the underlying process is similar. The 
plutonium nitrate liquor is brought into contact in counterflow with an organic solvent
to which the plutonium is preferentially transferred, leaving other components behind. 
By altering the valency of the plutonium so that it becomes insoluble in the organic 
solvent, the plutonium is transferred back into nitric acid in a separate pulse column. 
The majority of the plutonium migrates into the solvent or acid. The final pulse 
column utilises nitric acid; thus the exported liquor is plutonium nitrate.
The quantity of plutonium stored in a cycle at any instance in time cannot be measured 
directly but can be estimated on the basis of the known compositions of the feeds and 
on assumptions about the locations of the ‘heavy metal fronts’ in the columns. A 
certain level of confidence can be obtained about the position of these fronts by the use 
of neutron detectors, XRF detectors and density instruments. The liquor output from 
each stage of the solex plant (called a ‘cycle’) is largely composed of plutonium nitrate 
dissolved in nitric acid and at temperature T is of density ps (Howell and Scothern, 
1995):
P.v(î^) = P . ( r )  + «;JT)[BM ] + a ^ ,(T )[ //+ ]  + .... (1.4)
where: P,v(^) " density of water (g/l)
[Pu] - Pu concentration (g/l)
[H+] - Acid molarity (mol/1)
^  C(f/+(T) - coefficients
The acid molarity affects the density and hence if the density measurements are to be 
of any use in the estimation of plutonium, molarity has also to be known. The acid 
molarity leaving a solvent extraction plant can be altered by adjusting the molarity of 
the final nitric acid feed. Knowledge of this molarity has to be obtained from the 
downstream receiving tank’s density measurements.
1.2.3 Concentrator Plant
The concentrator plant consists of a storage tank, linked to a heating element via a 
downpipe and a riser. An outlet valve is fitted to the riser. Again a more technical 
description can be found in Benedict, Figford, and Levi (1981). Liquor is imported
into the storage tank from which material is passed through the heating element and 
returns to the tank. The heating action evaporates mainly water from the solvent and 
thus concentrates the material. Once the desired concentration has been reached, the 
material is exported through the outlet valve.
The factor of concentration is given by the ratio of import and export flows. The 
concentrator plant achieves significantly higher factors of concentration than a solex. 
Concentrator plants are normally operated in a continuous manner.
1.2.4 Sparging
To ensure that a homogeneous solution exists within a tank, nitrogen is sometimes 
bubbled through the mixture at regular intervals to agitate the contents. This also 
ensures that the liquor remains fully nitrated.
1.2.5 Sampling j
Sampling is undertaken on buffer tanks, normally before the export of solution, to 
check the composition of the contents before it enters a process stage. If necessary the 
operator then corrects its chemical composition by addition of chemicals prior to 
export. Little of this sampling data is made available to the inspector, and when it is, a 
considerable time lag exists. This lag is longer for accountancy tank samples as these 
are analysed more closely. Material is removed from the tank, a small proportion taken 
for testing and the vast majority returned. This usually occurs one hour before export.
1.3 Instrumentation
There are various types of instruments available for measuring various parameters on 
the plant. These will be described by function.
1.3.1 Volume Measurement
Data relating to the status of the volume of a tank can be derived from a variety of 
sensors (BNFL 1996 and IAEA 1999a). The most common method is to use level dip- 
tubes.
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An open-ended pipe is suspended in a tank and air or other gas is passed through the 
pipe. The pressure that is required to discharge liquid from this pipe is proportional to 
the head of liquid above the open-ended pipe and the density of the liquid. This 
pressure is measured by an electro-manometer and the change in the signal from the 
electro-manometer is proportional to the level within the tank.
With only a level dip-tube installed then various assumptions about the concentrations 
of the components of the liquor have to be made so that the volume, density and thus 
mass of the tank can be calculated.
1.3.2 Density Measurement
To avoid having to make these assumptions, a density dip-tube is installed in parallel 
with the level dip-tube (BNFL 1996, IAEA 1999a and Howell and Scothern 1995). 
The density dip-tube terminates at a known vertical separation above the level dip- 
tube. Its manner of operation is the same as the level dip-tube.
The density of the liquor present can be derived from the pressure differential between 
the two dip-tubes and the vertical separation.
1.3.3 Flow Measurement and other Instrumentation
Numerous other instruments might be available such as flow rate monitors (IAEA 
1999a). Although the technology is established, operators avoid invasive monitoring 
systems due to the problems of having maintainable items in cells (expensive) and 
invading the process liquor (plant containment). Thus flow rate is usually only 
measured in inactive lines.
Flow meters are used within plants. The material entering a plant is metered (as 
opposed to measured). An example of this is a wheel on which measuring spoons are 
mounted.
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1.4 Inverse Modelling
Inverse modelling has been defined as (Hess et al 1991):
Computational methods that determine control inputs to a dynamic system that 
produce desired system outputs.
Inverse modelling has long held the attention of a wide spectrum of scientists, from 
ecologists (Patten 1970) to aeronautical dynamists (Thomson and Bradley 1990). 
Inverse solutions are notorious for being non-unique and unstable and thus can be 
classified as ill posed. Inverse solutions are also influenced by any measurement 
biases present in the system. These problems are illustrated by example in the 
following sub-sections.
1.4.1 Non-uniqueness of Inverse Solutions
Inverse solutions have a propensity to be non-unique because it is often the case that 
the number of measured state variables is less than the number of inputs i.e. the 
systems are often under-specified. This results in non-unique solutions.
For example, consider a tank whose volume profile shows an increase of 1 litres/s.
One possible inverse solution is that the flow in is 1 litre/s and the flow out 0 litre/s. 
However, this is not the only solution, the flow in could just as easily be 1001 litre/s 
and the flow out 1000 litre/s. The rate of change of the volume is only indicative of the 
difference in magnitude between the flow in and flow out.
1.4.2 Instability of Inverse Solutions
To illustrate the instability of an inverse solution, consider the Laplace domain system 
below:
X(s) Y{s)
G(s)w w
where: G{s)  ^ ^ ^ + 22850s + 15000)
iT(5) = 1 /5  (unit step at time = zero)
This can be rearranged to give (see figure 1.4.1 for a plot of this function):
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Suppose the output of the system Y(s) was estimated to be ^ then the 1 
solution for X(s) could be approximated to:
^(^) = j4i54*(s + 175 + V50^)
inverse
The first term in X(s) is the second derivative of a unit step (or the derivative of 
infinity) which is not physically meaningful.
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Figure 1.4.1 Plot ofY(s) when G(s) is subjected to a unit step at time zero 
1.4.3 Affect of Measurement Bias on Inverse Solutions
Two possible types of bias may be present on the measured state variable used to 
estimate the system’s inputs: additive and multiplicative. As far as tank volume 
measurement systems are concerned, additive biases are of little consequence as these 
do not affect the estimation of volume transfers. However, multiplicative biases can 
cause many problems if they are not identified and estimated, because the 
multiplicative bias will adversely affect the transfer estimates.
For example, consider a tank that has a constant volumetric flow in and an intermittent 
flow out. The volume of the tank is measured, but subjected to a multiplicative bias.
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The inverse solution for either or both flows will be in error due to the bias on the 
volume measurement.
This problem is prevalent in other areas of research (Murray-Smith 2000).
1.4.4 Affect of Noise on Inverse Solutions
Inverse modelling is susceptible to noise. Consider G(s) in section 1.4.2, the inverse of 
which is s"^ /s^  which is susceptible to noise. Furthermore, the numerical differentiation 
of a measured state, which is subjected to noise, is extremely difficult and arduous.
The possibility of producing a robust yet simple algorithm to perform such a task is 
low.
1.5 Proposal for an Additional Safeguards System
It should now be clear that the direct measurement of the plutonium inventory in a 
tank, or of its mass and plutonium concentration, is rare. Although mass can be 
measured readily, plutonium concentration cannot. Measurements can only be 
obtained via sampling, and this introduces significant overheads in terms of cost and 
laboratory time. The alternative is to estimate the plutonium concentration throughout 
the plant. The estimation of plutonium concentration requires an understanding of the 
movement of solutions through the plant, which in turn requires a model. Having 
constructed a model, it then seems quite natural to explore other possible uses because 
it seems pointless to distil all the knowledge now obtained into the single MUF 
statistic of Equation 1.3 i.e. the dynamic account. This leads to the following concept;
Having confidence in the accountancy tank measurements, the aim is to produce a 
system in which the differences between the variables associated with the modelled 
inventory and those associated with the measured physical inventory are justified. In 
cases where they are not justified, the system is intended to generate partial diagnoses 
to explain the disagreements observed. Thus the aim is to detect and diagnose rather 
than to improve the account.
The system proposed here can be viewed as an evolution of the solution monitoring 
systems previously developed at the University of Glasgow (Howell and Scothern 
1997). In very broad terms, the approach is based upon simple plant simulations.
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Simple simulations are used in a number of different roles: in generating reference 
data, in generating boundary conditions for other simulations, and in reasoning about 
disagreements.
The plant is then deemed to be operating as declared if a simulation can be constructed 
that is in agreement with the plant measurements over two different time intervals:
• Short-term: approximately equivalent to 1.5 cycles of filling/emptying a 
buffer tank.
• Medium-term: approximately equivalent to 10 cycles of filling/emptying a 
buffer tank.
Long-term assurances are not considered because other approaches may be more 
appropriate, e.g. conventional accountancy. Although the aim is not to improve the 
account per se, the methods presented in this thesis would improve the accuracy of the 
physical inventory estimates and hence of both the conventional and near-real time 
accounts.
An outline of the proposed system is given in Figure 1.5.1. As in Howell & Scothern 
(1997), the main output is that of a list of events, which describe those physical 
activities that would be needed so that the simulation correlates with the plant data. 
The key system components are a data collection system, a real-time database, a plant 
simulation and various tools that perform various functions: short-term assurances, 
medium-term assurances and redistribution. These various components are described 
in this sub-section.
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Figure 1.5.1 Outline o f Additional Safeguards System
1.5.1 Definition of Terms
1.5.1.1 Event
As far as the system is concerned, an event is a set of one or more actions that are 
viewed by the operator or inspector as representing a single entity. It would not be 
unusual for the operator or inspector to attach a descriptive name to an event. For 
instance, the event ‘transfer from Tank 1 to Tank 2’ might be used to denote the 
opening of various valves, the starting of the transfer mechanism, eventually stopping 
the transfer mechanism and finally closing the valves. The observed ‘symptoms’ of the 
transfer are a decrease in the volume of Tank 1 and a corresponding increase in the 
volume of Tank 2. From a symptomatic point of view, an event can be viewed as a 
sequence of sub-events which can be described by a particular choice of diagnoses.
1.5.1.2 Sub-event
Refers to a single rise or fall in the measured value of a sensor attached to a plant 
element. The most common sub-events are increases and decreases in the volume of a 
tank.
16
1.5.2 Strategy
The base data obtained from the plant can be summarised as follows:
• accountancy tank data at inlet;
• volume, density and temperature measurements for each tank;
• accountancy tank data at outlet.
With no further analysis, our understanding of the plutonium distribution is simply the 
imported and exported quantities from the accountancy tanks, the region between them 
is simply a black hole into which material disappears and then reappears sometime 
later. Note also that only bulk volume and the combined density of all the solutes in 
the liquor are measured, not plutonium concentration.
1.5.2.1 Plant Simulations
The simulations largely derive from balances of water, plutonium, nitric acid and any 
other components where the choices of matter ‘balanced’ varies depending on the 
process units involved. There are two types of model, one that pertain to tanks and 
one that pertains to ‘hidden’ inventories like solvent-extraction cycles and the 
concentrator. The tank simulation is composed of a number of materials balances like:
dM.
dt = hX P ul.,-fouA P u]  (1.5)
where f  denotes a flowrate and [] a concentration. Based on the steady state follower 
approach, the hidden inventory models are very simple. These will be described in 5.1.
1.5.2.2 Estimation of Plutonium Distribution
Simulation is possible because material moves forwards from the input accountancy 
tank. The accurate knowledge of the plutonium exported from the input accountancy 
t ^ k  data will allow the simulation to propagate material through the plant. The 
simulation simulates each tank set and process stage in turns, enabling the system to 
estimate the plutonium distribution throughout.
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The results of this simulation are then used to perform the short-term assurance 
simulation. Any short-term errors identified would then be rationalised.
In order to perform this simulation, the following information is required:
1 . plutonium concentration from inlet;
2 . import transfers from inlet;
3. import and export transfers from all tanks;
4. acid molarity exported by process stages;
5. addition of substances to tanks to alter liquor composition;
6 . initial conditions of tanks;
7. initial load of process stages;
8 . plutonium concentration from outlet;
9. export transfers from outlet.
The operator can supply 1, 2, 7, 8 , and 9 whilst 6 is easily obtainable. New methods 
have had to be developed for points 3, 4 and 5. These are described in detail in 
Chapters Three, Four and Five, and the problems are outlined below. Point number 3
includes every import and export transfer in a tank, i.e. includes the unauthorised
diversion of material.
1.5.2.3 Estimation of Transfers
Any information pertaining to the import and export flows of a tank must be obtained 
indirectly from analysing its volume measurement record. If a simple system model is 
used to represent this situation:
= / . - / »  (1-6)
where: V - output
/. & / „ - inputs
it can be seen that the inputs to the system are to be determined from the system 
outputs -  this is a definition of inverse modelling. For a single tank this is impossible
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as the volume only contains information pertaining to the difference between the 
import and export flows.
The connectivity of the plant together with the accountancy tank flows allows this 
problem to be solved. Consider the simple three-tank system shown in figure 1.5.1.1 
below:
t1
1 2 3w W W
Figure 1.5.1.1 Three-tank system
Without knowing any of the flows the problem is not solvable, there being three 
equations and four unknown parameters ( /] , / 2, A , A)- The introduction of the
accountancy flows ( ) reduces the problem to three equations and two unknowns,
which is now solvable.
The simplest method of inverse modelling for the liquor flow rates associated with a 
tank, would be to numerically differentiate the volume measurement record. 
Unfortunately, as this measurement is susceptible to noise, this approach would lead to 
instability. Therefore a more robust approach is required.
This approach is based on the assumption that during the horizontal sections of 
volume measurement data no flows are occurring. The inverse modelling task is 
simplified into two stages: the identification of the sections of volume measurement 
record that correspond to flows and the estimation of the flow rates of those stages.
1.5.2.4 Redistribution of Plutonium Inventory
For various reasons inverse modelling is not accurate (these were explored in section
1.4) and over a period of time any simulation that is driven by data derived from
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inverse modelling will diverge from reality. Again consider the three-tank system 
shown in figure 1.5.1.1. In this instance /j is a constant accountancy flow and the 
throughput of the plant is measured after tank 3. Estimates for the constant flow 
rates , A , A  have been obtained by inverse modelling. If is over-estimated by
1%, the error in throughput between the real and simulated plant is that shown in 
figure 1.5.1.2.
Figure 1.5.1.2 Divergence o f simulated throughput from actual throughput
If the other flows ( A , A ) are also badly estimated, all of the tanks affected by the 
incorrect flow rates will diverge from their volume measurements. If f  ^  is now 
replaced with the accountancy flow, the throughput of the simulated plant will match 
that of the actual plant. However, the individual tanks will still diverge from reality. 
By altering the estimated flow rates logically to redistribute the errors between the 
tanks, the simulation can be made to converge with the real plant.
This may require the introduction of additional events e.g. diversions of material.
1.5.2.5 Effect of Tank Biases
One reason for poor flow-rate estimation and hence model divergence, are 
multiplicative measurement biases. If these exist it is more sensible to estimate them 
and hence compensate than to redistribute. The decision as to when to redistribute and 
when to estimate biases is a complex one. It is preferable that biases are estimated as a 
redistribution of large amounts of material may result in false alarms.
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1.5.3 Implementation
In section 1.5.1, the basic outline of the additional safeguards system was established. 
The tasks that the system has to undertake are:
• Basic Tasks
• Estimate the import and export flow rates for each tank.
• Estimate the acid concentration output from a solvent-extraction cycle.
• Simulate each process unit.
• Short-term Assurance Tasks
• Detect and diagnose disagreements.
• Medium-term Assurance Tasks
• Redistribute plutonium.
• Detect and diagnose disagreements.
• Additional Task
• Estimation of multiplicative volume measurement biases.
To perform the first basic task, a tool, which analyses the volume measurement record 
of a tank, is required. Since the volume profiles of the feeding and receiving tanks are 
closely related, a single tool can be used for both. An additional tool is required for 
buffer tanks. The second basic tool analyses the density measurement record from 
receiving tanks.
The short-term and medium-term assurance tasks make use of the same family of 
tools. The detection and diagnostic tools make use of a variety of algorithms, e.g. 
cumulative sums based detectors, observer-based detectors, observer-based diagnostic 
tools. The redistribution tool is associated with the medium-term simulation and 
simply redistributes the small plutonium disagreements to improve the systems 
understanding of the plutonium distribution in the plant.
Finally, an additional tool is required to estimate the multiplicative biases that affect 
the volume measurements. Since transfers used in the simulations are derived from the 
volume measurements, any multiplicative bias that affects that measurement also
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affects the plutonium distribution. This results in a divergence between the model and 
actual plant in the medium-term.
All of the tools are designed to be modular in construction. The reasons for this are as 
follows:
1. Quality assurance of the software implementation.
2. The need for further development
a). Quality of real plant data is unknown.
b). Added complexity may not be of benefit.
c). The flow estimation tools have common components.
1.6 Original Work
1.6.1 Safeguards
The development of additional nuclear materials safeguards tools is, by necessity, 
extremely practical, international diplomacy cannot be based solely on theoretical 
arguments. There have been at least four attempts to monitor the movements of 
solutions in reprocessing plants: Cobb et al (1981a, 1981b), Ehinger et al (1981 and 
1989), Burr and Wangen (1996b), and Scothern & Howell (1997). Both the Cobb and 
Ehinger activities focused on the AGNS facility in South Carolina. Both Scothern and 
Howell (1997) and Burr and Wangen (1996b) worked on solution monitoring systems 
for product storage areas.
Cobb et al. effectively sought the formation of the dynamic account by recourse to 
advanced instrumentation, Kalman filtering and other statistical estimators. Ehinger 
worked on a more practical approach, selecting and developing specific applications of 
process monitoring with a role in international safeguards. Howell (Automatica, 1994) 
was the first to examine the possibility of applying computer simulations directly, 
whilst Burr & Wangen (1996a) looked at some theoretical implications. In particular 
the work of Scothern & Howell was simulation based. By their very nature product 
storage facilities are very different from chemical separation facilities; tanks in one are 
virtually always static, the contents of a large number of tanks in the other are 
continually changing. The development of the simulation-based safeguards approach 
described here is completely novel.
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The emphasis of this thesis is on the development of a practical system, one that could 
easily be adapted for use on a real plant. A number of different activities were needed 
to convert the concept described in 1.5 into a practical additional safeguards system 
(Table 1.6.1)
Number Activity
1 . Analysis of volume measurements using inverse modelling.
2 . Analysis of density measurements using inverse modelling.
3. Short-term disagreement detection.
4. Diagnosis of short-term disagreements.
5. Medium-term disagreement detection.
6 . Diagnosis of medium-term disagreements.
7. Establish a method of identifying gross biases in a dynamic environment.
8 . Test system on realistic data.
9. Investigate data collection systems.
Table 1.6.1 Table o f required activities
With practical implementation as its goal, the quality of the measurement records is of 
key importance. Towards this end a considerable amount of time was spent working 
with real data collected from a commercially operated facility (Appendix 1) whilst 
gaining an insight into the performance of the Howell & Scothern (1997) system. This 
work is described in 1.8 (activity 9).
1.6.2 Model-based Fault Detection
A considerable amount of literature has been published about model-based fault 
detection and diagnosis. Two approaches exist in model-based fault detection and 
diagnosis: quantitative and qualitative methods. A survey of not only these approaches 
but of process fault detection and diagnosis as a whole exists in Venkatasubramanian 
(2001). There also exist some hybrid methods that seek to combine the best features of 
both quantitative and qualitative to their advantage.
23
The quantitative approach is an established research topic and uses techniques from 
control theory and statistical analysis such as observers (Frank, 1990), Kalman filters 
(Willsky, 1976; Basseville, 1988), parity equations (Gertler and Singer, 1990; Gertler, 
1991), and parameter estimation (Young, 1981; Isermann, 1984). The quantitative 
approach is essentially a two-stage process. The first stage generates residuals between 
the actual plant and the expected behaviour of an explicit model of the monitored 
plant. These residuals are ‘pseudo-signals’ reflecting the potential faults of the system. 
The second stage chooses a decision rule for diagnosis.
The drawbacks of the quantitative approach are the difficulties related to modelling the 
process and the specific modelling of faults. The additional safeguards system 
described in this thesis can be thought of as a physical quantitative model-based 
approach. Geiger et al (2001) describe another type of physical quantitative model- 
based approach, albeit for a combined gas/oil pipeline scheme. This uses neural nets to 
correct for modelling inaccuracies.
To overcome these drawbacks, qualitative modelling has been adopted in recent years 
(Frank 1994; Forbus, 1984). However, the qualitative modelling approach generally 
leads to multiple solutions, which are not compatible with diagnosis. To overcome the 
limitations of individual strategies, hybrid methods have been developed that integrate 
the best features of each method. An example of this is the method developed by 
Gentil and Montmain (2000) that relies on both a qualitative causal representation of 
the process function and quantitative local behavioural models. However, this method 
still relies upon the existence of a precise model of the industrial facility.
1.7 Outline of Thesis
In Chapter Two, a review of the algorithms like Shewhart Control Charts, Recursive 
Least Squares used to construct the tools is presented. The emphasis is on simple, 
adaptable algorithms.
The designs for the volume analysis tools for both the feeding/receiving tanks and 
buffer tanks are discussed in Chapter Three together with suitable short-term detection 
and diagnostic tools (activities 1, 3, & 4). Chapter Four discusses the design of the
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density measurement analysis tool for receiving tanks. Again short-term detection and 
diagnostic tools are presented (activities 2, 3 & 4).
The medium-term assurance tools are discussed in Chapter Five. These are the 
distribution simulation, the redistribution tool, and the detection and diagnostic 
algorithms (activities 5 & 6). Presented in the same chapter is a method of estimating 
gross measurement errors to improve the accuracy of the system (activity 7). In 
Chapter Six, test cases and their results are presented and discussed (activity 8). The 
conclusions and recommendations for further research are included in Chapter Seven.
1.8 Practical Issues
Since the focus is on practical implementations, this chapter finishes by examining 
some of the issues involved.
1.8.1 Data Acquisition System
The data acquisition system is one of, if not the, most important components of a 
safeguards system. The data acquisition system is the foundation of the additional 
safeguards system and its performance will have far reaching implications for the 
overall system. The system is composed of both hardware and data collection 
software.
The minimum data to be collected by the system includes pressure dip-tube 
measurement records pertaining to tank levels and densities plus temperatures (IAEA 
1999b). The data has to be recorded at a rate sufficiently fast to enable appropriate 
data analyses to be made. It is important to have a high data collection rate (e.g. every 
15 seconds) to view the start and finish of process operations clearly. However this 
results in large quantities of data, most of which is of no relevance to safeguards. 
Hence data compression is important. The data acquisition software then converts this 
data into volume/density/temperature records together with their standard deviations. 
For safeguards purposes it is essential that any data point recorded can be traced back 
to its origin. Thus ‘corrected’ data cannot be recorded, as their legitimacy is 
questionable.
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Operators are reluctant to publish information pertaining to their systems in situ for 
security reasons. However, details of both the JA6 system installed in the product 
storage area of Tokai-Mura Reprocessing Plant (Howell and Miller, 2001b) and the 
portable Volume Long-Term Monitoring device (known as VLTM) developed at JRC 
Ispra (Landat et al, 1997a, 1997b, and 1998) are available. Data collected on the TRP 
facility using both systems was made available for the work described here.
1.8.2 Ideal Data Acquisition System
Below is a list of features that would exist in the ideal data acquisition system for the 
additional safeguards system. If implemented, this data acquisition system would 
reduce the complexity of the overall system.
Individual SEVA pressure transducers for each dip-tube pressure line.
Software data compression only with user specified parameters.
High data collection rate (e.g. every 15 seconds).
Sparging interlock.
Raw data storage for sensor validation/fault isolation 
Synchronised data collection for all tanks.
Real-time data base for storage of measurements.
The reasoning behind this specification is outlined in the sections that follow.
1.8.3 Data Collection Hardware
Accurate pressure sensors are extremely expensive and because of this the JA6 system 
makes use of a type of rotating manifold known as a scanivalve. This mechanical 
device multiplexes pressure lines from various dip-tubes onto the same pressure 
transducer. Combined with the data collection software, the resulting system produces 
poor quality data that requires substantial pre-processing before any subsequent 
analyses can be made. The main problems are a loss of sensitivity, a loss of definition, 
a low rate of data collection, and a lack of synchronisation between tanks. For full 
details see Appendices 2 and 3. For these reasons, a system where a pressure 
transducer is used for each pressure line is preferred.
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1.8.4 Data Collection Software
It is desirable that the data collection software includes data compression algorithms 
that are flexible in design. The need for data compression is not peculiar to solution 
monitoring. Data compression is used in many areas and in particular in the process 
industries (Hale and Sellars, 1981; Bristol, 1990; Cheung and Stephanopoulos, 1990a 
& 1990b). Data compression for safeguards purposes (Appendix 1) is peculiar because 
the objective is somewhat different: process industry data compression is about 
recording the under-lying trends in the data whereas, data compression for safeguards 
purposes should reflect more the quantitative state of the contents of the tank.
A number of user specified parameters, such as those available in the VLTM system 
(Table 1.8.4.1) are required to enable the system performance to be optimised. 
Appendix 4 shows the effect of varying a single, key parameter ‘Alarm Threshold’ on 
the quality of the data collected. Although not essential, it is useful if data collection 
was synchronised between tanks.
Parameter Description
Acquisition time Time to capture a single averaged 
measurement.
Alarm Threshold Limit of change in measurement before 
it is recorded. A value of zero will 
ensure maximum data collection rate.
Backup time If no measurement is output during this 
period, a measurement is recorded.
Maximum data collection 
rate
Acquisition time * number of 
multiplexed channels.
Table 1.8.4 JV LT M  data acquisition system parameters
Also desirable is a sparging interlock. When a tank is sparged, there is an artificial rise 
in level (and thus volume) as the nitrogen bubbles through the liquor. By using an 
interlock it is possible to avoid recording this data, substituting previous data values 
for those that are affected by the sparging.
27
The data collection software must also be designed to accommodate eventualities such 
as the tank levels dropping below the density dip-tubes, which does not appear to be 
uncommon in normal operations.
The level/density measurement system has a tendency to be self-validating because the 
two key dip-tube pressure signals are highly correlated. To reduce the complexity of 
the system, and because it is sensible anyway, it is preferable that faults internal to 
dip-tube instrumentation be isolated separately. Adherence to the recently proposed 
standard on SEVA sensors (Clarke & Henry) is beneficial, as it would provide a 
communication protocol between the sensor validation system and the data collection 
software. Ideally the raw data would be recorded as well as the converted data. The 
raw data would be used to validate the operation of the dip-tube system.
1.8.5 Simulated Data
Due to the unavailability of real plant data pertaining to a solvent-extraction facility 
during the course of this research, appropriate time-series were obtained from a 
simulation of an actual facility. The simulation produces unbiased time series.
The data collection system was assumed to have an alarm threshold of 0.0, an 
acquisition time of 3 seconds and a maximum of 5 multiplexed channels. The volume, 
density and temperature of each tank were recorded into a database every 1.5 seconds. 
For the accountancy tanks, the accountancy flows as well as plutonium concentration 
was recorded in another database together with the loads of the solvent extraction 
cycles and concentrator. Noise and biases could subsequently be added to this raw 
data.
The simulation was developed to simulate various events that may take place on a real 
facility. An event is those instances that are deemed to be abnormal in some way. All 
events are of a temporal nature (i.e. have a start and stop time). For instance material 
may disappear at one time and re-appear at another. Events are classified by the time 
period over which they exist. Abrupt events have a relatively short duration whereas 
gradual events are long term trends.
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CHAPTER 2 
TOOL COMPONENTS
2.0 Introduction
In this chapter, various component algorithms are described which form the building 
blocks from which some of the tools are constructed. As the algorithms are common to 
more than one tool, it is important to introduce them at this stage. Knowledge of the 
algorithms is helpful for understanding Chapters Three to Five, where the tools are 
described in detail.
The algorithms are drawn from a number of fields, although the majority are widely 
used in statistical process control. None of the algorithms are unusual or novel in 
anyway. The emphasis is on practice rather than theory.
The algorithms described here have been chosen on the basis of our limited exposure 
to real data during the construction of a new and original data compression tool, albeit 
from a product storage area (Appendix 1). The function of the tool developed for that 
application was to extract the pertinent features from the measurement record whilst 
discarding the unimportant data. One aspect of this ‘feature extraction’ tool was the 
identification and recording of abrupt transfers, a not dissimilar task to one required by 
this system.
The algorithms are described in the context of their application to fulfil the tasks 
required by the system.
2.1 Estimation of Moving Average
As outlined in section 1.6, the system has to estimate the transfers into and out of a 
tank from the volume measurement records. To achieve this, the points at which 
transfers begin and end have to be identified.
The method used is to detect divergences between the plant data and an estimated 
process mean. This estimated process mean is the moving average of the plant data. If
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the measurement data diverges sufficiently then a change can be detected. If the noise 
on the real plant data is asymmetric then the moving average estimate will be biased. 
This will result in incorrect transfer estimates. Therefore, pre-filtering of the plant data 
is required in this situation. The simulated ‘real’ plant data used in the development of 
the system has a symmetrical noise profile, so pre-filtering is not an issue.
The choice of moving average estimator is dependent on two factors. Firstly, for 
reliable detection of changes, the plant data must diverge significantly. Therefore the 
estimator needs to be insensitive; i.e. the tracking of the data has to be poor. (Figure
2.1.1). The second is that this insensitivity must not impair the estimator’s ability to 
track uphill or downhill segments of data as this will result in poor transfer 
identification.
*  A — ■'L.4---------   *
*  It
!
* //* /
* *
  : Moving Average * : Data Point
Figure 2.2.1 Poor tracking o f the data during changes (left plot compared with right 
plot) results in reliable change detection.
The exponentially weighted moving average (EWMA) or geometric weighted moving 
average (GWMA) is used extensively in forecasting and time series modelling 
(Roberts 1959 and Crowder 1987). The EWMA is defined as:
(2.1)
where: z,. : exponentially weighted moving average. 
X- : data point
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0 < A ^ 1 : a constant
However, to obtain the insensitivity required for reliable detection, the value of A is 
small. This results in poor performance on uphill or downhill segments as the data 
increases or decreases more rapidly than the EWMA.
As the EWMA is unsuitable, a minimum-variance unbiased estimator is preferred. 
Ignoring process noise, a volume measurement history can be represented by a series 
of straight-line segments, the interception points of which correspond to physical 
events on the tank. An ideal estimator to generate equations for these straight-line is 
the recursive least squares (RES) or sequential least squares (SLS) algorithm (Graup 
1972 and Hisa 1977). The algorithm has the desired insensitivity and uphill/downhill 
tracking ability. The RES estimate requires to be reset when a change is detected. This 
concept has already been shown to work in Appendix 1. A disadvantage of this 
method is that the fitting of straight lines to data that may taper asymptotically may 
cause problems.
2.1.1 Recursive Least Squares
The recursive least squares algorithm estimates the gradient, m, and constant, c of a 
straight line [i.e. m,c : v,, = mt^ + c ] . Graup defines the algorithm as follows;
) (2.2)
where: v = h^x  + n
h = \t 1J
x  = [m c j  
n - noise
+1
To apply this, A  = * 2x2 identity matrix and the elements of x^ are m = 0 and c =
the first data value. To reset the RES calculation, = A  x^ , to have m = 0 and c 
= value of process mean at this point. Resetting the RES calculation is preferred to the
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introduction of a forgetting factor (Soderstrom and Stoica, 1989) as this introduces 
similar sensitivity issues to the EWMA.
Using delayed values from several points beforehand can increase the insensitivity of 
the RLS estimate. This may be of use when the data collection rate is high in 
comparison with the plant dynamics.
2.2 Detection of Changes
Detectors are distributed throughout the system. For example to detect plant data 
diverging from the process mean estimate or an alarm signal being activated. The 
changes that are of interest to the system can all be classed as abrupt.
The classic abrupt detectors are the Shewhart Control Chart (Shewhart 1931), the 
Cumulative Sum Control Chart (Page 1954) and the V-mask (Barnard 1959).
2.2.1 Shewhart Control Chart
The Shewhart control chart (Shewhart 1931, Montgomery 1996) is an established 
method for online process monitoring. If the process data values fall within the upper 
and lower control limits (UCL and LCL) then the process is deemed to be in control 
(or not changing). If the data values move outside the control limits h is an indication 
that the process has moved off target. The Shewhart control chart is defined as:
UCL = v+ L a  ^
(2.3)
LCL =
where: v - data value
V - mean of v
C7  ^ - the standard deviation of v 
L - ‘distance’ of control limits from v
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A major disadvantage of the Shewhart control chart is that it only uses the information 
about the process contained in the last data point and it ignores any information given 
by the entire sequence of points.
To overcome this disadvantage whilst maintaining the simplicity and ease of 
understanding, the Shewhart control chart can be combined with that of RLS 
estimation, as proposed in Basseville & Nikiforov (1993).
2.2.2 Standardised Cumulative Sum
The standardised cumulative sum or cusum (Page 1954, Chatfield 1996) is an 
established method for online process monitoring. Cusums combine successive 
measurements, which enables them to detect small changes in the process.
The standardised cusum consists of two cusums, the one-sided upper and lower
(C ) cusums. The standardised cusum is calculated as follows:
C; =max[0,y^-t + C;_,] 
C~ = max[0 ,-A -  +C ;.,]
where: =
V - data value
V - mean of v
- the standard deviation of v 
k - reference value
If either cusum exceeds the decision interval h , the process is deemed to be out of 
control. The choice of k and h affect the performance of the cusum.
2.2.3 V-Mask
The V-mask (Barnard 1959 and Johnson 1961) is an adaptation of the standardised 
cusum. Using the v-mask simplifies the procedure for choosing k  and h for the 
standardised cusum. The v-mask is applied to successive values of the upper and lower
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cusums (C^ and C ), as illustrated in figure 2.23.1. The V-mask is placed on the plot 
with A on the last point of and AB parallel to the t axis. If all the previous values 
for lie within the two arms, the process is in control. The process is deemed to be 
out of control if any of the cumulative sums lie outside the arms of the V-mask.
— I— I— I— I— I— I—
Figure 2.2.3.1 example o f V-mask
Barnard and Johnson both suggest techniques for tuning the V-mask, but here the 
procedure described by Montgomery (1996) is preferred. No matter which technique is 
used, some trial and error is necessary until the desired performance is achieved.
Let AB = d , the lead distance; the performance of the V-mask is determined by d 
and 0 , the angle of the arms to the horizontal. The values of k and h are related to 
these values by the formulae:
k = C tan 6 
h = dk
C is the horizontal distance on the V-mask plot between successive points in terms of 
unit distance on the vertical scale. By selecting a constant d , varying 0 will affect the 
performance of the V-mask.
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2.3 Calculation of Flow Rates
Once a transfer has been identified, the flow rate during the transfer has to be 
estimated. Note that this need not be performed in real-time so both optimisation and 
estimators are considered. The choice of algorithm is influenced by the quality of the 
measurement data. If the data is relatively clean or has been pre-filtered for the reasons 
outlined in section 2.1, then a simple averaging algorithm is sufficient. Otherwise, a 
more complex algorithm is required.
2.3.1 Average Flow Rates
Although obvious, the averaging method of flow rate calculation is presented for 
completeness. If the volumes at two time points are known, then the average flow rate 
can be calculated:
/  = (2.5)
where: /  - averaged flow rate
6  - start time of flow 
Vj - volume at start of flow 
- end time of flow 
■ V2 - volume at end of flow
2.3.2 Function Optimisation
The calculation of flow rates can be defined as a function optimisation problem. 
Optimisation problems consist of two components:
• the function to be optimised which has to have either a maximum or a minimum at 
the desired values;
• the optimisation algorithm.
Several numerical methods for optimisation exist; three possibilities are Powell's 
method, the Downhill Simplex method, and simulated annealing.
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For a set of given parameters, the function to be optimised simulates the volume of a 
tank, returning the cumulative sum of the square of the errors between the simulated 
volume and actual volume of the tank i.e.
= ^ n - \  + (y ,^i (2.6)
where: E  -cumulative sum of errors squared
- simulated volume measurements 
Vm - actual volume measurements
If the simulated volume exactly matches the actual volume measurements, then the 
function will be at its minimum value - zero.
The more popular optimisation algorithms such as the Downhill Simplex Method 
(Dantzig 1963 and Nelder & Mead 1965) or direction-set methods, of which Powell’s 
method (Powell 1964 & 1968) is the well-known prototype, are not able to 
differentiate between a local and the global minimum. Therefore the optimisation 
algorithm utilised here is the simulated annealing algorithm (Van Laarhoven 1988 and 
Van Ginneken and Otten 1989) which statistically guarantees an optimal solution (i.e. 
the global minimum is always identified).
Simulated annealing is a method of finding optimum solutions to problems that have a 
large set of solutions, in an analogous fashion to the physical annealing of solids to 
attain minimum energy states. The fundamental idea is to generate a path through the 
solution space, from one solution to another nearby solution, leading ultimately to the 
optimum solution. In generating this path, solutions are chosen from the locality of the 
preceding solution by a probabilistic function of the improvement gained by this 
move. A key element of the simulated annealing algorithm is the Metropolis function 
(Fishman 1996 and Barkema & Newman 1999).
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2.4 State Space Based Methods
Both Kalman filters (Kalman 1960, Kalman and Bucy 1961) and observers 
(Luenberger 1966 and 1977) are dynamic systems whose state variables are the 
estimates of the state of the target system where the Kalman filter can be considered to 
be an optimal observer.
Although Kalman filters can be constructed to undertake input estimation for a tank 
system, the resultant estimate would be inseparable, i.e. the rate of change of the state 
is estimated so that the sum of the flow in and flow out would be estimated. The 
additional effort required to separate the flows and to construct the Kalman filter in the 
first place mean that they are only likely to be used in situations if excessive noise is 
present. Since real data is not available they were not considered any further. There 
may also be problems with computational time and the numerical stability of the 
solution (Chen, 2000).
Although the plant data would be discrete, for convenience, any simulated test data 
was converted to a continuous form via linear interpolation for the analysis. A discrete 
analysis could have been performed, but linear interpolation would still have been 
necessary to ensure a reasonably short interval between solutions.
Observers are used in several different guises in the system tools. The standard state- 
space equation (Friedland 1987) for an observer is:
x + B u + K { y - C x )  (2.7)
Observers are widely used in all aspects of control systems. Throughout the system 
they are used as:
• Estimators
• Components of detectors
The classic application of an observer is as an estimator, so this will not be elaborated 
upon as the majority of control textbooks cover this topic (Friedland 1987, Rugh 
1996). The incorporation of observers into detectors is less well known and so is 
described in some detail.
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The approach described here is a variation of fault detection using observers (Patton et 
al 1989, Viswanadham and Srichander 1987, and Viswanadham and Minto 1988). In 
general, these observer schemes are designed for sensor, actuator and component fault 
detection and isolation in dynamic systems. The important aspect of this work is the 
generation of so-called residuals, i.e. of functions that carry information about the 
faults, and then analysing the residual to see if a fault has occurred.
These philosophies can be modified for use in the safeguards system. The basic idea is 
to generate a residual that remains at a nominal value when the plant is operating as 
expected.
If the residual diverges from its nominal value, then decisions can be made about the 
plant’s operation. For example, consider a simple tank:
where: V  - volume of tank
- measured flow into tank through normal inlet 
/^ - measured flow out of tank through normal outlet 
/  -unmeasured flow through a separate outlet
The observer equation becomes:
- 1]
/ .
+  K ( y - V )  ( 2 .8 )
where: V  -observer estimate of volume
K  - observer gain.
which can be represented as a block diagram (figure 2.4.0.1). If, in normal operation, 
the unmonitored outlet is never used, then the residual (K( V  -  F ) ) is approximately 
zero. However, if material is removed via the unmonitored outlet, the residual
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becomes non-zero as the observer compensates for the unknown flow. This change in 
the residual can then be detected.
The choice of K is dependent upon the performance criteria of the observer and the 
quality of the real data. Therefore the decision of the value of K is left to the 
implementers of the system.
flow in
flow out V olum e
estimate
Volum e
Gain
Figure 2.4.0.1 Block diagram o f tank observer
As plant dynamics are involved, it is unlikely that discontinuities will exist in the plant 
data so K can be of a relatively low value providing the tracking ability of the observer 
is not impaired.
In most instances (like that described above), the observer will the noise on the 
measurement signal during normal operation. To select a suitable value for K, a 
section of noisy data can be input into the observer and K adjusted until the error is 
below an arbitrary value.
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2.5 Identification of Points of Change
Since the detectors only detect after the change has occurred, some method of 
identifying the data point closest to the actual point of change is required. Three 
possible methods for doing so are presented here.
2.5.1 Interception Point of Straight Line Segments
If the volume history can be represented by a series of straight-line segments, then an 
estimate for the points of change will be given by the intercepts of these lines. Using 
the values of m and c from the RLS algorithm, the intercept time is given by:
(2.9)
m ,  -  M r
where: - intercept time
m^,c^ - coefficients of line 1 
^ 2, C2 “ coefficients of line 2
To avoid the ‘real data’ problem (section 1.8),the data point with the time nearest to t, 
should then be selected. A disadvantage of this method is that the estimates for m and 
c will not be immediately available after a point of change has been detected, thus the 
identification of points will lag one point of change behind the detector.
2.5.2 Simulated Annealing Parameter
The function to be optimised by simulated annealing can be written so that an input 
parameter could be the time at which a change in flow rate occurs. Thus the optimised 
solution would contain an estimate for the time of change. Again the data point nearest 
to this time should be selected.
2.5.3 Rectangle Search
Although outwardly simple, it appears that the algorithm proposed here is 
unpublished. The rectangle search is only suitable for buffer tanks where the volume is 
constant before and after a transfer. The point at which the change is detected is shown
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as point E in (figure 2.5.3.1). A rectangle (ABCD) is constructed around point E with 
two of its vertices being data points Ar from E (A and C in the figure).
Figure 2.5.3 J  Illustration o f rectangle search
If the data points are at A and C, the transfer is into the tank. If BE > ED, then point A 
represents the start of the transfer. Otherwise point C represents the end of the transfer.
Similarly, if the data points are at B and D, the transfer is out of the tank. If CE > AE 
then point D represents the end of the transfer. Otherwise point B represents the start 
of the transfer.
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CHAPTER 3 
VOLUME MEASUREMENT ANALYSIS
3.0 Introduction
In this chapter, the tools developed to analyse the volume measurements from buffer 
and feeding/receiving tanks are described. The tools share a common kernel of 
components, only when calculating the flow rates do they significantly differ. As the 
analysis of the flow rates is performed on a per cycle basis (Section 1.5), the
opportunity is taken to detect short-term anomalies. The three sub-sections of this 
chapter are:
1 . calculation of flow rates;
2 . detection of short-term disagreements;
3. diagnosis of short-term disagreements.
A separate tool was developed to extract the volumetric flow rates from buffer tanks 
and feeding/receiving tanks. The detection and diagnostic tools are similar for both 
types of tank.
With reference to section 1.6, this chapter contributes activity 1 in its entirety, the 
analysis of volume measurements using inverse modelling. It also contributes towards 
activities 3 and 4, the short-term disagreement detection and diagnosis activities. Of 
these contributions, all are original.
3.1 Analysis Strategy
With no diversions taking place, two types of error can exist when simulating a tank 
using inverse modelled flow rates:
• Transient: where the total volume of liquor transferred is correct, but the 
duration of the flow is in error.
• Residual: where the total volume of liquor transferred is in error.
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Obviously, residual errors must be minimised otherwise the simulated plant will 
diverge from the real plant in a short space of time. However, the complete elimination 
of residual errors is not possible, hence the need for the redistribution tool. (Section
1.5.2.4).
Residual errors exist because of inaccuracies in the estimation of the total volume 
transferred during a transfer. There are two principal causes of transient errors. The 
first, and most likely cause, is that the system is fitting straight lines to transfers that 
‘taper’ asymptotically. The second is that the spikes are another feature of the inverse 
modelling process.
The system can be considered to be macroscopic in nature because minute by minute 
accuracy is not required. Thus the existence of transient errors in short duration flow 
estimates can be tolerated. However, transient errors must be minimised in the 
estimation of continuous flow rates because any error in the continuous flow rate will 
result in an incorrect plutonium concentration estimate in the propagation simulation 
because of its affect on the process stage simulations.
3.2 Detection Strategy
The short-term diversion detection strategy also influences the design of the tools.
Two possible signals may be used to detect disagreements, the first of which is the 
flow rate itself because this is usually maintained constant. The second is the short­
term simulation error ( e  = V  - V  ). The production of relevant residual signals for 
detection is an important design factor for the volume analysis tools.
The importance of there being no transient errors in the continuous flow estimate has 
already been discussed. The average continuous volumetric flow rate can be estimated 
over the period of time when batches are not transferred. If it can be assumed that the 
plant is operating steadily then they can be assumed to be constant for the duration of 
the batch flow. This assumption is verified by simultaneously monitoring the non­
active feeds into the process stage upstream of the receipt tank or monitoring the 
metering device out of a feed tank.
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Using an observer, the corrections required to this average flow rate so that it 
‘matches’ the volume profile are estimated. This correction signal can then be 
examined to see if there are any flows that may be indicative of an unauthorised 
movement of material.
Volumetric batch flow rate estimates are tolerant of transient errors and are easily 
obtained. In a three tank set comprising of receiving, buffer, and feeding tanks, there 
are two possible volumes that can be used to estimate the batch transfers: the export 
from one tank and the corresponding import into the next. It is preferable to use those 
estimates obtained by analysing the buffer tank volume as the analysis is simplified 
and it avoids compounding the errors in the short-term simulation.
In a buffer tank, since the flows used in the simulation will ‘match’ the volume profile, 
any simulation errors will be due to unauthorised transfers of material during the quiet 
periods. Thus diversions during batch transfers will result in errors in the feeding or 
receiving tank. It is anticipated that any diversion that overlaps a batch transfer will be 
visible in either or both the signals.
3.3 Flow Rate Estimation
In this section, the tools developed to estimate the volumetric import and export flows 
of both buffer and feeding/receiving tanks are described. These tools are constructed 
from the components outlined in Chapter 2. Note that since a feeding tank is 
essentially a reversed receiving tank, a single tool was developed for both.
Each tool is constructed from four components, the functions of which are:
1. Estimation of volume.
2. Detection of points of change.
3. Identification of points of change.
4. Calculation of flow rates.
Whenever a change is detected, the detector has to be suspended for a short period of 
time to allow the volume estimate to stabilise.
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3.3.1 Buffer Tanks
This tool has been developed to estimate the volumetric import and export flows of 
buffer tanks. Estimation is based upon the changes in volume as material is 
transferred. This is a simple procedure if the transfer is to or from a buffer tank as 
opposed to a feeding/receiving tank. It remains a simple procedure if the duration of 
the transfer to/from a feeding/receiving tank is always relatively small. Note the 
emphasis is on the word ‘always’ since this is an operational decision. If this is not the 
case then a different approach is required; the development of which would require 
access to real plant data. Therefore this additional development work is outside the 
scope of this thesis.
The automatic estimation of a change in volume may not be that simple: noise might 
be present on the volume measurements and the transfer might ‘taper’ asymptotically 
(i.e. take a long time to finish). This would cause problems in ensuring that residual 
errors are minimised. Therefore it is unlikely that the most appropriate algorithm can 
be specified without reference to actual plant data. However, a data compression tool 
based upon these algorithms was shown to be adequate when applied to real 
measurement data from a product storage area (Appendix 1). The algorithm presented 
here was developed to analyse the simulated plant data and should be close to what is 
required.
3.3.1.1 Tool Design
The tool consists of four elements whose functions were outlined in the introduction to 
section 3.3. An RLS estimate of the volume is produced to filter the ‘noise’. This 
estimate is delayed slightly to improve the detection of abrupt changes. Suitable 
change detectors are the V-mask or the Modified Shewhart Control Chart (MSCC). 
Both are equal in terms of performance although the MSCC is preferred on the basis 
of its simple design and tuning process.
Having detected the points (which, are necessarily after the change has occurred) it is 
necessary to identify start and stop volumes and the duration of the flow. The 
rectangle search (Section 2.5.3) is ideal as it can be tuned to ensure that a volume 
before and after the flow is selected. The accuracy of the time period is not so
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important as transient errors can be tolerated. The flow rate can then be found by 
averaging. If there is a desire to minimise transient errors, an observer could be 
designed to correct the estimated flow rates. The design of this observer would be 
similar to that discussed in Section 2.4. It is doubtful that the added complexity would 
bring any extra benefit.
Note that this tool is designed for operation in real-time, the calculation of the flow 
rates does not take place until a ‘transfer pair’ has been found.
3.3.1.2 Tool Performance
Figure 3.3.1.1 shows the start and end points of the volume transfers identified by the 
tool (denoted by a asterisk) superimposed on the volume measurement record of the 
buffer tank that was analysed. Figure 3.3.1.2 shows the simulation error of a normal 
plant for 2000 minutes. Note that transient errors exist, only the residual errors have 
been minimised. The performance of the tool meets the requirements outlined earlier.
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Figure 3.3.1.1 Start and end points o f volume transfers identified by tool
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Figure 3.3.1.2 Simulation error, buffer tank 
3.3.2 Estimation of Continuous flow rates.
This tool has been developed to estimate the continuous flow in feeding or receiving 
tanks. The estimate for the continuous flow rate into a tank (for a receiving tank) or 
out of a tank (for a feeding tank) is obtained by observing changes in its volume. This 
tool would operate in conjunction with the previous tool developed for buffer tanks, 
which would estimate the batch transfers, in the same tank. If metering device outputs 
were available on the continuous flow lines, this data could be used instead.
Again the tool consists of the four distinct parts described in the introduction to 
Section 3.3, which when combined estimate the flow rate. The first two parts are 
similar to those of the buffer tank tool: a RLS estimate to filter the ‘noise’ from the 
measurements and either a V-mask or MSCC to detect changes in the RLS estimate. 
The mode of operation of the detector differs slightly in this tool from that previously 
described. The detector is not only used to detect the points of change but also to 
identify the individual fill/empty cycles from the detected points. The first two parts 
operate continuously in real-time; the final two stages are invoked once a cycle for 
reasons that will be explained later.
The description here is for a receiving tank. The equations for a feeding tank would be 
very similar. Let the volume in the tank, at any time f , b e l / , the flow rate in be
and the flow rate out be . Then:
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dV
V d t = A , -  / »  (3 .1 )
Over a single cycle it is normal for the flow rate into the tank to remain fairly constant 
so that, without loss of generality,
//„ =«i+A /i„(0  (3.2)
where a. is a constant over the cycle i. The output is a batch transfer:
f 0 ; ? otherwise
|«„„,(0 ; ( :  ^ ^
where . and . are the times that the i‘*^ transfer commences and finishes. The 
purpose of the tool is to estimate , the out flow rate can also be obtained, but it
is surplus to requirements because its estimation is less complicated from the adjoining 
buffer tank.
3.3.2.1 Estimation of oc;
The constant flow rate, a . , is only estimated whilst is assumed to be zero, it is 
assumed to remain constant when is not equal to zero. Therefore, the key points of 
the cycle are ._i (some time after the previous batch transfer has stopped), . (the 
time at which the current batch transfer commences), and . (the time at which the 
current batch transfer ends). In practice, a slightly later time tf. is identified (Figure
3.3.2.1).
48
550 :
500
450
400
350
g  3 00
250
200
150
100
50
500 600 700 800  
Time, m inutes
900 1000 1100
Figure 33.2.1 Filllempty cycle
There are several methods to estimate a. over the time period t : r \  . The
simplest method, averaging, is crude but effective. The flow rate is simply the gradient 
between some data point after and another data point some time before (J. and
, when it is fairly certain that the batch transfer isn’t taking place. This method 
produces satisfactory estimates.
A more sophisticated method avoids making this assumption by estimating parameters 
a . ,  f3 and . over the time period t : , where
F ,dt
Qli -  ^sj )
i.e. an average flow rate out, (3, is assumed for the small time period t : .
The volume tank model is then solved to provide volume measurements, V , that can 
be compared with the measurements taken from the tank. Estimation is achieved by 
choosing those parameters (fin, fout, and tsj) that minimise the square of the cumulative 
sum of the differences:
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'A -Errsum = \ ( V i  -  Vi ) (3.5)
1=1
Simulated annealing is used to optimise these parameters. An estimate for gout could 
then be obtained by numerical differentiation if so desired.
3.3.2.2 Estimation of Afin(t)
Having obtained estimates for a. and (from the buffer tank tool), A/,.„ ( t ) , the
correction term of the continuous flow in can be estimated. An observer is an ideal 
estimator in this instance. The observer equation is:
^ ÿ d t = < = ^ , - L „ + K ( ÿ - V )  (3.6)
where: K (V  - V )  = A/".,, (t)
a  I - constant term of continuous flow rate 
- batch flow out estimate
V - volume measurement
V - volume estimate
The block diagram for this observer is shown in figure 3.3.2.1. Since a. is the 
averaged constant flow rate over cycle i , A/^ .„ (t) can be examined for short-term 
disagreements during the time period t : ..
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Figure 3.3.2.1 Observer for estimating Afn(t)
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3.3.2.3 Tool Performance
Figures 3.S.2.2 to 3.3.2.5 show the output of the tool when a normally operated 
receiving tank is analysed.
Figure 33.2.2 ai estimate (l/min)
- 0.02
-0.04
-0 .06
-0 .08
Figure 3.3.2.3 A fin (t) estimate (Umin)
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Figure 3.3.2 A  fin estimate (Hmin)
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Figure 33.2.5 Simulation error signal (litres)
The transient spikes in Figure 3.3.2,5 are due to the mismatch between the batch 
transfer estimated by the buffer tank tool and the actual flow. As these errors are 
transient (the net effect is zero), they can be ignored.
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3.4 Short-term Disagreement Detection
As explained in section 3.2, two signals are monitored for possible disagreements:
1. The estimate of the correction to the continuous flow rate.
2. The short-term simulation error signal for feeding/receiving tanks for 
disagreements in batch transfer estimates.
3. The short-term simulation error signal for disagreements that occur when 
there are no normal movements on a buffer tank.
As all of these signals are time-series of mean zero, a suitably tuned standardised 
cumulative sum is an appropriate detector.
The tolerances of the cusum were set sufficiently large so that the desired level of 
sensitivity was obtained. The detectors extract the ‘start’ and ‘stop’ times and the time 
history pertaining to the incident. Once a disagreement has been detected, a sub-event 
is created to represent the disagreement.
3.5 Short-term Disagreement Diagnosis
There are only three possible explanations for negative changes in the continuous flow 
rate: Three possible explanations for changes in the continuous flo .v rate are:
1. liquor has been transferred to hidden inventory (i.e. removed from the tank);
2. the acid molarity and the Pu concentration have changed simultaneously;
3. the unspecified component and Pu concentration have changed simultaneously.
Simultaneous actions might be required to satisfy both volume and density 
measurements.
To diagnose short-term disagreements, a set of observers is invoked concurrently to 
quantify the three possible solutions by analysing the time history extracted by the 
detector. Further observers can be added to expand the possible explanations for the 
disagreement. Descriptions and scores can then be attached to each of the three
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possibilities, which are then attached to the sub-event as diagnoses. The transfer to 
hidden inventory is chosen preferentially as it is a single parameter solution.
Similarly there are four possible explanations for disagreements in the short-term 
simulation error:
1. liquor has been transferred to hidden inventory (i.e. removed from the tank);
2. plutonium nitrate solution of similar concentration has been added to the tank;
3. plutonium nitrate solution of dissimilar concentration has been added to the 
tank;
4. acid has been added to the tank.
Again, descriptions and scores can then be attached to each of these possibilities, 
which are then attached to the sub-event as diagnoses. The transfer to hidden inventory 
is chosen preferentially as it is a single parameter solution, especially as the others are 
not physically meaningful if material is leaving the tank.
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CHAPTER 4 
DENSITY MEASUREMENT ANALYSIS
4.0 Introduction
In this chapter the tools developed to analyse the density measurements are described. 
The system is designed to propagate the plutonium through the plant using a 
simulation. The start point of the simulation is the input accountancy tank where the 
composition of the liquor is known, the individual components can be traced through 
the plant to the first process stage (cycle 1). This can be achieved by adding mass 
balances pertaining to acid, uranium and unspecified (for all other components) to the 
simulation. In theory, plutonium concentration can now be confirmed by comparing 
the density calculated on the basis of Equation 1.4 with the density measurements. A 
similar process can be applied after the first cycle, and so on, provided that the 
composition of the liquor can be assumed at the start of each set of tanks.
Unfortunately the composition of liquor exported by a cycle (i.e. imported into the 
receiving tank) is unlikely to be known accurately for various operational reasons. It is 
therefore difficult to attribute fluctuations in density to fluctuations in plutonium 
concentration because density might fluctuate as a result of changes in the 
concentrations of any of the other components of the liquor. As a consequence of this 
detection must be relatively insensitive and diagnosis must accommodate the various 
possibilities.
With reference to section 1.6, this chapter contributes activity 2 in its entirety, the 
analysis of density measurements using inverse modelling. It also contributes towards 
activities 3 and 4, the short-term disagreement detection and diagnosis activities. Of 
these contributions, all are original.
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4.1 Density Measurement
Before describing the tools, it is important to appreciate that density measurements are 
just that. At a given temperature (T), the density , of any solution, which is likely to
be present, can be calculated on the basis of a correlation like Equation 1.4, which is 
repeated here:
, .  ^ -, Equivalent terms associated ^ ^
(T ) =  P j ^ ( T ’)  +  (T )[P w ] +  (T )[- ff+ ] +  with other elem ents (4.1)
Where: p,^ (T) - density of water (g/1)
[jPm] - Pu concentration (g/1)
[Ff+] - Acid molarity (mol/1) 
cCp,XT) & «//+(?’) - coefficients
For the purpose of the analysis, a shortened version of this equation is used to 
accommodate the fact that many of the individual components are not known. An 
additional term, (T)[Unsp] , is introduced to represent the contribution to the
density of the liquor of these unspecified components. The density correlation is now: 
PÂT)  = p„Çr) + a,„{T)[Pu] + a„^(T)[H+] + a,„,,^{T)[Ur,sp] (4.2)
At a temperature of 25 degrees Celsius, and with no unspecified components in the 
liquor, the density correlation is evaluated to be (Howell and Scothem, 1995):
p , = 997.02+ 1.47[Fn] + 34[F/+] (4.3)
Thus if the Pu concentration is known from the propagation simulation, the acid 
molarity can be estimated.
If the liquor density, acid molarity, unspecified concentration, and temperature of the 
liquor are known then the concentration of plutonium can be obtained. However if
57
only a density measurement is available, and without making any further assumptions, 
the individual components cannot be estimated separately.
The inseparable nature of the liquor constituents means that the term X is introduced 
to denote this fact:
P.(7’) = P .(7 ’) + 2r (4.4)
Changes in X are indicative that one or more of the components of the liquor are 
changing.
The tool consists of three components:
1. Estimation of process stage output X concentration
2. Detection of changes in X concentration
3. Diagnosis of changes in X concentration.
4.2 Analysis Tools
4.2.1 Estimation of Process Stage output X concentration
The function of this sub-tool is to estimate the X concentration of the import flow into 
the receiving tank. The mass of X in the receiving tank is given by:
”  A " “ (4 5)
where: Mx  - the mass of X in the tank (g)
fx^  ^ - the flow of X into the tank (g/min)
- the flow of X out of the tank (g/min)
As the liquor within the tank can be assumed to homogeneous, the X concentration of
the export flow of the tank is equal to the X concentration of the tank itself and so the
above equation can be rearranged as:
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= (4.6)
where: Mx - the mass of X in the tank (g)
- volumetric flow into tank (l/min)
- volumetric flow out of tank (l/min)
- X concentration into tank (g/1)
X^f^-X  concentration in tank (g/1)
The density of X in the tank can be obtained from the density and temperature 
measurements, and so it follows that the mass of X in the tank is relatively easy to 
obtain. Both the volumetric import and export flows are available from the tools
described in Chapter 3. Using the above equations, the X concentration can be
estimated using an observer:
%  = K { M x - M x ) -  f „ , [X „] (4.7)
where: K{M  x -  M  x ) /  ^
/  J  in
M  X  -measured mass of X in the tank 
M  X -estimated mass of X in the tank :
The block diagram for this observer is shown in figure 4.2.1.
4.2.2 X Concentration Disagreement Detector
In normal operation, the X density exported by the process stage remains close to a 
constant value with minor fluctuations e.g. slop on the outflow from the cycle or minor 
variations in the solvent feed concentration. The detector has to ignore these minor 
deviations and alarm when a major incident occurs. An appropriate detector is the 
standardised cumulative sum.
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The tolerances of the cusum were set sufficiently large so that the desired level of 
insensitivity was obtained. The detector extracts the ‘start’ and ‘stop’ times and the 
time history pertaining to the incident. It then creates a sub-event to represent the 
disagreement.
4.2.3 Diagnosis
As illustrated in section 4.1, fluctuations in density may be caused by fluctuations in 
the concentration of any of the components of the liquor. The concentrations of all 
three components (plutonium, acid, and unspecified) are known before the incident 
occurs. Therefore, by ‘freezing’ two of the components, the change required in the 
third component to produce the fluctuation in density could be estimated.
The three equations required, obtained by rearranging the standard density correlation, 
are:
rr, H {T)[unsp][fw] =------------------   (4-8)
(^ )[^ “ ] -  {T)[unsp]
These three diagnostic tools can be invoked concurrently. Descriptions and scores can 
then be attached to each of the three possibilities. These possibilities are then attached 
to the sub-event as diagnoses.
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Figure 4.2.1 X  in concentration observer
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CHAPTER 5 
MODEL BASED REASONING
5.0 Introduction
Having completed the analysis of the volume and density measurements, all the 
information required by the system for it to provide medium-term assurances is now 
available. The detection and evaluation of disagreements over the medium-term is 
different because the emphasis is on the development of a gradual mismatch between 
the predicted and measured material distribution.
An initial estimate of the plutonium distribution within the plant can be obtained by 
propagating material through the plant from the inlet accountancy tank using a 
simulation. There will always be a gradual mismatch between the predicted 
distribution and the measured inventory, even when the plant is operating normally. A 
gradual mismatch can derive from:
1. flow rate estimation errors;
2. measurement biases;
3. a plant incident.
The term redistribution is then used to describe the process of moving plutonium 
around the plant simulation so that it predicts that measured. Other plant information is 
required to choose which of the above has caused this redistribution.
To compensate for this gradual divergence, and at the same time, to be in a position to 
detect and diagnose an event that occurs gradually, the entire plant is analysed as one. 
That is the focus is macroscopic rather than microscopic. The reason for this is that the 
amount of material involved during a gradual event is negligible when analysed on a 
per cycle basis. Only when the plant is examined as a whole over a long period of time 
does the gradual divergence become apparent. To achieve an agreement, a tool is 
required to redistribute plutonium over time.
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Measurement biases can affect both the flow rate estimates and the comparison 
directly. Having obtained estimates for the biases the difficulty then is to decide 
whether a new ‘mismatch’ is due to a change in biases or either of the other two 
options. If the inspectors have confidence in the accuracy of the bias estimates, i.e. the 
system has established a record of good performance and if the redistribution is 
relatively large, then the redistribution would be attributed to real movements. 
However, for the plant operators, the possibility of the existence of a bias is the 
preferred explanation for a medium-term disagreement. Supporting evidence should 
also be taken into consideration, such as the recent replacement or re-calibration of 
instrumentation.
With reference to section 1.6, this chapter contributes activities 5,6, and 7, of which all 
are original. This chapter is split into three sections: the first section describes the 
models of the plant used within the system; the second describes the method 
developed for the estimation of gross systematic multiplicative biases; the 
redistribution and medium-term detection and diagnosis tools are described in the final 
section.
5.1 Plant Models
The chemical separation area is not modelled as a whole for reasons of computational
simplicity. The process stages provide natural boundaries at which to separate the
plant into segments comprising of tank-sets or process stages. Each segment is
simulated separately and comprises of one or more discrete units with zero-inventory
connections. If, on the real plant, the assumption of zero-inventory pipe models is felt 
to be inadequate, then simple pipe inventory models could be included. The outputs of
the individual simulations are combined before being analysed as a whole.
Two types of models exist, one for tanks and one for process stages. Process stages are 
also known as ‘hidden inventories’ as their plutonium inventories are unmeasured.
5.1.1 Tank Models
The tank model is composed of a number of material balances like:
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dM
= (5.1)
where: M - mass of Pu in the tank (grams)
- volumetric flow into the tank (1/min)
“ volumetric flow out of the tank (1/min)
{Pu\i - Pu concentration of inlet (g/1)
[Pm] - Pu concentration of tank (g/1)
All of the tank models are based upon similar material balances. More complicated 
models are available, Howell & Scothem (1995), but again this is an implementation 
issue.
5.1.2 Process Stage Models
The choice of process stage model is again an implementation issue. From a 
safeguard’s point of view, it is important to appreciate that the models are only needed 
to predict the Pu inventory within the individual stages and to predict the 
concentrations of Pu leaving the process stage. The units are fed from, and output to, 
tanks which ‘smooth’ out short-term fluctuations. Therefore, the system does not 
require accurate dynamic estimates of the operational status of individual locations 
within the process stage. However, more accurate models may be used, but the extra 
benefit the added complexity will bring is difficult to determine.
The solvent extraction cycle is based on the steady state follower approach. This 
model involves the formation of pairs of equations, the first to accommodate changes 
in the process flow sheet and the second to accommodate deviations from the nominal 
inventory value. The model of the plutonium inventory is thus:
x d l = (5.2)
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where: - nominal Pu inventory of cycle (grams)
I  - current Pu inventory of cycle (grams)
T - time constant of cycle
- Pu inventory of hidden inventory (grams)
- volumetric flow into the cycle (1/min) 
font “ volumetric flow out of the cycle (1/min)
[Pm].,, - Pu concentration of inlet (g/1)
\P^\ui ~ Pti concentration of outlet (g/1)
The time constant of the process stage, x, is determined during commissioning, and 
need only be known approximately. A similar pair of equations is used to model the 
uranium inventory in the first solvent extraction cycle. If the plant is assumed to be 
operating in accordance with the flow sheet, then the rate of change of the deviation 
inventory is zero. Thus the model now becomes:
J out
Therefore, the flow rate of plutonium leaving the cycle can be calculated provided that 
the volumetric flow rate out is in accordance with the flow sheet. Otherwise, the first 
pair of equations needs to be solved. A similar approach holds for uranium. In the 
absence of a more sophisticated estimator, Candy & Rozsa (1980), a similar model can 
be adopted for the concentrator.
5.1.3 Distribution Model
Having obtained the estimates for the inter-tank volume transfers, it is a 
straightforward task to distribute the plutonium throughout the plant using a suitable 
simulation. The preferred simulation has both volume and Pu balances, but the 
implementers may wish to include other balances, e.g. mass of acid.
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The volumetric flow rate and plutonium concentration of the flow into the first tank of 
the plant is known from the accountancy vessel upstream. Thus it is a straightforward 
task to simulate the flow of material through the first tank set to the first process stage. 
It is assumed that the inventory of the all the process stages is made available by the 
operators, so the plutonium concentration output by the process stage can be 
calculated.
The simulation continues on through the next set of tanks and so on until the final tank 
has been reached. The export flow and plutonium concentration of the final tank is 
known from the product accountancy tank.
5.2 Estimation of Gross Systematic Multiplicative Biases
Modelling and identifying gross errors in process data is established in both steady- 
state and dynamic systems. For steady-state systems, several methods based upon 
linear data-reconciliation have been proposed. These methods are known as the ‘global 
test’ (Reilly and Carpani, 1963), the ‘nodal test’ (Reilly and Carpani, 1963; Mah et al., 
1976), the ‘measurement test’ (Mah and Tamhane, 1982; Crowe et al., 1983), 
‘generalised likelihood ratios’ (Narasimhan and Mah, 1987), etc. The situation is 
somewhat different for dynamic systems, the application of data-reconciliation is still 
in its infancy (Liebman et al., 1992; Sistu et al., 1993).
Those schemes that have been developed for dynamic systems (Bagajewicz and Jiang, 
1998; Sanchez et al., 1999; Albuquerque and Biegler; 1996) are reliant upon the 
availability of measured flow rate variables or flow sheets for the plant. Another 
drawback is that all the measurements required for the application to be successful 
must be available. This is not the case with reprocessing plants.
A general method is proposed for isolating and estimating gross biases by analysing 
the predicted movements of both bulk and nuclear material over time. The foundation 
for the method is based on an examination of how a bias would affect the flow rate 
calculations for either a buffer or feed/receipt tank, and how these biases therefore 
affect tank volume predictions over time. Equations can be derived to show how these 
predictions would diverge from the volume measurements and how biases would 
cause the predicted plutonium inventory in the product accountancy tank to diverge
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from that measured. Given these understandings, a method is then proposed to solve 
the inverse: ‘if disagreements are observed between measurements and predictions, 
what are the biases?’
For simplicity the description is based on a three tank-set comprising of a receipt tank, 
a buffer tank, and a feed tank. In the plant model, the estimates for the short duration 
transfers from the buffer tank analysis are utilised. Reference is made to other types of 
tank-sets where appropriate.
The following subscript convention is used throughout the analysis. An identifier, ‘b ’, 
‘f’, or ‘r’ denotes the type of tank (buffer, feed, or receipt). This identifier maybe 
followed by a number if more than one of that type of tank exists in the tank set. For 
example, Vb2 refers to the volume of buffer tank number two.
5.2.1 Affects of Gross Multiplicative Biases on the Plant
If the tank measurements are biased, then this will bias the transfer estimates and 
hence the model of how nuclear material is progressing through the plant. The 
estimation of biases that affect the density measurements is not as important to the 
overall performance of the system. The effect of a biased density measurement will be 
to over or underestimate the acid concentration input to a receipt tank. If only one 
tank is estimated, its effect will be fairly transparent so that the bias can be isolated 
and estimated in a straightforward manner; if not, estimation is more complicated.
5.2.1.1 Buffer Tanks
Consider some arbitrary operational cycle, Æ,ofa  buffer tank: in the beginning the 
tank has initial volume V l , is then filled to volume V jj . Sometime later, the tank is 
emptied from volume V f  to volume V f . If these volumes are measured, and these 
measurements are subject to a multiplicative bias, , which is assumed to be constant 
over the time period of the analysis, then the total volume input and output during 
cycle ^ (/* & E^)  can be estimated as:
h  = V';(1 + e , ) - v l (1 + £,) . / , +  (5,5)
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Ëu =V^ Hi  ^+ e , ) - V l { l  + e ,)  = E, + e ,E ,  (5.6)
These equations do not take into consideration any other direct additions/withdrawals 
of liquor. It is assumed that the system would account for these activities. If 
evaporation is assumed toy/nsignificant and if any sampling results in a relatively small 
change in volume then, assuming the estimates for7^  & are accurate:
V l = V l ^ I , - E ,  (5.7)
If, over a period of time, the buffer tank performs N fill/empty cycles then:
N  ^  N  N
Total input = Y  7]^  = Y  7^  + E;, Y  (5.8)
N ^  N  N
Total Output ==^Ef^  ^^ ^  (5.9)
5.2.1.2 Receipt/feed Tanks
A receipt/feed tank either import continuously and export in batches or vice versa. The 
analysis presented here is for a receipt tank, the analysis for a feed tank is similar. For 
a single cycle, k , over the period of time (f% , to ) when the output batch is not
transferred, the average continuous volumetric flow rate, ^ , can be estimated on the 
basis of the volume measurements recorded (subjected to multiplicative bias a^):
- dV ' dV dV
h -  h . )  = (5.10)
h.s
As the batch volume input/output is estimated on the observed changes in the buffer 
tank, the continuous flow rate can now be estimated over the entire fill/empty cycle 
(h,s to h,f  )• The ‘true’ volume at the end of a cycle is given by:
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dV,
K , + (5 11)
And the estimated volume at the end of the cycle is given by:
K,=y,-^hh.,-hj-Ë,  (5.12)
Which can be re-arranged to:
dV dV
K ,  = K. + f - ^ d t  + f - ^ d t  - E , -  e ,E ,  (5.13)
‘k ,s  h . s
Note the re-arranged equation distinguishes between the two errors because the biases 
pertain to different tanks. The equation can be extended to multiple fill/empty cycles 
(over the time period to tj-, the duration of N  cycles) using the equations for total
input and output from the buffer tank analysis:
For a feed tank, this equation is:
.  'w y ,  ‘^ d v ,
\  (5-15)
 ^ dt d dt
5.2.1.3 Tank-set bias equations
Volume estimates derived on the basis of the above are now compared with the 
measured volumes over a number of cycles. For a tank-set composed of three tanks, 
the disagreements would be as follows:
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‘LdV ^
Receipt tank: 5 , = R,, -  V,, = (V,, - K, ) -  + £» V
Buffer tank: 6^ = = 0
Feed tank: ôj- = (Y/^ - y ^ )  + e ^ J —^ d t  “ ^ 7
(5.16)
(5.17) 
0x18)
Consider the receipt tank, if either or e,, »  then the measured and estimated
final volumes will diverge in time. A similar situation arises for feed tanks. Note also 
that a bias in the buffer tank will affect both the feed and receipt tank equations, but 
not the equation for the buffer tank. If all the biases are similar, there will be no 
increase. An additional procedure has to be included to accommodate this eventuality.
It is important to appreciate that there are only certain instances when V  can be 
estimated sensibly because of the assumptions about the continuous flow rates, 
evaporation etc. This limits the number of ‘points of disagreement’ that are available 
for the analysis.
If only a single set of measurements were available for a three tank-set then:
(5 19)
where:
■0/ l'y - y  1'/ 7 = AD^
C/_
A =
7>3 =
-1  1 0 
0 -1  1
g. 0 0
0 g, 0
0 0 g/
Sh = y . Y
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‘LdV
7 - 7, )
Biases in other tank sets can be modelled in the same way. For instance for a four 
tank-set composed of three buffer tanks (61,62,63) and a feed tank ( /  ), where the 
first tank receives the input accountancy flow, the model becomes:
A , ' •_1 0 0 ' '
^ h 3 = 1 -1 0 ^ h 3
0 1 -1
(5.20)
If transfers from the input accountancy tank are accurately known and the flow rate 
estimate out of tank b l and into tank b2 is based on V^ 2 ^nd so on. The equivalent
matrix A  is square because the equation pertaining to the first buffer tank only refers 
to one bias because the input accountancy tank multiplicative bias is assumed to be 
negligible. It is then a straightforward calculation to estimate .
5.2.1.4 The Entire Plant
For the purposes of this analysis, the concentrator and solvent extraction cycles can be 
viewed as transformers with physical inventories:
dM Pu
dt
(5.21)
where [] denotes a concentration and /  a flow. The outlet conditions are estimated on 
the basis of knowledge of the instantaneous nominal inventory, M  ^ {t):
dM I 
dt -frlPi‘]r-fAPul (5.22)
If either or both of the flow rate estimates are derived from biased volume 
measurements, then:
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[ P u l --------------^ ^ ----- —  (5.23)
(! + £,)■
dt
Therefore the plutonium concentration out will be over or underestimated depending 
on the relative values of the feed and receipt tank biases. This over/underestimate will 
be propagated downstream of the cycle, possibly being compounded because of errors 
in other feed/receipt tanks.
The error will be detected when the material reaches the product accountancy tank 
because material transfers are measured at this KMP. That is the physical inventory 
estimate for this tank will continue to rise or fall because of the biased estimate in 
plutonium concentration:
dM ^  ^
= y  M X ,  (5.24)
Thus the residual for the product accountancy tank is an important
indicator of one or more biased tanks upstream.
5.2.2 Identifying the gross biases
To identify the gross biases, a systematic search procedure is used. The biases are 
estimated on the bias of equations like those in section 5.2.1.3.
Starting at the product accountancy tank, the gross biases for each tank-set are 
estimated one tank-set at a time. Any biases that are estimated are used immediately to 
revise the plutonium concentration downstream of the tank-set. This results in a new
value of the residual (M^„ for the product accountancy tank.
The residual is a key indicator as to the status of the analysis. If, at any stage, the 
residual deviates significantly from zero, then either the biases in the current tank-set 
have been estimated incorrectly or the problem lies in a tank-set downstream of that 
being analysed.
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A disadvantage of this method is that the residual is only one variable and it can be 
affected by biases in a number of different tanks. Additional information can be 
obtained by repeating the analysis on plant data collected subsequently, and by taking 
samples in ‘suspect’ tank-sets. This allows the comparison of the models with the 
‘true’ throughput of the tank-set.
The method used to estimate the biases is dependent upon the status of matrix A . The 
matrix A may be defined, over-defined or under-defined. Solving for anything other 
than an under-defined A matrix is simple. If matrix A is square and invertible
(i.e. AGR'" : rank (A) = m ), then the equation can simply be solved if D = D .
If A is over-defined (i.e. AG R "' *R" ,m  > n : rank{A) = n), then linear regression is 
an appropriate method for solving for the biases. Linear regression for w sets of 
measurements, is based on the following equation:
where X
AD,
AD..
e = {X'^C~^XY'X'^C-^
A '
Ô3.1
a,'
A.
(5.25)
and C is the measurement covariance matrix, which is diagonal
and contains elements where is the random error.
The assumption that D = D can then be ameliorated by incorporating the bias 
estimates into the simulation to obtained a revised D , which can then be used to 
produce revised bias estimates and so on until convergence.
Otherwise A is under-defined and any attempt to perform linear regression would 
result in a singularity because the solutions are not unique. Instead only those biases
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that are likely to be significantly in error are identified and incorporated into the 
equations, on which linear regression may take place.
Consider a three tank-set, larger tank sets can be treated in the same way, but the 
analysis presented here is for a three tank-set. There exist seven possible combinations 
of gross biases ({ e j ,{ £ j ,{ £ ^ }  {e,.,£j,{e,.,£^},{e;,,e^}and the last of
which leads to singularity. Thus the combination of results in non-unique
solutions which require a different approach from those combinations that result in 
unique solutions. The aim is to identify those sub-sets that are likely to contain gross 
biases.
S.2.2.2 Under-defined A  matrix -  unique solutions
The algorithm is based on qualitative reasoning (Forbus (1984) and De Kleer &
Brown (1984)), which is applied to matrix A  and hence to only one set of 
measurements i.e. one disagreement per tank.
A gross bias is defined as a bias that results in a significant disagreement. A tolerance 
is set for each tank, and a gross bias is deemed to exist if the modulus of the 
disagreement exceeds this tolerance. The disagreement can then be classified as either 
+ve (i.e. the disagreement > tolerance), -ve (i.e. the disagreement < tolerance), or null 
(i.e. no disagreement).
If each bias in turn is taken to be non-gross, matrix A  becomes square and thus 
invertible. Each of these three inverses can now be applied to the qualitative vector of 
disagreements on the basis of the quantitative/qualitative product operator defined in 
table 5.2.2.1. This results to the three sets of results shown in table 5.2.2.2. Note that 
‘u ’ means undefined whilst ‘uO’ means that although it is undefined, it is most likely to 
be zero. Similarly, a ‘u+’ means that although it is undefined, it is most likely to be 
positive.
Adopting the format the sub-sets are then {e^,e^,0},
{0, , £ y } together with {£,.,0,£y}''{£,,£,,,0} ''{0,£,,,£y}, where is applied along
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the three elements pertaining to and so on. For example, if both disagreements 
(6,. and <5y ) are positive, then {-,0,+}, {-,-,0}, and {0,+,+} are obtained from the table 
5.2.2.2, which when combined gives the fourth sub-set {u-,u,u+}.
Qualitative
values
* 0 + 1
Quantitative -10
1
+ uO - 
0 0 0 
uO +multiplier
Table 5.2.2 J  Quantitative!qualitative product operator
Ô3 1 Ô3
Gr - 0 + Ef - 0 +
- + + u - - uO +
Ô1 0 uO u,0 uO 0 - uO +
+ - - - + - uO +
Ô 3  1 Ô 3
Er - 0 + 1 E b - 0 +
; - + + u I - + uO -
Ô 1 i  0 + uO -  1 0 + uO -
+ u - - + + uO -
Ô3 1 §3
Eb 0 +  1 Ef 0  +  1
61 0
+
uO uO uO  ^
+  +  +  1
0
+
u
uO + 
u  +  +  1
Table 5.2.2.2 Disagreements to biases for 2~element subsets
Note that ‘no disagreements’ is not an indicator that no biases exist on the tank-set. 
For instance, the case where all three biases are positive and of similar magnitude 
might generate no disagreements. However, such cases would lead to a disagreement 
in the product accountancy tank and this feature is exploited in the method for non­
unique solutions.
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A parsimonious search is now invoked (i.e. the principle of Occam’s razor is applied). 
That sub-set with the least number of biases is chosen first and the individual biases 
are quantified by performing least squares regression.
This result is then accepted if all the tank volume estimates and the product 
accountancy tank’s plutonium inventory now agree with those measured. The result is 
only partially accepted if the bias estimates fail to correct the product accountancy 
tank residual.
5.2.2.3 Under-defined A matrix -  non -unique solutions
Non-unique solutions exist if every tank in the tank-set is affected by a bias. To enable 
the estimation of these biases, a different method is required. Two criteria are 
introduced to enable a solution to be obtained:
1. There is no long-term build-up or loss of material within the tank-set.
2. The product accountancy tank’s residual, (M ,^„ -  ) »  0 .
The first involves determining those relationships that are required to ensure zero 
build-up or loss over the long-term. If the (long-term) rate at which the estimated total
volume of liquor contained in the tank-set diverges from the actual total
volume ( )  is a , then:
-Yotal)
dt
= a (5.26)
where
dt i h  - t , )
,dV,
f — ^ d t  ~ f  
J dt J
'LdVr
dt
-dt
and
dt
‘LdVr ‘^ dV .
dt + £y r PdtI dt dt
hence: a  = (5.27)
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Thus if an estimate ofoc, i.e. a  , can be obtained then:
(5.28)
which can be rearranged to provide an estimate for
g /g /
8r
(5.29)
If the tank-set is of the conventional receipt/buffer/feed configuration, then can be 
substituted into Equation 5.19:
16 1
= AD^ = AD 2 <
g / ' â  '
—
g. gr
^b - 0
0
-
- 1  1 ■ g f £ f ' a
1 - 1 gh^b _ 0
(5.30)
which is singular if: = <5 f+ g f^  f 
gb
(5.31)
Therefore, using the first criterion reduces bias estimation for a three tank-set to an 
one-dimensional problem: if e j. is hypothesised then the other two biases can be
calculated provided that a  is known. This parameter can be estimated by noting that 
any solution {£*,£^,£^}must satisfy Equations 5.19, 5.28, and 5.31. If bias e*j- is
chosen: e*. = 0 = —7. and £* = -  — , then a  can be estimated by performing
gb g.
linear regression (Equation 5.25) on the basis of one unknown parameter e* .
A unique solution can now be obtained by applying the second criterion. The second 
criterion is required because, as can be seen from à  = £j-gf -  E^g, ’ il is the scaled
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difference between the receipt and feed tank biases that determine the rate of 
divergence, and not their absolute values. Selecting biases that result in a zero a  do 
not automatically lead to a correct long-term throughput of the tank-set. This can only 
be achieved by comparing the actual throughput, preferably through the tank-set itself, 
but more likely with the throughput as observed in the product accountancy tank. Thus 
£y is adjusted until:
- ^ p u < toi (5.32)
where toi is likely to be relatively large to reflect the inaccuracy in the plutonium 
inventory estimate. Test cases are located in Chapter 6 , Section 6.2.
It is important to understand that the analyses described can be performed regularly. 
Thus, for instance, a hypothesis can be made, which correlates with the day’s data, 
then tested against data collected on subsequent days. It is difficult to ‘pre-plan’ a 
strategy for dealing with this eventuality until the actual data collection process 
begins.
5.3 Redistribution Tools
5.3.1 The Redistribution Tool
Due to difficulties in accurately estimating the volume transfers, the predicted 
plutonium distribution will always gradually diverge from the plant data. This drift 
will occur on a plant that is operating normally. To correct for this divergence, and 
also to provide an opportunity to detect medium-term disagreements, it is necessary to 
analyse the plant as a whole and then redistribute plutonium over time to minimise the 
divergence.
For each process unit in the plant (i.e. both tanks and process stages), the distribution 
tool allows the system to estimate the error between the simulated and real plant:
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e„,.,.=[Pu](V-V) (5.33)
The obvious solution is to correct the estimated transfers to minimise the error 
between the simulated and measured volume. However, as the estimated plutonium 
concentration is obtained from the distribution tool, it is necessary to re-run the tool if 
any of the corrected flow rates affect a process stage and hence the estimated 
plutonium concentration.
As the in-tank volume measurements have been analysed to estimate the transfers into 
and out of each tank, the transfer estimates will be biased if the volume measurements 
are biased. Therefore, the distribution model will also be affected by these biases and 
the predicted plutonium inventory in the product accountancy will diverge from that 
measured. Therefore it is important to identify and correct the volume transfers for the 
biases, for which a method is proposed.
The basic concept of the redistribution tool is simple. Material cannot cross the 
boundaries of the chemical separation areas, and so the tool seeks to move the excess 
material upstream or downstream until the errors are minimised. Each process unit has 
a tolerance from which material can be added or extracted e.g. if the tolerance on a 
tank was 50 grams, and its error was 34 grams, an extra 16 grams of plutonium could 
be redistributed into that tank or up to 34 grams could be extracted from that tank. In 
effect, the tool is attempting to level the error profile of the plant. As process stages 
can be viewed as hidden inventories, large amounts of material can be removed and 
placed into them.
For redistribution to take place, four assumptions have to be made:
1. The inventory of each process unit can only be in error by a specified 
amount, grams, a should be selected on the basis of the standard
deviations of both the volume and density measurements.
2. No material can be redistributed upstream of the first tank i.e. material flow 
measurements from the input accountancy vessel are assumed to be 
unbiased and error free for the time period in question.
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3. No material can be redistributed downstream of the last tank i.e. material 
flow measurements from the output accountancy vessel are assumed to be 
unbiased and error free for the time period in question.
4. An estimate for the measurement bias on each tank is available and the 
distribution tool has been re-run to take these into account i.e. the Pu 
concentration is as correct as possible and the errors in the volume 
estimates is not due to biases on the measured signal.
Let AM,,,,., denote the incremental mass redistribution, i.e. the material balance moved 
between process units, and initially let AM,„„., = 0. Starting at the last process unit and 
ending in the first process unit in the plant:
1. Calculate the total error in the tank by summing the error in the tank 
with the material carried forward: = e„„., + AM„„,.,
2. Calculate the amount of material carried upstream to the next process 
unit: A M = max(0,| ë„,„, | *sign(ë„„,)
3. Revise the error in the unit as material has now moved upstream:
=3 ^ — /\ A/funit unit unit * upstream
If the first process unit is reached and AM,,,,,., = 0 , then redistribution has been 
successful. Otherwise, the excess material can be redistributed downstream into any 
available process unit, and upon reaching the last process unit, AM„„., = 0. In normal
operation d should be chosen to ensure this is the case.
For example, consider a four tank system with errors of 0 ,10, 35, and 75 grams 
respectively and d,„„., =50  grams. Starting in Tank 4 with AM^ = 0 :
1 . £4 = 7 5  + 0 = 75
2. AM3 = 7 5 - 5 0  = 25
3. £4 = 75 -  25 = 50 
Moving upstream to Tank 3:
4. £3 = 35 + 25 = 60
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5.
6 .
AM. = 6 0 - 5 0  = 10
êg = 6 0 -1 0  = 50
Moving upstream to Tank 2: 
7. 62=10 + 10 = 20
9.
AM^ = 2 0 - 5 0  = 0 
6.  = 2 0 - 0  = 20
Moving upstream to Tank 1:
10. êj = 0  + 0 = 0
1 1 . AMj = 0  — 0  = 0
12. 6  ^ = 0 - 0  =  0 
Figure 5.3.1 shows the error profile before and after redistribution has taken place.
Figure 53.1  Error profile before (left) and after (right) redistribution. Tanks* error
tolerance indicated by dashed line.
5.3.2 Medium-term Detection
Having set the tolerances on the process units to ensure redistribution on a normally 
operated plant, the occasion may occur when a process unit continues to diverge. 
Reasons for this may include a gradual diversion of material from a tank (i.e. a 
previously undetected low-magnitude flow that lasts for a period of days) or if the 
divergence is in the last tank only, a substitution of liquor with acid of similar density.
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Identifying the process units where these diversions are taking place is not a 
straightforward task. If the diversion is in a buffer tank, then excess liquor builds up in 
the tank in the simulation, so the source of the diversion is easily identifiable.
However, if the diversion is from a feeding or receiving tank, the excess plutonium 
will affect the process stage simulation, resulting in material propagating through the 
plant that is of incorrect concentration.
Since the simulated plant can be observed diverging from the real plant over a period 
of days, sampling on various tanks can be increased if a gradual diversion is suspected. 
The sample data can then be used to locate the process stage and its associated feeding 
and receiving tanks that are the source of the problem. Redistribution would then be 
applied on the basis that the problem is within the process stage.
The detection of an acid substitution would follow a similar procedure. The final tank 
in the plant would diverge, as the simulation would export excess quantities of 
plutonium when compared with the accountancy quantities. Again the build up would 
be observed and extra sampling would be undertaken. As before, the samples would 
aid in locating the process stage in whose vicinity the substitution had taken place.
In each case, appropriate flow rate correction terms would be generated and applied. 
An event would be created to describe the situation. Test cases are located in Chapter 
6 , section 6.3.
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CHAPTER 6 
TEST CASES
6.0 Introduction
This chapter illustrates how the system would respond in various situations. The 
additional safeguards system is designed to be effective in both the short and medium- 
term. The aim of this work was to examine the overall performance of the system 
without spending a large amount of time on detailed development. The simulation on 
which these results are based was crude, but unbiased. As the real plant data would 
undoubtedly be different, the tools were not optimised to their full extent. The results 
presented should be viewed with this understanding in mind.
The hypothetical reprocessing plant consisted of two solvent extraction cycles and a 
concentrator (Figure 6.0.1). The plant is thus constructed from 7 distinct segments.
A C B
Decreasing V d I u tu b
-HTMTMZh " AC
Decreasing plutonium 
concentration
AC “ Accountancy Tank P -  process stage  
F -  feeding tank R -  receiving tank B -  buffer tank
Figure 6.0.1 Arrangement o f simulated plant.
The segments are (NB. The Pu concentrations are approximate):
1. Tank-set 1 consisting of four tanks after the input accountancy tank.
2. Cycle 1, Pu concentration increasing from 2g/l to 7g/l
3. Tank-set 2 consisting of three tanks.
4. Cycle 2, Pu concentration increasing from 7 g/1 to 31.5 g/1
5. Tank-set 3 consisting of three tanks
6 . Concentrator, Pu concentration increasing from 31.5 g/1 to 220 g/1
7. Tank-set 4 consisting of two tanks, the second of which is connected to the 
product accountancy tank.
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Figures 6.0.2 to 6.0.5 give the volume and density histories of each tank over the first 
5000 minutes of a 4-day period.
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Figure 6.0.2 Tank-set 1, volume (litres) and density (gll) plots
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Figure 6.0.3 Tank-set 2, volume (litres) and density (gll) plots
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Figure 6.0.4 Tank-set 3, volume (litres) and density (g/l) plots
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Figure 6.0.5 Tank-set 4, volume (litres) and density (g/l) plots
The simulation errors generated by comparing the simulation output with the plant 
data for the ‘clean’ plant (i.e. no disagreements) are shown in table 6 .0.1 and the re­
distributed errors (after 4 days) in table 6.0.2.
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Process Unit 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days
Tank 1 0.01 0.21 0.65 0.71
Tank 2 -9.60 -9.81 -9.98 -9.96
Tank 3 -0.04 -0.01 -0.37 -0.47
Tank 4 -6.51 -6.41 -8.33 -8.76
Solex 1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
Tank 5 -1.19 0.39 -4.13 -3.46
Tank 6 1.50 0.73 0.26 -0.06
Tank 7 -7.26 -6.26 -4.84 -4.75
Solex 2 0.19 0.21 0.06 0.06
Tank 8 -38.99 -43.28 -75.09 -118.18
Tank 9 1.09 1.88 -5.75 -9.06
Tank 10 18.16 86.10 142.47 191.05
Concentrator -0.75 -2.27 -1.24 3.14
Tank 11 1.56 10.80 18.04 22.60
Tank 12 -51.44 -51.64 -150.71 -61.99
Table 6.0.1: showing errors increasing over 4 days
Process Unit Errors if no redistribution Redistribution
, Tank 1 0.71 0.71
Tank 2 -9.96 -9.96
Tank 3 -0.47 -0.47
Tank 4 -8.76 -8.76
Solex 1 -0.01 -0.01
Tank 5 -3.46 -3.46
Tank 6 -0.06 -0.06
Tank 7 -4.75 -4.75
Solex 2 0.06 0.06
Tank 8 -118.18 -36.19
Tank 9 -9.06 50.00
Tank 10 191.05 50.00
Concentrator 3.14 3.14
Tank 11 22.60 10.61
Tank 12 -61.99 -50.00
Table 6.0.2: redistribution i f  performed once at the end o f 4 days
The test cases are split into three categories; each designed to test a different aspect of 
the system tools. These categories are:
1. Short-term disagreements (Section 6.1).
2. Gross biases (Section 6.2).
3. Medium-term disagreements (Section 6.3).
Within each section, a variety of different test cases are presented. It should be noted 
that the system is not optimised, and so the results may be somewhat clouded.
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6.1 Short-term Test Cases
6.1.1 Abrupt Diversion from Cycle 2 Outlet.
Amount: 20 litres of liquor at Pu concentration of approximately 31.5 g/1.
Duration: 60 minutes.
Location: Cycle 2 outlet -  molarity assumed to be constant.
Effect: Temporary reduction in liquor entering receiving tank (tank 8).
This test case is designed to illustrate the response of the volume analysis tools 
described in Chapter 3 to an abrupt diversion of material during the filling of a receipt 
tank.
Figures 6 .1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2 show the volume and density plots that are observed in 
tank 8 : note the incident between 1500 and 2000 minutes in Figure 6 .1.1.1. The 
outputs of the flow rate error observer (Section 3.3.2) and the X observer (Section
4.2.1) are shown in Figures 6 .1.1.3 and 6.1.1.4. Note the irregularity from about 1700 
minutes of duration 60 minutes. This is the first indication that material may be 
missing.
The irregularity is identified using a cusum-based detector (Section 3.4), the test 
signals of which are plotted in Figures 6.1.1.5-7. The 'start', ‘stop’ times and time 
history pertaining to the incident are then extracted for diagnosis. A sub-event is 
created to represent the irregularity.
The three diagnostic tools (Section 3.5) are invoked concurrently: one examines the 
possibility that material may be transferred to hidden inventory (Figure 6 .1.1.8); 
another examines the possibility of a simultaneous change in Pu concentration and 
acid molarity (Figures 6 .1.1.9 & 6.1.1.10); the final possibility examined is a 
simultaneous change in unspecified and Pu concentration (Figures 6.1.1.11 and 
6.1.1.12). The various possibilities would now be scored on their probability, and 
entered as possible diagnoses of the sub-event. The movement to hidden inventory is 
the most probable as it involves a single deviation and does not involve physically 
impossible concentrations of material.
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Figures 6.1.1.1 & 6.1.1.2 Tank 8 volume (litres) and density (gfl)
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Figures 6.1.1.3 &. 6.1.1.4 Tank 8 observer outputs: flow rate error (Umin) a n d X  (gH)
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Figures 6.1.1.5-7 Tank 8 Detectors
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Figure 6.1.1.8 Hidden inventory diagnosis (grams o f Pu)
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Figures 6.1.1.9 & 6.1.1.10 Acid (molli) and Pu diagnosis (gll)
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Figure 6.1.1.11 & 6.1.1.12 Unspecified (g/l) and Pu diagnosis (gjl)
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6.1.2 Abrupt Diversion from Tank 8 during Export
Amount: 20 litres of liquor at Pu concentration of approximately 31.5 g/l.
Duration: 15 minutes, during batch transfer out.
Location: Tank 8 to tank 9, batch transfer.
Effect: Volume of liquor imported by tank 9 less than exported by tank 8 .
This test case is designed to illustrate the response of the volume analysis tools 
described in Chapter 3 to an abrupt diversion of material during the emptying of a 
receipt tank.
This movement is characterised by an increase in the liquor remaining in tank 8 in the 
short-term simulation because the flow out is derived from the buffer tank (tank 9). 
Figure 6.1.2.1 shows the flow rate error observer output from tank8 . There is no 
indication that material may be missing. The volume estimate from the short-term 
simulation is plotted in Figure 6 .1.2.1 together with the actual tank volume 
measurements. Note the divergence between the two signals on the second batch 
transfer (940 minutes onwards).
Figures 6.1.2.3-5 shows the short-term simulation error signal that is input to the 
cusum-based detector (Section 3.4) and the two detector (Boolean) outputs. A ‘start’ 
time of about 920 minutes and a time history starting from 900 minutes are 
automatically extracted. A sub-event is created to represent the irregularity.
Up to four diagnostic tools (Section 3.5) are now invoked concurrently to diagnose the 
irregularity. The first looks at a transfer out to hidden inventory. The other three look 
at the possibility of additional material being added to the tank: plutonium nitrate 
solution of a similar concentration, plutonium nitrate solution of different 
concentration or acid. In each case a material movement would be obtained, but the 
addition of material is not physically meaningful and so these diagnoses have low 
probabilities. Thus the first diagnosis (Figure 6.1.2.6), transfer out to hidden inventory, 
is the most probable diagnosis of the sub-event.
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6.1.3 Temporary Increase in Cycle 2 Inventory
Amount: 600 grams of Plutonium.
Duration: 12-hour period.
Location: Cycle 2 inventory.
Effect: Reduction in density of liquor exported to receiving tank (tank 8).
This test case is designed to illustrate the response of the density analysis tools 
described in Chapter 4 to a temporary increase in the inventory of the second solvent 
extraction plant. In this instance, 600 grams of plutonium ‘disappears’ into Cycle 2 ’s 
inventory and then ‘reappears’ 12 hours later (Figure 6 .1.3.1). This movement is 
characterised by transient decreases and increases in the density of liquor entering the 
receiving tank as the plutonium ‘disappears’ and ‘reappears’. As the liquor consists of 
four components, it is difficult to attribute fluctuations in density with fluctuations in 
plutonium concentration. Density may also fluctuate due to variations in acid molarity 
or unspecified components concentration. As a consequence of this detection must be 
relatively insensitive and diagnosis must accommodate the various possibilities.
Figure 6 .1.3.2 shows the output of the X-observer (Section 4.2.1). Note the pair of 
symmetrical irregularities, the first a negative irregularity, the second a positive 
irregularity. If these irregularities were identified by the cusum-based detector (Section
4.2.2) then the ‘start’ and ‘stop’ times and time history pertaining to the two
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irregularities would be extracted automatically. A sub-event is created to represent 
each irregularity.
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Figure 6.1.3.1 Transient change in Cycle 2 plutonium inventory (grams)
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Figure 6.1.3.2 X-observer output for Cycle 2 receiving tank (gH)
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The three diagnostic tools (Section 4.2.3) are now invoked concurrently. The first 
determines the change in Pu concentration that is required to explain the variation 
(Figure 6 .1.3.3). The second the variation in acid molarity required (Figure 6 .1.3.4) 
and the third the variation in the unspecified component’s concentration (Figure 
6 .1.3.5) required to explain the variation. Probabilities and descriptions are then 
created for each possibility, the most likely explanation having the highest probability. 
These are now the diagnoses of the sub-event.
6.2 Gross Bias Test Cases
A number of test cases were examined to show the effect of multiplicative biases and 
how the various procedures described locate and estimate them. Table 6.2.1 indicates 
which tank volumes were used in the estimation of the various flow rates.
Flow In Flow out
Tank 1 Input Ago. Tank Tank 2
Tank 2 Tank 2 Tank 2
Tank 3 Tank 2 Tank 3
Tank 4 Tank 3 Tank 4
Tank 5 Tank 5 Tank 6
Tank 6 Tank 6 Tank 6
Tank 7 Tank 6 Tank 7
Tank 8 Tank 8 Tank 9
Tank 9 Tank 9 Tank 9
Tank 10 Tank 9 Tank 10
Tank 11 Tank 11 Tank 11
Tank 12 Tank 11 Output Ago. Tank
Table 6.2 J :  Identifies the tank volumes used to estimate the flow rates
It is assumed that the errors caused by sampling and evaporation are negligible. The 
test cases were designed to test the various procedures developed. In particular, the 
testing focussed upon the under-defined problem procedures. In each case the analysis 
was performed after 2  days to allow the errors to reach a sufficient level to exceed the 
tolerances. The value of the tolerances is a decision for the implementers of the 
system.
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6.2.1 Over-defined and Square ‘A^  Matrix Test Case
As the procedure for estimating the biases when the matrix A is over-defined or square 
is straightforward, two test cases are presented. The first tank-set consists of a three 
buffer tanks and a feed tank, and so has a square A matrix (Table 6.2.1).
6.2.1.1 Single Tank Biased in Tank-set 1
The first, simple test case is a +1% measurement bias on Tank 3’s volume. Note that 
since tank 3 is not a feed/receipt tank, the Pu error in Tank 12 is not included in the 
results. The resulting volume errors and the bias estimates obtained are shown in Table 
6 .2.2.
Tank Error (litres) Bias Estimate (%)
1 0.24 -
2 -4.64 0
3 -463.36 0.97
4 383.13 0
Table 6.2.2 Volume errors and bias estimates for +1% on Tank 3
These estimates were then used to produce revised volume throughput estimates for 
tanks 2 to 4 ., then Tank I ’s bias was estimated on the bias of Tank 2’s bias since the 
flow into Tank 1 is unbiased( input from accountancy tank) and the flow out derived 
from Tank 2 ’s volume measurements. The resulting volume errors and the bias 
estimates are shown in Table 6.2.3.
Tank Error (litres) Bias Estimate (%)
1 0.24 0
2 -4.64 0
3 -463.36 1.002
4 383.13 0
Table 6.2.3 Volume errors and revised bias estimates for  +7 % on Tank 3
Three sets of data of data were now analysed, collected every 750 minutes, to show the 
effect of analysing more than one set of data at a time (Table 6.2.4). Note that there is 
little difference to just waiting for 2 days. Finally the corrected disagreements and
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volume throughputs after 2600 minutes are given in Table 6.2.5. The biases estimated 
were found to eliminate the disagreements.
Tank Iteration 1 (%) Iteration 2 (%) Iteration 3 (%)
1 0.0 0.0 0.0
2 0.0 0.0 0.0
3 1.003 1.003 1.002
4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 6.2.4: Bias estimates for first three 750 minutes iterations
No Correction +1.002 Correction
Tank Error (litres) Throughput (litres) Error (litres) Throughput
(litres)
1 -4.74 46315 -4.74 46315
2 -5.62 46320 -5.62 46320
3 -468.83 38975 -4.72 38600
4 381.77 40951 -4.85 40951
Table 6.2.5: Corrected throughput and disagreements after 2600.0 minutes 
6.2.1.2 All Tanks Biased in Tank-set 1
In this more complicated test case. Tank 1 is subjected to a bias of +1%, Tank 2 to a 
bias of -1% , Tank 3 to a bias of +1%, and Tank 4 to a bias o f-1% . Since the ‘A ’ 
matrix is square. Tank 12’s Pu disagreement has no bearing on the result. The 
resulting volume errors and the bias estimates obtained are shown in Table 6.2.6. The 
biases estimated were found to eliminate the disagreements (Table 6.2.7). Note that 
although errors still exist, these are below tolerance for the tank-set.
Tank Error (litres) Bias Estimate (%)
1 463.40 1.00
2 -4.75 -0.98
3 -926.51 1.03
4 769.43 -0.94
Table 6.2.6 Volume errors and bias estimates for all tanks biased test case
Tank Bias Estimate (%) Error (litres)
1 1.00 4.58
2 -0.98 -5.52
3 1.03 -1.19
4 -0.94 9.28
Table 6.2.7 Volume errors and bias estimates for all tanks biased test case
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6.2.2 Under-defined A matrix test cases
As the procedure for estimating the biases when the ‘A ’ matrix is under-defined is 
more complex, four test cases are presented. The single tank examples have unique 
solutions and the ‘all’ tanks example a non-unique solution. The location of all the test 
cases is the third tank-set (tanks 8 , 9, & 10). As the biases in the feed and receive tanks 
(8 & 10) will affect the Pu disagreement in Tank 12, it is included in the results.
6.2.2.1 Single Tank Biased in Tank-set 3
Three test cases are presented for the testing of the procedure for estimating the biases 
when the matrix A is under-defined and the solution is unique. The test cases were:
a). +1% on Tank 8 .
b). +1% on Tank 9.
c). +1% on Tank 10.
Since biases in a feed or receipt tank affect the process cycles, the Pu error in tank 12 
is included in the error table (Table 6.2.8). The biases estimated by the procedure are 
shown in Table 6.2.9.
Tank Case ‘a’ Case ‘b ’ Case ‘c’
8 (litres) 23.26 -26.53 -1.90
9 (litres) 0.04 0.12 0.04
10 (litres) 0.47 26.57 -23.27
12 (Pu gms) -307.69 - 729.46
Table 6.2.8: Error table for unique solution test cases
Tank Case ‘a’ Case ‘b ’ Case ‘c’
8 (litres) 0.94 0 0
9 (litres) 0 1.08 0
10 (litres) 0 0 0.90
Table 6.2.9: Bias estimates for unique solution test cases
For each test case, the bias estimate was found to eliminate both the volume and Pu 
disagreements.
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6.2.2.2 All Tanks Biased in Tank-set 3
A single test case is presented for the testing of the procedure for estimating the biases 
when the matrix A is under-defined and the solutions are non-unique. The third tank- 
set is again the location for the test. The test case was:
+5% on Tank 8 -5% on Tank 9 -5% on Tank 10
The volume throughput and volume & Pu disagreements for the tank-set (including 
Tank 12) are shown in Table 6.2.10.
Tank Throughput Litres Disagreement Litres Pu (gms)
8 dr 2728 Ôr 242.78 7353.75
9 db 2328 Ôb -0.27 -0.54
10 df 2468 ôf 1.57 54.98
12 - - Ôl2 -2.17 -7010.46
Table 6.2.10 Volume throughput and volume & Pu disagreements
Linear regression was now applied assuming = 0 & = 6.7*lO'"^  to obtain =
9.4% and hence a  = - 256.4. (Table 6.2.11). Table 6.2.11 also contains the case 
(performed for interest) where the regression was repeated but with Equations 5.28 
and 5.31 solved assuming = 0. The revised disagreements for the volumes are also 
tabulated in Table 6.2.11. Associated with these solutions are the revised Pu errors 
(Table 6.2.12).
Tank Biases Solution 1 Revised
Disagreement
Solution 2 Revised
Disagreement
8 9.4 21.91 0 -41.99
9 0 -0.27 -10.9 -0.30
10 0 1.57 -10.4 16.33
12 - -2.17 - -21.7
Table 6.2.11: Revised volume disagreements for unique solutions
Tank Biases Solution 1 Revised
Disagreement
Solution 2 Revised
Disagreement
8 K 9.4 777.04 0 -1204.75
9 0 -0.58 -10.9 -0.08
10 0 59.82 -10.4 497.63
12 - -416.61 - 1132.71
Table 6.2.12: Revised Pu disagreements for unique solutions
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As neither of the unique solutions gave satisfactory results, an iterative search (based 
on was performed. The Pu disagreements for the first three iterations are shown in 
Table 6.3.13: the third iteration would be deemed to be acceptable because toi < 180 
(i.e. Equation 5.32) and the sum of the disagreements squared is reduced. The process 
could then be repeated with revised volume throughputs that are based upon the third 
iteration (Table 6.2.14).
Tank First Iteration Second Iteration Third Iteration
8 5 -84.28 7.5 445.97 6.00 130.05
9 -5.09 -1.01 -2.16 -0.78 -3.92 -0.83
10 -4.86 247.08 -2.10 107.25 -3.76 188.86
12 - 259.68 - -131.71 - 103.75
Table 6.2.13: Revised Pu disagreements for iterative search
No Correction With Correction
Tank Error (litres) Throughput (litres) Error (litres) Throughput
(litres)
8 242.78 2728 2.30 2573
9 -0.27 2328 -0.28 2423
10 1.57 2468 5.66 2565
Table 6.2.14: Corrected throughput and disagreements after 2600.0 minutes 
6.2.3 Plant Analysis Strategy
This section is not a test case as such, but describes the application of the bias 
estimating procedures to the entire plant. The example referred to in this strategy is 
what might be considered the hardest test case: +1%, -1% on alternate tanks 
throughout the plant. The volume and Pu disagreements are shown in Table 6.2.15. It 
is important to understand that the analyses described can be performed regularly. 
Thus, for instance, a hypothesis can be made, which correlates with the day’s data, 
then tested against data collected on subsequent days. It is difficult to ‘pre-plan’ a 
strategy for dealing with this eventuality until the actual data collection process 
begins.
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Tank Disagreement (litres) Disagreement (Pu)
1 463.40 926.80
2 -4.75 -9.49
3 -926.51 -1853.02
4 769.43 1538.86
5 220.21 1508.97
6 -0.00 -0.08
7 -221.80 -1522.06
8 -50.92 -1748.30
9 0.30 9.65
10 51.33 1617.73
11 -0.03 -7.06
12 1.17 -850.62
Table 6.2.15: Volume and Pu disagreements for worst case scenario
The analysis of the first tank-set is straightforward as the ‘A ’ matrix is square. Thus it 
is relatively easy to obtain estimates for the biases for this tank-set (Table 6.2.16). The 
volume and Pu disagreements are then re-estimated on the basis of these results. 
(Table 6.2.17).
Tank Bias
1 1.00
2 -0.98
3 1.03
4 -0.94
Table 6.2.16 Bias Estimates for Tank-set 1
Tank Disagreement (litres) Disagreement (Pu)
1 4.58 19.12
2 -5.52 -9.59
3 -1.19 8.57
4 9.28 19.19
5 220.21 1523.44
6 -1.17 0.60
7 -221.99 -1536.52
8 -50.92 -1764.79
9 0.03 10.55
10 51.27 1632.58
11 -0.03 -7.12
12 1.15 -126.28
Table 6.2.17: Volume and Pu disagreements. Tank-set 1 solved
The analysis for tank-set 2 would be of a similar pattern to that performed for the non­
unique test case. Looking solely at the measurements local to the tank-set, the 
preferred solution would be {0 %, -2 %, 0 %}.Unfortunately, as biases downstream of
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the tank-set also affect the Pu error in Tank 12, this solution would not satisfy the 
condition on Tank 12. So the analysis would have to be continued using flow meters 
etc. to help in the estimation of biases. And so on for the other tank sets.
6.3 Medium-term Test Cases
The test cases presented in this section are designed to illustrate the response of the 
medium-term tools described in Chapter 5 in various scenarios, assuming that 
multiplicative biases either do not exist or have been estimated.
6.3.1 Gradual Diversion from Buffer Tank
Amount: 0.02 litre/min diversion of liquor at approximately 31.5 g/l
Duration: Continuous.
Location: Tank 9, buffer tank.
Effect: Build-up in error in Tank 9.
In this instance, liquor was continuously diverted from Tank 9 (the buffer tank after 
Cycle 2). Depending on the tolerances specified, a disagreement would arise in the 
redistribution tool after a few days (Table 6.3.1.1). The same tool would examine the 
redistribution of these errors and identify the problem in the correct buffer tank (Table
6.3.1.2). Appropriate flow rate correction terms would then be generated and applied. 
An event describing the disagreement would also be created.
Process Unit 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days
Tank 1 0.17 0.25 0.50 0.48
Tank 2 -9.26 -9.10 -9.14 -9.22
Tank 3 -0.19 -0.09 -0.38 -0.36
Tank 4 -6.70 -6.62 -7.25 -7.55
Solex 1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
Tank 5 0.47 1.44 -1.87 -0.93
Tank 6 -0.39 0.51 -0.31 -0.48
Tank 7 -8.60 -8.61 -7.94 -8.10
Solex 2 0.11 0.06 -0.02 -0.18
Tank 8 49.00 93.79 154.93 163.48
Tank 9 497.15 868.45 1442.33 1819.11
Tank 10 93.04 215.09 374.42 473.31
Concentrator -0.15 0.01 -0.40 5.76
Tank 11 1.98 12.37 20.63 25.18
Tank 12 -47.84 -20.38 -85.78 -22.29
Table 63.1.1 Plutonium mass disagreements: simulated vs. measured, Tank 9
1 0 2
Process Unit Errors if no redistribution Redistribution
Tank 1 0.48 0.48
Tank 2 -9.22 -9.22
Tank 3 -0.36 -0.36
Tank 4 -7.55 -7.55
Solex 1 -0.00 -0.00
Tank 5 -0.93 -0.93
Tank 6 -0.48 4.72
Tank 7 -8.10 50.00
Solex 2 -0.18 50.00
Tank 8 163.48 50.00
Tank 9 1819.11 2242.24
Tank 10 473.31 50.00
Concentrator 5.76 5.76
Tank 11 25.18 25.18
Tank 12 -22.29 -22.29
Table 6.3.1.2 Tank 9 gradual diversion, redistribution 
6.3.2 Gradual Diversion from Tank 8 Inlet
Amount; 0.02 litre/min diversion of liquor at approximately 31.5 g/l
Duration: Continuous.
Location: Cycle 2 outlet / Tank 8 inlet.
Effect: Over estimation of Pu throughput.
In this instance, liquor was continuously diverted from the Cycle 2 outlet (Tank 8 
inlet). Depending on the tolerances specified, a disagreement would arise in the 
redistribution tool after a few days (Table 6.3.2.1). This build-up would trigger the 
collection of samples, which would then be compared with the simulation results 
(Table 6.3.2.2). This would indicate that the problem was located in the vicinity of 
Cycle 2. The redistribution tool would then redistribute the errors (table 6.3.2.3).
Appropriate flow rate correction terms would then be generated and applied. An event 
describing the disagreement would also be created.
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Process Unit 1 day 2 days 3 days 4 days
Tank 1 0.24 0.30 0.52 0.72
Tank 2 -8.51 -8.61 -8.58 -8.52
Tank 3 -0.21 -0.23 -0.23 -0.54
Tank 4 -6.57 -6.65 -7.18 -7.39
Solex 1 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
Tank 5 0.59 1.18 -1.91 -1.45
Tank 6 -1.00 0.22 -0.55 -0.55
Tank 7 -8.46 -7.87 -7.29 -8.05
Solex 2 0.02 -0.00 -0.06 -0.24
Tank 8 -27.38 -42.92 -109.76 -153.40
Tank 9 2.08 1.11 1.78 2.80
Tank 10 11.33 78.88 129.04 173.69
Concentrator -1.70 -3.54 -1.35 5.09
Tank 11 11.45 6.33 19.98 18.75
Tank 12 130.08 512.59 1180.83 1852.60
Table 63.2.1 Plutonium mass disagreements: simulated vs. measured, Tank 8
Process Unit Sample Simulated
Tank 3 2.00 2.00
Tank 6 7.00 6.9992
Tank 9 31.45 31.98
Tank 12 221.78 226.61
Table 6.3.2.2 Plutonium sample data (g/l)
Process Unit Errors if no redistribution Redistribution
Tank 1 0.72 0.72
Tank 2 -8.52 -8.52
Tank 3 -0.54 -0.54
Tank 4 -7.39 -7.39
Solex 1 -0.00 -0.00
Tank 5 -1.45 -1.45
Tank 6 -0.55 -0.55
Tank 7 -8.05 -8.05
Solex 2 -0.24 1599.29
Tank 8 -153.40 50.00
Tank 9 2.80 50.00
Tank 10 173.69 50.00
Concentrator 5.09 50.00
Tank 11 18.75 50.00
Tank 12 1852.60 50.00
Table 6.3.2.3 Tank 8 inlet gradual diversion, redistribution on basis o f sample data
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6.3.3 Substitution of Solution with Add
Amount: 50 litres of liquor at approximately 31.5 g/l
Duration: short.
Location: Tank 9.
Effect: Over estimation of Pu throughput.
In this instance, a relatively large quantity of liquor, (50 litres at approximately 31.5 
g/l of Pu) is replaced in the buffer tank upstream of the concentrator with a quantity of 
nitric acid of the same volume and density (50 litres of 2.32 molarity).
In theory, it is possible to perform the switch ‘cleanly’, i.e. no variation in the volume 
or density of the tank should be observed. In practice, however, the probability of 
achieving this must be very small, so some variation may be observed. There are 
numerous possibilities in the way in which the substitution may affect the volume and 
density measurements so here the worst case scenario is assumed: that any variation is 
indistinguishable from the process noise. The implication of this is that the detection 
and diagnosis is reliant upon corroborating evidence.
Although there would be various short-term effects on the units downstream, these 
would not be detectable, so detection is based on observing the medium term effects 
through the plutonium balance (redistribution tool). Table 6.3.3.1 shows the plutonium 
balance over the day of the incident and the following day. Note that the error in tank 
12 takes time to build-up as the substituted solution propagates through the upstream 
units.
This build-up would trigger the collection of samples, which would be compared with 
the simulation results. Depending upon the timing, these may or may not provide 
evidence that the substitution has occurred. Either way, the problem would be 
diagnosed as being in the vicinity of the concentrator. The redistribution tool would 
then redistribute the errors.
Appropriate flow rate correction terms would then be generated and applied. An event 
describing the disagreement would also be created.
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Process Unit 1 day 2 days
Tank 1 0.19 0.39
Tank 2 -9.40 -9.37
Tank 3 -0.04 -0.09
Tank 4 -3.94 -4.26
Solex 1 -0.01 -0.01
Tank 5 -0.04 2.71
Tank 6 -0.60 -0.19
Tank 7 -6.58 -7.75
Solex 2 -0.23 -0.33
Tank 8 -32.87 -50.86
Tank 9 3.71 0.22
Tank 10 -2.82 7.45
Concentrator 7.21 0.27
Tank 11 4.82 9.06
Tank 12 970.50 1539.33
Table 63.3.1 Acid substitution errors
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
7.0 Material Safeguards
As pointed out by Burr and Wangen (1996b), conventional material accountancy 
methods will be unable to satisfy the protracted loss detection goal specified by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency when applied to large scale reprocessing plants. 
Therefore, there is a requirement for additional systems that enhance the conventional 
accountancy approach, and one possible system has been introduced in this thesis. The 
system proposed can fulfil many of the roles envisaged by Burr and Wangen (1996a), 
in assisting the safeguarding of nuclear material. In particular, the system has the 
ability to reconstruct plant transfers from minimum instrumentation and hence identify 
abnormal processes, such as diversions of material.
7.1 The Additional Safeguards System
It is appreciated that development of the additional safeguards system proposed in this 
thesis is curtailed somewhat by the lack of real data. The system is designed for 
confirming that a facility is operating as declared by the operator. The system itself is 
largely unproven, based on software developments that would evolve as the plant is 
commissioned.
An extensive programme of work would be required to ensure a successful 
implementation on a commercial facility, much thought has gone into ensuring that, 
having invested so much in the implementation, the evaluation tools can be evolved so 
that the system performs as expected. It must be emphasised that the system’s success 
depends upon the quality of the data collection system. It is crucial that appropriate 
data is collected; although the analytical tools can evolve, the data cannot i.e. one 
cannot go back and collect the same data again.
The various case studies have demonstrated that the implementation of such a system 
would provide additional assurances that the plant is operating as declared. The focus 
of the case studies has been on how the system would work, rather than on measuring
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the system’s ability to detect and isolate a particular incident. This is because 
quantitative results would be misleading unless they were based on data that 
resembled real data, which is not currently available.
7.2 Summary
It has been demonstrated that the proposed additional system has the potential to be a 
valuable aid for inspectors responsible for nuclear materials safeguards, providing 
additional short-term and medium-term assurances to supplement traditional materials 
accountancy methods. Working prototypes of the tools described within this thesis 
have been produced and evaluated using data sets pertaining to a hypothetical plant. 
Features of the system described within this thesis, which are likely to be of particular 
use, are:
• simple, practical algorithms;
• transfer estimation;
• ability of the design to evolve to meet future requirements;
• methods used can be applied to information poor plants, where traditional 
methods have problems;
• the potential to detect and diagnose short-term disagreements;
• the potential to detect and diagnose medium-term disagreements;
• the potential to estimate plutonium distribution within the chemical process 
area at any point in time;
• a method to detect and identify gross biases has been established.
7.3 Component Summary
It is somewhat difficult to draw conclusions about the tools without having the 
opportunity of testing them on real data.
The volume analysis tools described in Chapter 3 are robust, simple designs that are 
easily adapted if need be. As several of their constituent components have already 
been shown to perform adequately with real data (Appendix 1), the application of the 
tools to real data should be straightforward. Since the Modified Shewhart Control
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Chart is easier to set-up and tune than the V-mask, it is the preferred change detection 
algorithm. To calculate the flow rates, simulated annealing should only be used as a 
last resort. Although it guarantees the correct solution, the computational efficiency of 
the algorithm is low.
Observers are widely used throughout the system, not only in the volume analysis 
tools (Chapter 3) but also in the density analysis tools described in Chapter 4. They 
have been shown to be appropriate for the generation of detector signals and for the 
diagnosis of any anomalies that may be found.
The method developed for the estimation of gross multiplicative biases, presented in 
Chapter 5, has been shown to work on typical plant data where a limited number of 
tanks have volume measurements that are biased grossly. The case where all tank 
volume measurement systems have gross biases is considerably more difficult; 
although the method would give possible solutions, additional plant data would be 
needed to establish the validity of the estimates thus obtained.
The redistribution and the medium-term assurance tools perform as expected. The 
largest difficulty associated with the medium-term assurance tools is the decision as to 
when to redistribute and when to estimate gross biases. A solution to this problem is 
proposed, but this would probably require modification for use on a real plant.
7.4 Recommendations for Future Work
The work presented in this thesis can be considered to be a set of development 
guidelines for the future implementation of an additional safeguards system. There are 
many possible improvements and refinements that could be made to the system in the 
future, some possibilities include:
• development of a complete prototype system. This depends upon the 
availability of real plant data and/or improved simulated data;
• expand the system to cover design information verification. The system 
will provide an operational template for a plant once implemented, and this 
information can be used to detect unauthorised alterations to the plant 
design or operation;
• further research in data compression and warehousing.
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Tank Measurement Data Compression for 
Solution Monitoring
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A bstract
A tank miîîisureiatîin Uatn corttpre.sssoii schetae is described that 
luts been developed to meet the pectiSiar needs oi'nuclear mate­
rials safegnarrls. in geucf al. and solution monitoring in partieu- 
iar, 'i ne scdieme has (wo stages, a filtering stage fbdowed by a 
correlate and test stage, 'i'he filjcr might t>e viewed tts an exten­
sion o f  the box c o r  algorithm that enables featnre extraction; the 
coiTChile Kubstagc uses a recursive least .squares estintator, and 
the test .stage is based on the Cusum test. The schem e has been 
developed by testing with data obtainerl from a commercially 
ol'cralcd facility.
.IntrodHction
.Solution moisitoriug has Iwen defined its the "e&sentially contiji- 
nou.s monitoring o f  solution level, density and température in all 
tanks m the process that contain, or could contain, safegutirds- 
.signitlcani quantities
o f nuclear mate- ----------------
nitl."-A'\s such it is a 
candidate ''defense 
in-depth" approach, 
the need for which L - Lref
has (jcen discussed ___________ t, Fihcring
by Andrew.'' To per­
form solution snoni- 
tormg vvtih the data- 
colleciitm  rates 
thought to f'c necessary
to monitor uotmal plant uctivttics,' it is likely that at least 
15,00!) points/sensor/month wdl netnl to he collected for subse­
quent analysis. Although not excessively large, it is clear that a 
large portion o f these data would be redundant because a high 
diitn-collcction rate is only needed when a change in |dant activ­
ity actually occurs, attd this is relatively infretjuent. .Some form 
ol data compression is thcret'orc desirable from a data-storagc 
viewpoint. ÎJI adrlitirm, any sensible data compression would 
nko Ire o f  benefit to the solutimi-monitonng system installed if 
it enables its com plexity U'< be reduced in sonw way. Solutitm- 
nronitonog-system development work dewr ibcsl to dale has not 
examined this primarily because the dam have not t>een rtrride
F i x u f f  1. Dntrr m l w c l i o n  .s c h e m e
available to motivate .such work. Both Burr and Warigen* ’ and 
Seolheni and HovvciF have used .similar data to test their respec­
tive sy.stems. Either real data, recorded at very infrequent inter­
vals o f  time, have been used directly, or data have been synthe- 
si%cd; tar  instance, infrequently recorded real data have been 
liirearly interpolated, sampled at five-minute intervals and cm - 
ntpted with Gaussian noise. Perhaps it is worth pointing out that 
these particular infrequently recorded data had already b e e n  
compressed using a variation of the well-kntnvti combined box 
car and backward slope algorithm,'' but: the justification for 
using this algorithm is unclear
Tl)c need for data ctrmpres.sian is not peculiar to solution 
monitormg. Data compression is used in many areas and in pttr- 
ticttlar in the process mdiiMries." However, what might be 
peculiar about data compre.ssion for solution nioniloririg is that 
the objective is somewhat different; Process indu.siry data com ­
pression is about
------------------ k  Data Stream A  recording the under­
lying trends in the 
data whereas, with 
its close relutlonship 
With nuclear materi­
als accountancy, data 
cnmpressed for input 
to a sfiluimn-murti- 
lortng s y s te m  should 
reflect more the 
qnuntntiiive stuli; ol
the contents o f tlte tank. A good example o f the diffetence arises 
when a tank is spttrged. It might then be ttecessary to ignore 
level measuixmrenls because level flucniatitnrs would be mts- 
letidtng: level is used to infer volume via a calibiniion obtained 
W ith  spmifing switched off. Thus any data compression algti- 
rilhm that is suitable for solution monitoring is hkeiy to have an 
dem ent o f feature extraction in it and is hcncc unlikely to be 
generally applicable to the process industries.
This paper descritxvs a dntit compression scheme (Figure 11 
that extracts all the important features of data pertaining to tanks 
in which fiqutir is not imported and exported at the same time. 
The results are output os four sepntaio streams- .Slrcotn A con-
Corrclate
Data Stream B
Data Stream C
Data Stream D
kpf itJI.! IN M M  s  2 5
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tisins tisîies -a! which (iccurs, sticoin B contains spikes
tiiat ms^hi he viewed as "otld ' events, while streatns C and D 
conlatfi only those data records that need to be input in to  a 
solu tton-m oniE orin» system  like that developed at the 
University o f  Glasgow ' ' The only diîTereitce between streams 
C and D is in their data format. 'Tlie scbeine would need to be 
modified to process measurement data obtained from itmks that 
can have .stmoltimcous inputs and outputs to niid front them 
te.g. a Holveni -v'stTaction-cycJe receiving tank), and this is dis­
cussed in the winclussons.
The scitcme Jtns been developed and tested by aimlytring 
data collected from a number of tanks located in a product slur- 
iigf area of a reprocessing plant. The data were collected using 
the Isjira VLTM system." which is capable ol collecting data 
through six multiplexed chunnels. L.icb chatmcl is interrogated 
over a ihrec-secoud period, approximately once every 18 sec­
onds; about eight measurements are input and averaged t-'ver the 
three-secoEtd |tet iod, and the standard dcvialioti can also be cal- 
culats'd. Mote that the maximum collection rate o f  once every 
ÎH seconds is ahout six times fastei than that which is iwntinally 
aujuired. Instead o f just slow ing dowti the sampling rale, the 
developers have chosen to provide the htciliiy to comptess the 
data instead using a variation of the box car algorithm. 
Typical ilala comprc.ssi<in.s o f  IxUweeu 7.5 percent and 8,1 per­
cent have been obtained where
Tuttil number of 
twemged 
measurements recorded
Total number of 
averaged
Data measurements input
Total number o f averaged 
measurements input
.Note that an u\t;rage dttta comprexsiort o f  about 88 jKTtteui
Li
would give the nominal goal of 15,(XX) points/seu.sor/tnoiith, 
whereas the sclraue described in this paper has achieved better 
thrm 99,y percent. To avoid confusion, it is wotth pointing oui 
that the work described here ha.s iurgcly been carried out using 
data collected with the developer's fitcdity switched otT; that is, 
tlte scheme Jius been developed using ilatsi recorded approxi­
mately every 20 secottds. Bach data record is assumed to con­
tain, tvhere avaihibie, level, density and reference dip-lulre aver­
aged pressure measurements, plus the standard deviations of 
each o f the level dip-tuhe averaged pressures. On input, the 
etpiivalent level and density are then calculated and added to 
each record. Thu daia-ctunpressioti algorithms are then applied 
to level and density tts opposed to dip-tube pressures, because 
not only ate level and density t>f primary interest, but also data 
comprc-sskut based on the level recording eliminates the cot«- 
mon influence oti ail the dip-tube picssures cairsed by changes 
in atmospheric pressure.
Typical Measorement Records
A typical tank level history is shown in Figurt: 2 for a ]u*riod of 
time where there are no transfers o f multuial into or out o f the 
tank. Note that the level docs not icmaiit cmi.stanl because the 
tank is spat;ged ahout every seven miuute.s and there i.s evapora­
tion. Two sparge cycles that are clearly ideatilîtiblu in b'igure 2 
are chamclerized by a series td about six poiut,s: a downwtud 
rclkction, followed by a shaqj upward incretise to some point 
ahow  the true level, followed by a plateau for two lo three 
points that remains above the true Icwl. followed by a siicirt 
upward trend and then a sharp downward decrease to another 
reflection before returning around the true mean. Figure 2 also 
has some temporal deviations or spikes, whctc the level devi»le.s 
from surd then immediately returns st> the true level. Figure 3 
shows the data colleeted while the tank was recirculated and 
sampled.
I'igtire 2. Txpieul funk level thUa Figure 3. Typical lank level du fa during rcrhctdaliun
Ü6 m iW .x Sprmg 1999
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Several actions can be jdennllcd;
1, Reciirulate through pump for about 1,800 seconds:
2- Fill and tecitoulate through the measuring (rot:
3- Stop pump îUîiî sample mensuring (tot;
4. Drain measuring pot back to tank.
A p p lica tio n  o f  a  S im ph ' D a ta  C otnpresxion  A lg o riih m  
The tgrplication o f  something like the box ear algorithm can atid 
a bias to the data if  (tnicess noise is one-sided over ttmescales 
o f interest As far as solution irtonitoristg is concerned, process 
noise includes aptu^iug and small tempoiai deviation,s. m  these 
arc of no interest in the longer term, An example o f this one­
sided effect is shown in I'igure.s 4 and 5, where the expotten- 
îiîilîy weighted moving average litcs been calculated for both 
tank level data and for tank level data compressed using the box 
car algDi'ithm with a 3 mm 11,0 tolerance, respectively, The 
faint, highly noisy data are the rrfiginai level data that fitietiiaies 
umnnd 867 mm tappa».); a time constant of X = 0.1 was used 
in the EWMA,*^
I'hi* S c i i e in e
The data comiJtession .sdienre is composed o f two parts 
(Figure I ), hherlug fbllowed by correlation and testing. Tlte atm 
o f filtering is to:
1. Remove unnecessary data points from (he main output 
streuHt;
2. Output those tunes at which sparging occurs through 
streoijt A;
3. Output those points that ptmain to odd events through 
stream B;
4. Renmve those points pcrciifïing to streams A  and B from 
the mailt output stream.
The main output stream shunid then contain only data (xnms 
corrupted with tneasuremeni. errors as opposed to process noise. 
Typically, a data cotiiptvssion o f  b'),3 percent is obtained at thi.s
|sss:
ew,
863t
r ?03 2 r r% ? .’0& ? ra? i  ?ca s ?;» 3 n
Tmx,M
Figure 4, FWiMA ttftjrigiiml dutn
point. A conxdaie and te.si .stage i.s (hen ap{)lied so that t.mly the 
following are output:
1. Tlio.se poiiit.s pm u im ng  to physical yctivitie.s like recir­
culation and transfers;
2. Siiffieient (loint.s to enable an overall, gradual trend to be 
ob.setveil, for instance, a gradual axluction in level ax a 
re,suit o f evaporation.
Depending on the activities ongoing on the plant, the litutl out- 
pat smram «right contain as little as a lew terrs of poini.s jxr month.
7'ho Fil!enn,i> P /vced n rc
The data filtering algorithm iterates throngh the titrte series by 
making m v  o f ivvrr limits: a p tw in u r:  limit, t|„ atrd a cluing^ 
Jinrit, Xj|,. 'Die proximity limit specifies the bi.amds within which 
a data [joint must lie for it to he ignojrd and the focus of the
algorithm moved on to (he loi lowing point, lire change limit
seeks to i,solute those event.s that rrtight be o f  interest to the .soln* 
tion-tnonttoring .system. Thus it specifies the jTUignitude that 
the ddlcfEnee between two adj.aceut puttH.s nnwt ex iecd  before 
it is passed to the output stream. Let the data .series to be filtered 
be defined by A',, A',, . . . .  A’,,, lot the main output stream be
Tj, Fj, S') and note Ihnf the input sent» need not be collected
at a aim tm ii rate. Then the following test.s (Figure 6) arc 
applied:
a) No real change: Ignoa' A, if l.Y,„, -  ,Vj l<  ,
bl Important evcrii: A', and X.,. ■ Stream Y if
, isi,.
c) Sparging: .Yj., -»  Stream .A if
f  < 1%»,,, -  A, l< T,, and ■ Y, ,
Vpi : I < « < J!i : 3 < ui < K),
d) Impwrrtimt event: .Y, rtitd .Y ... .  ->  .Stream Y  if
V ji  : I ,< n s  m : .1 < f>i < I IS:
c i Sudden change in bias: .Y. and ,\T, - j Stream Y" si
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pToximi
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to cutreiu point
Y es No
Search
Procedure
Odd events are riiuntiatcd by looking at the associated level 
dip'tiibe staiidard-deviations o ,, a ,,  o , .  .. .  after the other tests 
have been contpletcth
a) Odtl everit; X  ^ and Y. , Streant B if 
> r„ , where is another toieranctr.
Note that these tests are not guaranteed to Biter out all tea- 
lures that arc unimportant. Duplicate records are someti:ne.s 
output, but these are easily detected ami removed.
1'he main steps t>f the iterative ptocethirc arc shown as How 
diagrtmis in Figures 7 and îi. Starting from the lop o f  the dia­
gram, the algorithm compares the proceeding point with the 
current point; if  the proceeding point is within the prosirnily 
limits, it becom es the current point and the next point assumes 
the mantle o f  the proceeding point, and so  on. if  the proceeding 
point lies outside the proximity limit*, the search algorithm is 
invoked and tire current point retnnin.s the same until a search is  
completed. On completion, passirrg both points to the output 
stream is important, as it means that both the start point and end 
point are collected, 'fire proceeding point is cheeked to ensure 
that it does not lie within the proxisnity limits. It is then checked  
to see if  it lies outside the change limit. Jf it fails to meet either 
of these criteria, the focus of the algorithm shifts to the next 
point, i.e., it becom es the proceeding point, 'fliis loop continues 
until either the proceeding point returns to he within the prox­
imity limits or exceed the charrge limit. Note that the procedure 
is more complicated than this to accommodate the maximum  
loop count o f 10 and hcrscc the possibility o f  a sudden change 
in bias. Under a certain set o f  condition.*, the level could remain 
between the proximity and change limits indefinitely, thus caus­
ing corruption o f the filtered data. If the points lie between the 
proximity and change limits for 10 points (i.e.. lor 10 loops of  
the search loop), it is assumed that the level will never return to 
within the proximity limit o f the current point; the current point 
and the proceeding point are then pas.sed to the output stream 
and the proceeding point is then reset as current, 'lire entire 
procc.s.s is tlren started again.
f RgiXl fHiure pomi |
l¥ fi£ iu )€  fî£»siu wntnn
pmxmwil} limits
is mtun jXMRi owtsîdç
change hniif.*.
StOK  CuiîCfH pOffît
frigure 7. l.ogicaï description ol'tîllcriiig algorithm Figure 8, J.ogk-al rlescripfimt of .seardt algorithm
2 t t  m INM .M Spnni>, 1979
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Figure 9 shows rhe resuitanl; filtered uiUpul obtained Iroin a 
smnli sample of input data. The input data are snperimpoftstd as 
a faim line and each * denotes an output point. Note that a sig­
nificant number o f  points are output Irccause o f  the stgaillcattl 
number of temporal deviations that iiave occurred. Tf> smooth 
the output fuitlwr, the filtered date were passed through the fiT 
toting algorithm a .second tittle with the proximity limit set to 
twice that o f the first pass and with tlte same change Hmil. No  
additional output streams ora required, as all the feolure.s o f  
interest should hiive been passed on thu initial filter pass. 
Figure 10 shows the sam ple data after being .filtered twice: Bach 
point output to the sparging record file Is marked as ‘o ’.
F igure 9. .Stinipîe tSiHit + ou tp o t (*) from  first filter pa&s
|S«!
m  «00 see soco uoo
Figure 10. Stniiple (lain, output (*) frnirs 
.second filter pass, turd sparging fat
7'/te' C cm vk ife  a m i Test P m c e d u re
Altiiough the above achieves a significantly high level o f  duta 
compression, the level Is still likely to be too low for a solution- 
ntoniforing system where otdy rehttivcly infrequent events art: 
o f  intermt. Ty|jically, only fOO points migiit be o f miciest in 
KlO.fKSO points, suggesting a data compression down to, say. 
one per 1,000, or 99.5 percent, Thus a fu rther piocedm e is 
required to extract the desired points.
'fhtt correlate and lesr procedure i.s ba,sed on the observation 
that, if  process noise is ignored, then a level history plot can be 
represented by a series o f  straight-line segments, the change 
points o f which correlate with those jthy.sical evcnf.s that might 
be o f  interest to a solution-monitoring system This then leads 
to the application o f  an estimator to generate équations for the 
straight-line segments and the application o f  a test procedure to 
detect the change points. The basic scheme is shown in 
Figure 11, There are several points that need to be taken into 
ctmsidcratioa m order for this procedure to ftmcdon in the 
desired manner:
1. The estimato.r must be reset upon detection oi a change 
in order for it to construct a new estimate for the pmcm.s 
mean'.
2. The test procedure has to be switched off whenever the 
program is rcAtartiugfinciiiding the initial start 1 to allow  
an accurate estimate for the équation of the line. Ftiilurc 
to do so will r esolt in false alarms.
This approach does not output appropriate .start and end 
poittts for an entire rncnsuicment history .so, to .tcdncc the effect: 
of process noise, these point.s are obtained from the ,hWM,A 
I w ith  T = f). 1 that is calcidated in [Jaoitlel with the filter, cor­
relate and test procedures. The start poitn is then taken to be the 
15ill point o f the i'.VVMA value, and the end point is the last 
point calculated. TTitx is tire only time that caSculuted data, as 
opposed to rct'orded data, are output.
STARTI
Suite priiii iKltci)
rtitmjU- titMetaetl
No
 J  gMr j
Figure I f .  f.ogferd description of 
fhc correlate mid (e.st proeedm e
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V-masK arm  irsiorccpls sa riio r d a ia  
BOin! - c ftan g a  dctecies^ .
Fijriiri' 12. V-nmsk fvniptatt
T he C o r re la te  P iv c e d u r e
A recursive lc;ist .squares algorishîiv^ is used lo estim ate the gta- 
dieit! m ami constant c  (w. r  ; = mz, + r  ; ?, = !, -  q ; r is lime!
as Jbiltnvs:
V, + /'..I
I- = id.v + I!
A = k ir
•T “  im ( f  
n -  lUMse
=c  - c  z'.
To apply this, -■■ »  * 2 x 2  identity tmnrix ami has m 0  
and (■ œ the Jirst data point. It is necessary to reset the RLS cai- 
culstton even' time a point o f  change is detected, T liis is easily 
achieved by simply resetting to ils initial value and setting 
X  to have w  -  0  and e  -  value o f  process mean at this point.
Due m problems eiict'muereci later on when finding m and r 
at points o f  change, the values calculated by the above code arc 
storcti in a sim ple ring bulTer with a delay between the write and 
read counters.
The Test P r o c e d m e
A modified version o f the sttindtud Ctismn test' '*^  is used to test 
for changes. Fixsm reference 14, expressions for the upper 
(Atsum ft?') and the lower Cusurn ft? ), when applied to a nor­
malised data point-v,, are as follosvs:
C ' -  mas 10, V. -  tp,, f  Kh + C*,..,]
C, = ma.s (0, - K )  -  .T, + C , ,]
where p  ^ is the target prnccss mean and K  is a constant.
If either C ' or ( ’, exceeds appropriate toleremces, then the 
process mean is deem ed to be changing. This procedure is often 
represented by  a V-rnnsk tl-igure 12) that is applierl at every
point of the data; if  one o f  the arms o f  the V-rtmsk intercepts a 
data point then a change in the mean is deemed to have taken 
place. Tlie values o f  /f  and K  relate to the vertical height and the 
tingle o f  the arms o f  the V-mnsk respectively. If K  ■■= 0, the arms 
are at right angles. Here, the Cusvint lest is applied In the data 
without normalization, and hcttce the value o f  H is related to the 
standard deviation, a , o f the input data:
// ~ h * CT
where h = a constant 11 < /) < 5 1. N ole that standard deviation 
estimates are output by the VllTM system directly.
This jrn.rcedure has to be modified lo account for the fact that 
the test is not on a process mean that is assumed to be cotistattî. 
hut on whether or tiol the data have deviated from a straight-line 
trajectory. Thus p , is re]jhiced by mz  ^ +
Due to the nature o f  the V-mask tesl. rhe time at which the 
change is detected is at least one time step after the start o f  the 
actual physical change. Thcte are two way.s of pioeuring a more 
accurate estim ate, the choice o f rvhich is dependent on the out­
put that is desireil by the ti.ser.
Ï. Store both the gi'tidieut and the con.stam o f the line prior 
to the pt?iut o f  change and, once the estimate o f  the sub­
sequent line has been completed, calculate the inlersec- 
lioti o f  both lines to obtain a new point o f  change that 
might not exist within the original data;
2. Tctnponrrily store the data points so that an appropiiate 
point can be recalled and used as the change point. Thus 
the point o f  change will exist within the input data set.
In this iitstance the latter option was chosen beimuse tlw output 
o f genumc data poittls was preferied.
The V-ma.sk requires careful calibration for it to process data 
succcssiViiiy, Many factors affect it.s operation. For example, 
bow soon after least squares shttukl it be restarted'.' Answers to 
these and other (piestions arc dependent on tlte density o f the 
data points to be processed. The VLTM data sets are' o f  rela­
tively low density, with substantial cbangtw in the process meim 
occurring wtthin five or mure points heforv filtering.
Figure I ?1 show s the points output over u one-month ;%riod 
(approx.) superimposed over the filtered Jam because the input 
data set K so large. F'igure 14 is a close-up o f  the recirculatiou 
period. Note that the end points can be ttsed to estimate the 
effect o f evaporalitm and that there are sufficient points to 
extract all the important feature.s o f  the recirculation/.sarnpltng.
Conchisions
A tank m easinem ent data contprcs.sioti scheme has been 
described tiiat has been developed to meet the specird needs o f  
nisclKu materials .safeguards in general and solution monitoi ing 
in particular, Dejrcriding on the uutount o f  activity that i.s rrs.so- 
ciatcd with the tank, a high degree o f  data compression can be 
obtained. The outputs from a number o f  nx'onled data sets have 
been input into the .solution moniiorntg system steveloped by 
Scothern and HowclT and, m every instance, the 
recircuhiuon/saittpling activities were detected and djygnoced.
4(1 »  ÎNM.V1 Spring tpoq
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The -<i.'henK has been tioveioTed 
to coini'i't'ss data peitoining is> tanks 
whose irnptnts/expojls are in the 
ftsnn o f  bati'hes. U ss a nsooi |>oinl 
wbetlier it w ould work without 
tnodjfteatioit on, for instaaco, the 
receiv in g  tank o f  a so lven t-  
extraction cyc le , breause here the 
level history is likely to have some 
form o f  sawtooth protlie. fn siidi 
cases, the V-mask test might pro­
duce erwineouv outputs if the ver­
tices o f  the profile are too sluup. 
There are a number o f  ways o f  
accom»ioil:ttir)g this, but modifica­
tion is not thought to be worthwhile 
imlil ajrjîropritite real test data arc 
available to work with.
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APPENDIX 2 
DATA ACQUISITION PROBLEMS
This appendix describes the problems that may occur when a hardware-based data 
compression system is included in the design of the tank level measurement system.
A2.1 Time Issues
Consider the 4-input scanivalve, which is connected to four tanks to measure the level 
dip-tube pressures in Pa. The valve is ‘illustrated’ below:
1
Î
The ‘pointer’ rotates with a total time to move between the ports on the valve of ten 
seconds. The pressure signal is measured over 5 seconds, the rest being used for 
rotation and settling times. Thus a new averaged reading for each tank is obtained 
every ten seconds.
The valve rotates in a clockwise direction (reading ports 1,2,3,4). The collected data is 
held in buffer, with each new measurement over-writing the previous measurement for 
that tank. Every thirty seconds the contents of the buffer are recorded in a data file.
What happens as the reading head rotates is illustrated on the following pages.
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t = 0
1
I
Reading; P](0)
Buffer: Pi(0), P2(?), P3(?), ? 4(?)
t = 10
t=20
Reading: P2(10)
Buffer: Pi(0), P2(10), F3 O), P4(?)
Reading: P3(20)
Buffer: Pi(0), P2(10), P3(2 0 ), ? 4(?)
t=30
Reading: P4(30)
Buffer: Pi(0), P2(10), P3(2 0 ), P4(30)
Written to file: Pi(0), P2(10), P3(20), P4(30)
t = 40
Reading: P i(40)
Buffer: Pi(40), P2(10), P3(20), P4(30)
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t = 50
t=60
t=70
t - 8 0
1
1
t = 90
1
3
Reading: PjfSO)
Buffer: Pi(40), P2(50), P^fZO), P4(30)
A  Reading: PsfdO)
Buffer: P,(40), P;(50), PjfdO), P^SO)
I #2 Written to file: Pi(40), P2(50), P3(60), P4(30)
3 P4 is unchanged but still written to file.
Reading; P4(V0)
Buffer: Pi(40), P2(50), P3(60), P4(70)
Reading: Pi (80)
Buffer: Pi(80), Pz(50), P3(60), P4(70)
Reading: Pz(90)
Buffer: Pi(80), P2(90), P3(60), P4(70)
Written to file: Pi(80), P2(90), P3(60), P4(70)
P3 is unchanged but still written to file.
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t=100
î
3
t=110
1
#
3
t = 120
1
Î
3
t = 130
1
3
t=140 1
e
2
Reading: P3(100)
Buffer: Pi(80), Pz(90), PsClOO), P4(70)
Reading: P4(110)
Buffer: Pi(80), P2(90), P3(100), P4(110)
Reading: Pi(120)
Buffer: Pi(120), P2(90), P3(100), P4(110)
Written to file: Pi(120), P2(90), P3(100), P4(110) 
P2 is unchanged but still written to file.
Reading: P2(130)
Buffer: Pi(120), P2(130), P3(100), P4(110)
Reading: p3(140)
Buffer: Pi(120), P2(130), P3(140), P4(H 0)
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t=150
®
3
Reading: P4(150)
Buffer: Pi(120), P2(130), P3(140), P4(150)
Written to file: Pi(120), P2(130), P3(140), P4(150) 
Pi is unchanged but still written to file.
Note the following effects:
• frozen points: the same record duplicated 30 seconds later;
• misalignment of data points in time. The measurements of two tanks are ten and 
twenty seconds old when the data is recorded i.e. for certain tanks the time 
recorded will be different from the time collected.
This has the following implications:
• plateaux in the middle of transfers due to frozen points;
• inaccurate starts to transfers if coincides with frozen point;
• transfers extended due to sliding end points of transfers.
A2.2 Quantisation
Frozen points can be eliminated easily if it is clear that the chances of two records, 
recorded one after the other, being identical is extremely remote. Unfortunately the 
averaged pressures are only recorded to an accuracy that reflects the accuracy of the 
measurement and the ‘noise’ is lost.
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For example the pressure readings for tank 1 may be:
Time Pressure (Pa) 
Calculated
Pressure (Pa) 
Recorded
0 14910.12 14910
30 14910.12 14910
60 14911.32 14911
90 14910.21 14910
120 14910.34 14910
Table A 2 .2J  Example pressure readings showing quantisation
Is the second point a frozen point or a new calculation? Ditto for the fifth point. 
Without recording to at least 2 significant figures (for statistical reasons) it is 
impossible to tell. Thus the second point is a frozen point, the fifth being a new 
calculation. Ideally the data should be recorded to at least 2 figures more than 
accuracy.
A2.3 Speed Issues
In order to understand the discussion that follows consider the following example 
transfer tank 4 to tank 3 with a pipe delay is of low magnitude (20 secs).
t=30
Reading: P4(30)
Buffer: Pi(0), P2(10), Ps(20), P4(30)
W ritten to file: P,(0), P2(10), P3(20), P4(30)
t = 40
Reading: P i(40)
Buffer: P,(40), P2(10), Ps(20), P4(30) 
Transfer starts.
133
t = 50
t=60
i
\~7Q
t = 80
1
î
2
Reading: P2(50) Transfer Continues 
Buffer: Pi(40), P2(50), P3(20 ), P4(30)
Reading: P3(60) Transfer Continues 
0  Buffer: Pi(40), P2(50), P3(60), P4(30)
0  Written to file: Pi(40), P2(50), P3(60), P4(30)
P4, no indication of transfer written to file but Tank 3 
shows receiving
Reading: P4(70) Transfer Continues 
Buffer: Pi(40), P2(50), P3(60), P4(70)
Reading: P i(80) Transfer Continues 
Buffer: Pi(80), P2(50), P3(60), P4(70)
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t = 90
Reading: P2(90) Transfer Continues 
Buffer: Pi(80), P2(90), P3(60), P4(70)
Written to file: Pi(80), P2(90), P3(60), P4(70)
First indication that tank 4 is transferring written to file.
Admittedly this example is convoluted as pipe delays are usually of the magnitude of 
minutes rather than seconds. Thus with tanks connected to the same scanivalve the 
following are possibilities (and may both occur on the same transfer):
1. target starts to receive before source is indicated to be transferring.
2. target finishes receiving before the source has finished transferring.
If the source and target are connected to different scani-valves then more problems 
may be encountered. If the source is on the faster valve (less tanks or faster rotation) 
then the problems should be minimised. However if the target is on the faster valve, 
the problems indicated above can be exacerbated. Figure A .I.3.1 is a plot of actual 
data of a transfer from the JA6 system. The target tank is on a faster valve than the 
source tank. Note that the target tank trace has been shifted to allow easy comparison.
LL com parison for transfer from V I3 to V 11
S 400
Figure A23.1  Comparison o f transfer from source to target tank
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In this instance all is well as the source tank starts and stops before the target does. 
However, if the transfer was over a longer period of time, the target tank may overtake 
the source tank (i.e. the target tank has received more material than the source tank has 
transferred) and finish before the source tank has completed transferring due to the 
speed differences between the valves.
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APPENDIX 3
This appendix describes an assessment of the JA6 monitoring system currently 
installed in the product storage area of the Tokai-Mura Reprocessing Plant.
JA6 ISSUES
Ideally, the performance of the JA6 monitoring system should be assessed by inputting 
known analogue signals into it. Unfortunately such data was not available for the JA6 
system so an analogue signal was effectively re-constructed from data collected using 
the Ispra VLTM system. The effect that the peculiarities in Appendix 1 have on 
recorded dip-tube pressure measurements was then examined by processing this data 
as if it had been collected via the scanivalves instead.
VLTM collects for 3 seconds every 18 seconds so a data point at say 18 secs really 
pertains to 16.5±1.5 secs whereas JA6 collects for 5 seconds every 40 seconds. Hence 
simulated JA6 data was obtained by:
• Noting that all VLTM time records should have 1.5 deducted from them;
• Interpolating the VLTM data to generate values at 40 second intervals (starting at 
37.5 seconds);
• Recording these values at 30 second intervals assuming a 'zero order hold facility'.
Some typical VLTM data ‘drawn’ as an analogue signal is shown in Figure A3.1. 
Figure A3.2 shows the (scanivalve) output that would be produced if this ‘analogue 
signal’ was to be input into it, Figure A3.3 shows the JA6 data that would be collected 
and Figure A3.4 compares this data with the original signal. The most important 
feature in this comparison relates to the lack of definition during the three instances 
when the tank was sparged. This definition is needed to justify the exclusion of data 
points during sparging.
An example of the time shift imposed by the scanivalve is shown in Figure A3.5. 
Visually, during plant activities like a recirculation (Figure A3.6), JA6 appears to track
137
the data adequately. However note the plateau on the down leg (enlarged in Figure 
A3.7), which was caused by the insertion of a 'frozen’ point. Although visually 
insignificant such instances cause difficulties when applying automated methods. 
Similarly note the delay on the final up leg (enlarged in Figure A3.8).
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Figure A 3 .1  Sample ofvltm  data from tank 11.
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Figure A 3 .2  Simulated scanivalve data
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Recorded scanivalve data
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Recorded data plotted over VLTM data
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Figure A3.4 Comparison o f recorded data with VLTM data
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Scanivalve data plotted against Recorded data
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Figure A3.5 Recorded data compared with scanivalve data showing time shift.
Recirculation, Recorded data plotted over VLTM data
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Figure A3.6 Recirculation in tank VI1, VLTM and recorded data.
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Break in transfer due to frozen point
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Figure A3 . 8  Shifted sample-pot return
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APPENDIX 4
This appendix describes the affect on data collection software performance of varying 
a single parameter.
VLTM PARAMETER COMPARISON
The VLTM system has a number of user specified parameters which relate to data 
compression. Figures A4.1 and A4.2 are plots of actual VLTM level measurement 
data that are presented here to show the effect of varying a single key parameter 
‘Alarm Threshold’. The difference can be clearly seen.
“  1545
I 1544
Tima (s)
Figure A4.1 Level measurements with alarm threshold o f 0.03 kPa
I  867
Time {3)
Figure A4.2 Level measurements with alarm threshold 0.0 kPa
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ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS ASSURANCES IN REPROCESSING 
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E C Miller
EXECUTIVE SUMIMARY
Due to the large throughput in some reprocessing plants, safeguards measures in addition to 
those that are currently utilised are needed to provide "additional assurances" that the plant is 
operating as declared. This report outlines the concept of one such measure: the evaluation of 
process information to confirm that a facility is operating in a way declared by the operator. 
When doubts do arise, there must be sufficient evidence to justify the taking of this position. 
In addition, any approach must address the fact that inspector resources are finite, there is a 
requirement that their effort should be kept to a minimum. The amount of data analysis needed 
to confirm that operation is as declared will be significant if a high level of automation is to be 
achieved. Thus there should be considerable emphasis on the representation, storage and 
presentation of the data and of the evaluations. The concept outlined here seeks to meet these 
objectives. The proposed approach can be viewed as a candidate element of a “defence in- 
depth” approach that seeks to compliment accountancy-centred activities. This report focuses 
on the process area, brief descriptions of possible approaches for accountancy tanks, storage 
areas and finishing plants are given in an appendix.
An initial assessment would be based largely on the operator’s declaration, on data derived 
from a combination of pressure and temperature measurement systems installed in vessels, and 
on accountancy tank data. Further investigation might involve data from neutron detectors, 
XRF detectors, samples, flow meters, flow rate sensors, a measurement of the heat input into 
the concentrator and so on.
The approach described here is based on the concept known as analytical redundancy. Put 
simply, a plant can be viewed as a number of units that are connected together: if an incident 
occurs in one unit, its effect is likely to be observed in others so that any local effects must 
correlate with effects observed elsewhere. Detection and diagnosis is performed by looking at 
the entire picture, which makes falsification difficult. Put more formally, analytical 
redundancy exploits the inherent static and dynamic relationships among the measured 
variables. In other words one makes use of a mathematical model. Mathematical modelling is 
not new to nuclear materials safeguards; for instance materials accountancy is based on a 
discrete model of the hold-up in a plant. The concept here seeks to extend this model, and not 
to propose a quantum leap in the type of model adopted. Thus the concept is based on the 
application of a continuous materials account (or balance) to the plant; this account can be 
decomposed into a set of materials balances, one balance per plant unit, and each individual 
balance would be based on the transfers into and out of that unit. Some of these transfers 
would also appear in the materials balances pertaining to the plant units that are connected
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directly to this unit, because transfers are made from one unit to another. The balance 
equations would be connected. By analysing these transfers, the underlying goal is to confirm 
that the nuclear material contained in a plant can be distributed in such a way that it correlates 
with an inspector’s perception of what is going on in a plant, and with the measurements that 
are available. This goal would be reassessed continually because reprocessing plants operate in 
time. To do this, use is made of computer simulations to continually predict the distribution of 
material by solving these balances; this is akin to a continuous version of a discrete simulation 
of the hold-up in a plant i.e. of a running book inventory. Any disagreements that arise would 
then be output as events in what is known as an event list. Clearly in the process of performing 
these actions other goals arise, which increase the system’s capability.
The two basic elements that are required to achieve these goals are plant data and evaluation 
tools. In addition the storage and manipulation of data and knowledge are central if a high level 
of automation is to be achieved. Thus it is envisaged that any implementation would contain a 
kernel composed of two databases, a real-time database and an object oriented database, both 
of which are available commercially. Appropriate, time-stamped data would be stored in the 
real-time database whilst other knowledge would be stored as objects. Co-ordinated by a real­
time software procedure known as the Executive, evaluation tools would estimate the transfers, 
perform the computer simulation, compare what is predicted with what is observed, and 
corroborate any conclusions reached by referring to other data (knowledge) sources.
The methodology is largely unproven, based on software developments that are evolving all 
the time, and would require an extensive programme of work to ensure its suceess on a 
commercial facility. Thus the conclusions contain recommendations as to how the approach 
should be implemented. Considerable thought has gone into ensuring that, having invested so 
much in its implementation, the evaluation tools can be evolved so that the system matches up 
to expectations. It is important that appropriate data is collected; although the analytical tools 
can evolve, the data cannot i.e. one cannot go back and collect the same data again. Similarly 
it is important that both the structure of the databases and the specification of their numerous 
data fields are carefully thought about; it is difficult to re-build a database once it has started to 
be used.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Due to the large throughput in some reprocessing plants, safeguards measures in addition to 
those that are currently utilised are needed to provide "additional assurances" that the plant is 
operating as declared. This report outlines the concept of one such measure: the evaluation of 
process information to confirm that a facility is operating in a way declared by the operator. 
When doubts do arise, there must be sufficient evidence to justify the taking of this position. 
Although there might be many ways in which some level of assurance can be gained, few 
would have the capacity to generate appropriate evidence when needed. In addition, any 
approach must address the fact that inspector resources are finite, there is a requirement that 
their effort should be kept to a minimum. The amount of data analysis needed to confirm that 
operation is as declared will be significant if a high level of automation is to be achieved. Thus 
there should be considerable emphasis on the representation, storage and presentation of the 
data and of the evaluations. The concept outlined here seeks to meet these objectives. 
Although various aspects might have been examined in the past [1-3], it is largely unproven, 
based on software developments that are evolving all the time, and would require an extensive 
programme of work to ensure its success on a commercial facility.
The report contains an outline, a description of how the evaluation system would function, 
some details about its possible implementation, some comments that largely derive from 
questions that have been posed by others, and conclusions, in which a route to implementation 
is recommended. The report is intended to provide a broad overview of the approach, whilst 
the details and some examples are given in the appendices. The evaluation system would be 
composed of a large number of tools. Each tool is classified as being a member of one of eight 
toolboxes. Each toolbox is outlined in the main text and described in detail in Appendix 5. 
Results from various case studies are given in Appendix 6 to show how the approach would 
work when faced with various incidents.
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2. OUTLINE
2.1 Overview
The proposed approach can be viewed as a candidate element of a “defence in-depth” approach 
that seeks to compliment accountancy-centred activities [4]. It utilizes:
* plant design information and early consultations;
e plant process operational data/declarations;
• extensive inspector’s data.
The inspector’s data would largely derive from a combination of pressure and temperature 
measurement systems installed in vessels [5]. Appropriate data evaluation tools will be 
required for these systems, which represent a considerable investment in both hardware 
installation and software development.
The measure described here is a concept for such an evaluation tool, and is based on the 
concept known as analytical redundancy (Appendix 1). Put simply, a plant can be viewed as a 
number of units that are connected together: if an incident occurs in one unit, its effect is likely 
to be observed in others so that any local effects must correlate with effects observed 
elsewhere. This can be likened to a jigsaw puzzle: not only must the picture on a particular 
piece of jigsaw relate to the overall picture, but also the piece must connect with neighbouring 
pieces. Put more formally, analytical redundancy exploits the inherent static and dynamic 
relationships among the measured variables. In other words one makes use of a mathematical 
model. Mathematical modelling is not new to nuclear materials safeguards; for instance 
accountancy is based on a discrete model of the hold-up in a plant. The concept here seeks to 
extend this model, and not to propose a quantum leap in the type of model adopted. Thus the 
concept is based on continuous materials balances like those for a tank:
(1)dt
and
^  = (2)
where M is a mass, f is a volumetric flow rate, square brackets [] are used to denote a 
concentration and ps is the solution density. Some of these flow rates would also appear in the 
materials balances that would be formed for the plant units that are connected directly to this 
tank, because transfers are made from one unit to another. The equations would be connected. 
By analysing these transfers, the underlying goal is to confirm that the nuclear material 
contained in a plant can be distributed in such a way that it correlates with an inspector’s 
perception of what is going on in a plant, and with the measurements that are available. This 
goal would be assessed continually because reprocessing plants operate in time. To do this, 
use is made of computer simulations to continually predict the distribution of material by 
solving these balances; this is akin to a continuous version of a discrete simulation of the hold­
up in a plant i.e. of a running book inventory. Clearly in the process of doing this other goals 
arise, which increase the system’s capability, and these will be discussed with the detail.
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Figure 1 shows the way the concept would be implemented. Key novel features include the 
Real-Time Database, consisting of all measured and some calculated variables at all time 
points, the Operational History Database, containing the system’s perception of plant 
operation, and of course the Evaluation System where the goals would be assessed.
Such an approach is in accordance with the views of the LASCAR Working Group, which 
proposed that the verification of inventories of bulk materials should be supported by 
monitoring and evaluation of selected operating parameters.
Instrument Instrument Instrum entInstrum ent
Pre-processing Pre-processing
Inspector's
c onven tiona l
d a ta b a se
O pera to r
d a ta ba se
O p e ra tion a l 
history d a to b a s e
Inspector's reol-tim 
d a tabase
Evaluat ion  too l
Figure 1: The Evaluation Tool’s Place
2.2 Overall Aims
This report focuses on the process area, brief descriptions of possible approaches for 
accountancy tanks, storage areas and finishing plants are given in Appendix 2. Many 
operations occur daily in a process area of an operating reprocessing plant, e.g tanks are filled 
and emptied. These activities can be observed by looking at inspector data such as would be 
available through Solution Monitoring (e.g. by observing changes in tank levels).
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The overall aim of this approach is to confirm that observations derived from inspector data 
correlate with the operations declared by the operator and that no other operations have arisen; 
all significant features in the observations must be explained. In practice a number of 
disagreements are likely to arise daily. Operators may fail to declare an operation, plant 
problems may lead to unusual operations, sensors may function incorrectly and so on .. Most of 
these events are of little interest to a nuclear materials safeguards inspector and so a number of 
stages of data processing and evaluation would be required to extract those events that might 
be of importance;
detect —> hypothesise ^  follow-up —> unresolved
disagreement possible causes disagreement
The main visible output from the system would be a list of events. Reasons as to why they 
have been generated must be given so that these alternative causes can be evaluated.
This concept for evaluation software has been developed with the following objectives:
® to minimise the number of disagreements that arise in the first place;
® to minimise the inspection effort in the detection and hypothesis stages;
* to follow-up on only those disagreements where there is serious doubt;
« to describe the disagreements in a way that is transparent to the inspector; the intention is
that, on the majority of occasions, the inspector would ‘accept’ the disagreement as being 
of no further interest;
® to suggest follow-up action when needed.
The data evaluation system must be robust. Evaluation should not make too many assumptions 
about the data that is likely to be collected. For instance, although a transient in level observed 
in a certain tank might often look the same as before, one cannot assume that this will always 
be the case.
The methods described here would be implemented as computer software. Although 
commercial, high-level software tools are available that enable the systems developer to 
produce systems relatively easily, a considerable amount of effort would still be required in 
specification, programming and testing. For purposes of cost and of QA, it is important that 
the specification is clear and well stmctured. Given the need not to overburden the inspector, 
the user interface is of particular concern. The next sub-section outlines the various stages.
2.3.1 The various stages
Detect a disagreement: in order for the evaluation system to detect an irregularity, the system 
must have actual plant data and reference data with which to make a comparison. This 
reference data, which describes what would be expected to be observed if the plant was to be 
operated as expected, would largely derive from simple mathematical models of the plant. It is 
also important that the right plant data is collected: the system will only be able to detect an 
irregularity if it can be observed in the data \ At this stage, the source of the disagreement 
doesn’t matter, only its effect on the observed variables.
In fault detection circles the term characteristic variable is used to denote an appropriate variable 
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Hypothesise possible causes: in order for the evaluation system to generate hypotheses for why 
a disagreement has arisen, the system must be based on a methodology that allows as many 
alternatives as possible to be admissible, and to allow for the possibility that the cause has not 
been previously thought of. Simply saying, for instance, “Features X, Y & Z must imply 
Diversion D” would soon lead to false alarms. Instead it is proposed that the system offers 
likely alternative causes to explain the observed data, categorised as either ‘normal operation’, 
‘operational fault’ or ‘needs follow-up’, and orders these in some way.
Follow-up: each cause that is categorised as ‘needs follow-up’ would have a set of instructions 
associated with it, which would seek to eonfirm that that particular cause had actually occurred. 
If a particular cause is identified then it is likely that the disagreement would be re-categorised 
as either ‘normal operation’ or ‘operational fault’. However it is possible that it would remain 
unresolved.
Unresolved disagreement: it is important that the reasoning process that leads to this 
declaration should be transparent. In addition sufficient evidence must be available to justify 
this action.
2.4 Additional Assurance
Additional assurance would be obtained because of an increased capability to gather and to 
correlate evidence. An increased deterrence would be achieved by increasing the risk of 
detection through
• an increased awareness of tank operations; this is especially because undeclared changes 
in the contents of tanks would be correlated with effects observed elsewhere;
• an increased transparency in the operation of other process units;
• an increased likelihood to detect potential falsification of information through the use of 
corroborating instmmentation and through analytical redundancy.
Various case studies have shown that the system is capable of responding to certain diversion 
scenarios that are smaller than those that could be detected by an NRTA system. The teim 
‘responding to’ is used to highlight the fact that the results from the evaluation would not be in 
the form of alarms (i.e. in detection) but of information, layered to minimise inspector 
interaction.
2.5 Data Sources
2.5.1 Reference Data
Since plant data is temporal, so is reference data. Thus it is envisaged that the real-time 
database (see Figure 1) would also contain data fields pertaining to calculations, as opposed to 
measurements. The processes involved in producing suitable data also provide opportunities 
for detecting disagreements. It is important to appreciate that disagreement detection would be 
distributed in that a number of different tools would be involved. Before discussing these 
processes, data availability is first examined. The data might come from a number of sources: 
from the declared operation, from the operator’s DCS, and from inspector data.
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2.5.2 Declai'ed Operation
The declared operation would be in two parts: Category A and Category B. Category A would 
include that data that is declared conventionally, i.e. the operator’s declaration. The 
operator’s declaration would include data pertaining to KMP transfers, an “interim” physical 
inventory for NRTA and the conventional physical inventory taken relatively infrequently. 
Category A is then parameterised by a set of times of events, temperature measurements, level 
measurements, sample concentrations and sample densities that pertain to these points and 
vessels. Operator’s declaration -  Category B pertains to new additional data, which primarily 
consists of qualitative descriptions of the operation of the main stages of the process. Very 
little of this data would be used in the system directly, and none is essential. Its main purpose 
is to avoid unnecessary operator/inspector dialogues, which might otherwise arise if a 
disagreement is detected. Two examples are given here to explain this.
1. The Cycles and Concentrator represent hidden inventories, the contents of which would 
fluctuate with operation. Although the flow sheet and hence (approximate) inventory 
might be deduced by monitoring the various streams, this would be somewhat intrusive 
and complicated. It is far easier to “confirm” a flow sheet that has been declared.
2. Depending on the quantity of solution that leaves a tank during sampling and hence on 
the magnitude of the level depression thus caused, and on whether or not ‘acid 
substitution’ is an issue, sampling times might or might not be of interest.
The mode and frequency of declaration is open to discussion. Essentially there would a series 
of asynchronous declarations like “cycle_l flowsheet changed at time ... ”, which could be 
spawned automatically by the operator’s DCS, or entered via an electronic form when it 
happened, or once a day, or on demand. It is important to appreciate that this information 
would not be essential, it would just facilitate transparency.
2.5.3 Additional Operator Data That Will Be Required
This data differs, conceptually, from the above because an arrangement would have to be made 
with the operator so that DCS records could be transferred to Agency databases. There would 
be two types: data from other in-process instrumentation, and data pertaining to process 
controls. The precise information used in the evaluation would presumably be specified based 
on discussions between the Agency and the operators. Here we assume that all such 
information would be made available. However it is important to stress that not all data is 
essential, the acquisition of the various pieces of information merely leads to a more 
straightforward evaluation system. This will be discussed later.
Examples of the two types are shown below.
* Neutron detectors located in the main extraction and plutonium purification cycles to
detect spontaneous fission neutrons from Pu isotopes plus other neutrons from reactions 
in the solution; their outputs are usually compared with an alarm threshold.
® X-ray fluorescence monitors (to indicate relative atomic composition).
# Flow meters installed in the solvent-extraction area: these have low accuracy but high
precision. Thus although they might not be appropriate for quantitative calculations, they 
could be used to detect/confirm changes in plant operation.
• Data pertaining to the concentrator heating element.
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• Some form of indication that acid molarity is remaining constant at the outlets from the
solvent-extraction cycles and from the concentrator (electrical conductivity?).
• The set-point of the flow metering device on each of the active feeds;
• The set-point for the plutonium concentration output from the Concentrator.
2.5.4 Inspector Data
In addition to the nuclear materials data that is usually collected, inspector data would include 
pressure dip-tube measurement records pertaining to tank levels and densities plus 
temperatures [5]. The rates at which data would be recorded would be sufficiently fast to 
enable appropriate data analyses to be made. Although the data acquisition system would 
presumably convert this data into volume/density/temperature records, both the raw and the 
converted data would be stored. The raw data would be used to validate operation of the dip- 
tube system whilst the converted data would be input into the real-time database. It is well- 
known that the level/density measurement system has a propensity to be self-validating 
because the two key dip-tube pressure signals are highly correlated. To reduce the complexity 
of the analysis system, and because it is sensible anyway, it would be preferable that faults 
internal to level/dip-tube instrumentation should be isolated separately. Adherence to the 
recently proposed standard on SEVA sensors might be beneficial here because this would 
provide a communication protocol between the sensor validation system and the evaluation 
system that includes an instrument health status. Thus a system is envisaged like that shown in 
Figure 2. Although not essential it would be useful if data collection was synchronised 
between tanks i.e. the ‘output the average’ signal was synchronised. It is also worth pointing 
out that it does not appear to be uncommon for tank levels to drop below their density dip- 
tubes. Such eventualities must be accommodated in any data evaluation software.
It is also recommended that samples should be taken from certain tanks for a number of 
reasons:
• to guard against ‘substitution’ of solution with acid;
• to validate certain assumptions made about the reference data.
There is clearly a limit to the number of samples that could be collected and analysed. An 
analysis might be required as part of a follow-up activity but not all samples collected need be 
analysed. In order to provide a certain level of effectiveness, it is recommended that samples 
be collected and stored, temporarily for a day or two and frequently. An alternative approach 
that is probably less powerful but more practicable is to adopt some form of random sampling 
strategy in which a sample is taken from each tank every now and then.
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Figure 2 Dip-tube output pre-processing
2.6 Strategy
In very broad terms, the approach is based around simple simulations of the plant. Simple 
simulations are used in a number of different roles: in generating reference data, in generating 
boundary conditions for other simulations, and in reasoning about disagreements. Since the 
plant data is largely composed of tank volumes and densities, the focus of the simulations is on 
these variables. However plutonium is of primary interest, and hence there are also 
simulations that describe its flow and hold-up. The underlying strategy, which can also be 
stated in terms of a simulation, is given in the next paragraph.
A plant is deemed to be operating as declared if a simulation can be constructed that is in 
agreement with plant measurements over two different time intervals:
9 short term: broadly equivalent to 1.5 cycles of filling/emptying a buffer tank;
« medium term: broadly equivalent to ten cycles of filling/emptying a buffer tank.
Note that the long term is not considered because other approaches would be more appropriate. 
Evaluation over the short-term is to provide assurance that something like 0.1 SQ is not 
diverted over a period < 1 cycle.
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Evaluation over the medium term is
1. to provide assurance that something like 0.25 SQ is not diverted over a longer period < 10 
cycles;
2. to obtain additional assurances by
a) confirming that samples correlate with our understanding of plant operation;
b) confirming that the interim PI, which is taken for purposes of NRTA, correlates 
with our understanding of plant operation;
3. to maintain an understanding of the way material is distributed throughout the plant. This 
would also provide initial conditions for the short term evaluations.
The simulation is constructed by taking a fixed model (i.e. one whose balance equations etc. 
are specified apriori) and driving it with material movements derived in a number of stages:
1. flow rate estimation;
2 .
>  short term: constrained adjustment along pre-defined paths;
>  medium term: inverse modelling.
This leads to a structure in which a number of tools (modules) are engaged to build-up a 
‘picture’ of plant operation that is ‘housed’ in two databases, the Real-Time Database and the 
Operation History Database. The Operational History Database is used to store that data that is 
not time-stamped. It need not contain a complete record of plant activities and is more likely 
to be based on data objects. There would be three categories: those pertaining to declared 
operation, to events and to process units.
It is important to appreciate the temporal nature of the evaluation environment, plant data 
would be continually entered into the real-time database whilst evaluations take place. In this 
environment different activities would take place at different times, co-ordinated by some kind 
of ‘Executive’, which would have processes responsible for the short and medium tenn 
activities. This environment is outlined in the next main section.
2.6.1 Plant Mathematical Models
The plant models would be dynamic, quantitative and deterministic. They would be based on 
the plant design, and on possible plant operation and would be substantiated through the DIV 
process. They would not be what are commonly known as “process models” because they 
would not contain detailed equations pertaining to solvent extraction or evaporation. Instead 
they would largely derive from balances of water, plutonium, nitric acid and any other 
components where the choices of matter ‘balanced’ would vary and depend on the process 
units involved.
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2.7 Complexity and Inspector Involvement
By now the reader might be getting an impression that the system proposed will be 
complicated and involve considerable inspector effort. As with nuclear materials accountancy 
systems, there are compromises: inspector involvement versus software complexity, power to 
detect versus false alarm rate and so on. The aim here is to minimise inspector involvement by 
automating as much as possible. The resultant software complexity would then be handled, in 
part, by selecting appropriate software tools, in part by aiming for a professional, software 
engineered implementation of modular constmction and in part by ensuring that the 
implementation is not overly dependent on any one evaluation tool. One major aim must be to 
ensure that there is a proper software specification. Another must be to ensure that the system 
would remain operational, at least sub-optimally, even if a hypothetical situation arises where 
all the evaluation tools prove to be totally useless.
However, complete automation is undesirable because some degree of user interaction is 
sensible. As with nuclear materials accountancy systems, the aim is to detect the occuiTence of 
certain situations without having to respond to other situations (i.e. false alarms) as well. The 
difficulty is in discriminating between these two classes. Although the system could be 
configured so that it only detects really serious situations, this would raise two concerns: 
firstly, given that the system might never alarm, how does one know that it is working 
properly?, would anyone have the expertise to access it if this very unusual event actually 
occurred?, and secondly, how does one define a ‘really serious situation’ anyway? Thus there 
is a need to interact with two types of person: with an inspector, largely for training/refresher 
purposes, and with someone from systems studies, who is able to monitor and to adjust (i.e. to 
evolve) the performance of the system.
2,8 Data Collection and Storage
It is important to have a high data collection rate (e.g. every 15 seconds) to view the start and 
stop of process operations clearly. If data storage is an issue then frequent archiving is 
preferable to data compression. If data compression is to be used, then algorithms should be 
chosen with care so that pertinent features are observed [6]. Similarly if the hardware form of 
data compression, i.e. multiplexing using for instance scanivalves, is to be used then their 
outputs should be recorded with care. As part of the follow-up activities, sometimes it might 
be necessary to discuss a particular irregularity with the operators. This might lead to the 
operators consulting their own records to corroborate or refute the disagreement. The most 
appropriate measurement records are likely to contain measurements pertaining to tank 
volumes and densities. If data compression is used in the operator’s data recording system and 
it is different from that used in the inspector’s, then discrepancies might well arise. This issue 
should be addressed before a detailed systems specification is produced.
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3. THE EVALUATION ENVIRONMENT
The composition of the evaluation environment can be described in a number of different 
ways. From the function viewpoint the environment can be described in terms of an Executive 
that invokes tools to process & evaluate the data; the aim is to confirm that the plant is 
operating as specified. From the implementation viewpoint the environment can be described 
in terms of computational processes that interact with data input and with data stored in 
databases; the aim is to generate a list of events that describe any disagreements that have been 
detected and not explained. This section outlines the function viewpoint, the implementation 
viewpoint is discussed in the next section, A number of examples are given in Appendix 6 of 
how the various tools combine together to evaluate a particular scenario.
3.1 Plant Topology
For simplicity it is assumed that all the plutonium takes a ‘single’ route through the plant. The 
plant can then be viewed as a sequence of segments each composed of either a tank set or a 
process area. Where branching does occur, for example for reworking and at Pu/U separation, 
plutonium flows along the secondary branches would normally be viewed as flows to hidden 
inventory unless the actual inventories of these branches are estimated. If, for instance, 
appropriate data is available for a rework tank and the rework route spans two segments, then 
the rework tank would be included in the exporting segment.
3.2 The Executive
The role of the Executive (Appendix 3) is to confirm that the plant is operating as specified. It 
does this by invoking various tools, either when appropriate data becomes available or when a 
particular time is reached. The tools are contained in toolboxes, which address different 
functions (Table 1). Toolboxes 1-4 contain tools that provide those boundary conditions 
needed by the simulations. Toolboxes 3&4 have another role in that they contain tools that 
estimate flow rates, which are good indicators of plant operation, and hence can be used to 
detect disagreements (Toolbox 6). Toolbox 7 contains tools that provide hypotheses to explain 
the disagreements and then to output the most appropriate as events. Toolbox 8 contains tools, 
which gather data to corroborate these hypotheses.
The Executive is therefore driven by signals (which announce that a particular data package 
has arrived) and by timers. Its main output is that of an Event List, which contains events 
layered in order of importance. Figures 3-6 show the order in which the Executive schedules 
the tools: Figure 3 pertains to a tank-set. Figure 4 to a solvent-extraction cycle. Figure 5 to the 
concentrator and Figure 6 to a rework line. Measurement data flows from the tanks, solvent- 
extraction cycles and concentrator, both into databases and also into evaluation tools. The 
Executive schedules on the basis of decision boxes and boxes marked short-term assurances 
and medium-term assurances. For instance, box ‘Decision 1’ executes Tool 3b once data 
pertaining to a single cycle has been collected. Box ‘Decision 2 ’ schedules execution of Tool 
5, configured explicitly for a particular tank set: it is invoked every time the tank set is deemed 
to have completed an operational cycle, which is usually the same as ‘when the buffer tank has 
completed an operational cycle’. (A timer is also provided to ensure that Tool 5 is always 
invoked at least once every 12 hours). Short-term assurances are only sought in response to an 
output from either of the detectors (Tools 6a & 6b). Medium term assurances are likely to be
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sought once daily. Note that assurances for the solvent-extraction stages and concentrator are 
not obtained explicitly, but implicitly by evaluating their interactions with neighbouring tank 
sets. Short-term and medium-term assurances are derived through what is known as model- 
based reasoning.
Toolbox 1: Estimation of transfers into/out of a buffer tank.
Toolbox 2: Generates nominal plutonium inventories for the solvent-extraction 
cycles and for the concentrator
Toolbox 3: Estimation of bulk flow rate -  receiving/feeding tanks only.
Toolbox 4: Estimation of the X and acid components in the continuous stream into 
a receiving tank.
Toolbox 5: Plant simulations.
Toolbox 6: Disagreement detection.
Toolbox 7: Model-based reasoning.
Toolbox 8: Confirmation of Operational Unit Statuses
Table 1; The Toolboxes
3.3 Events
Events are those instances that are deemed to be abnormal in some way. The operator can 
input these instances as part of the declaration (e.g. addition of acid), or they can be inferred by 
the evaluation system. In practice all events will be of a temporal nature (i.e. they will have 
start and stop times) and their effects might continue after their stop times and be observed by 
more than one evaluation tool. For instance material might disappear into hidden inventory at 
one time and re-appear at another. Because of this, each event is represented as a set of suh- 
events, each element of which focuses on a particular aspect that can be described by its 
symptoms. Diagnoses, to explain the symptoms, are therefore attached to the sub-events.
3.4 Model-Based Reasoning (data reconciliation)
Model-based reasoning is used to hypothesise sets of explanations (events), which, when 
applied to the computer simulations, predict a distribution of material that correlates with the 
declared operation. It aims to present reasonable explanations in terms of
• faulty instrumentation, transfers between monitored tanks, tank calibration equations and
so on;
© additions of material;
# withdrawals of material.
Here model based reasoning draws on both quantitative and qualitative techniques. The 
quantitative techniques are based on various approaches to what is known as ‘inverse 
modelling’. The qualitative techniques are based on rules (known as productions) and search 
strategies. The overall philosophy is one of evidence gathering and hypothesis generation 
rather than of finding explanation’ for a particular disagreement. This is because the 
evaluation system is likely to have incomplete knowledge and the data that is available is 
unlikely to indicate a unique ‘explanation’. The hypotheses would be ordered with the most
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appropriate selected automatically. Each hypothesis would be supported by symptoms and 
diagnoses.
To explain the underlying argument that is involved, consider a sequence of N plant units 
(tanks, cycles and concentrator) and construct a plutonium mass balance for each unit. If all 
the right hand sides of these equations are now summed together, and then all the left hand 
sides are summed together, one obtains:
N N t
^ M a s s ;( t)  = ]^M ass^(0) + J flow _ rate _ ini (t) - f lo w  „  rate _ out^(t) dt (3)
1 1 0
That is, and as would be expected, the change in total mass is governed solely by the flow 
rates, or transfers, at the start and finish of the sequence. If the sequence represents an MBA 
then these transfers are at KMPs, which are already monitored accurately; thus the total mass is 
already monitored and the internal flow rates merely determine how the material is distributed. 
This distribution cannot be measured directly, but must be inferred from what can be measured 
and from knowledge of plant operation, which is encapsulated in the computer simulation of 
the plant. Of key importance is the fact that the operation of the tank sets are observable, 
directly, whilst the operation of process units are not. This has a number of implications: 
firstly each non-observable unit can be viewed as a single entity or unit, secondly, if a 
disagreement in an observable unit can be ‘explained’ by a material transfer across its external 
boundary, this material can hide, temporarily, in a connecting non-observable unit. This results 
in three stages of analysis that seek to answer the following:
1. how can the material be re-distributed to satisfy that observed?
2. can this re-distribution be corroborated by supporting evidence?
3. what event description best matches these re-distributions?
Re-distribution is examined in two different time-frames, the short term and the medium term. 
The system is not intended to be used to detect incidents that span the long-term (e.g. a 
diversion of less than say 0.005 significant quantity per hour). Although nominally model- 
based reasoning is assigned to Toolbox 7, it also makes use of simulations (Toolbox 5) and 
detectors (Toolbox 6). The reasoning process is therefore co-ordinated by the Executive and 
Toolbox 7 contains tools to support the reasoning processes.
3.5 Compensating For Tank Calibration Errors
Being based on flowrates estimated on the basis of volume changes, the approach is 
particularly sensitive to errors in volume change estimation. Additive errors in tank calibration 
are not of major concern because the emphasis is on volume changes and additive errors cancel 
out when calculating these changes. However, as explained by Burr & Wangen [10], 
multiplicative errors do not cancel out. A number of test cases are shown in Appendix 7, 
which have been produced to show how multiplicative errors affect the redistribution of 
material in a simulation as compared to in the real plant. The way in which material would 
redistribute over time would depend on the distribution of the multiplicative errors and on 
which volume data is used to estimate which flowrate. An error in a tank does not result in a 
redistribution at all (i.e. the effects of the error are confined to the tank itself) if certain flow 
rates are used in the calculation. However redistribution does occur otherwise especially if a 
number of tanks have significant multiplicative errors. Clearly the effects of these errors
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would tend to mask the visibility of other activities going on in the plant and hence tools are 
needed to identify and accommodate their existence. Toolbox 7 therefore contains two tools 
(7b"4 & 7b-5) that can be used to identify these errors.
14 UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA
SRDP-R279
•Receivinj
tank
B uf fe r  
tank
B u f f e r
tank
F e e d i n g
ta nk
T o o l  3a
Ï
ID
D e c i s i o n  
1
T o o l  3bID
Tool  4 ID
1
R e a l - T i m e
D a t a b a s e
A A A A
T o o l  5
m
T oo l  l a
ID
Dec i s ion  
2
M e d i u m - t e r m
A s s u r a n c e
T o o l  7b T oo l  7cm
C o n v e r t C o n v e r t C o n v e r t C o n v e r t
T o o l  6a
Id
T o o l  6a S h o r t - T e r mA s s u r a n c e
T o o l  5 To o l  7aHJ
► T o o l  6a
Too l  6b
_HJ
T
To 
r.t. 
D a t a b a s e  
A
T o o l  3a
rr
De c i s io n  
1
T o o l
' V
T o o l
1
Tool  5
rr
>f
Tool
Figure 3: Tool invokation schedule for a tank-set
UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA 15
SRDP-R279
XRF
Detectors
Neutron
Detectors Inactive Feed 
Flow rates
Active Feed 
Metering
Alarms
Change detection
Operational History Database
Real-Time Database
Tool 2
Solvent Extraction Stage
Figure 4: Data flows for a solvent-extraction cycle
16 UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA
SRDP-R279
Plutonium concentration 
at outlet
Heat input
Active feed 
metering
Change detection
Operational history database
Tool 2
Real-time database
Concentrator
Figure 5: Data flows for the concentrator
Tool la
Rework 1Rework 2
Tank set (i + 1)Tank set i Solvent extraction 
or
concentration
Figure 6: Data flows for re-work tanks
UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA 17
SRDP-R279
3.6 Density measurements
Before describing the individual tools, it is important to appreciate that density measurements 
are just that. At a given temperature T, the density, pg, of any solution, which is likely to be 
present, can be calculated on the basis of a correlation like [8]:
A (T ) = p M )  + ^P.(T)*[Pu] + «t„,(T)HH+]+  (4)
where pw(T) is the density of water, [Pu] is the volumetric concentration (g/1) of plutonium, 
[H] is the molarity and ^re coefficients. If the solution density, acid
molarity and temperature are known then the concentration can be obtained. However if only a 
density measurement is available, and without making any further assumptions, the individual 
components cannot be estimated separately. The term X is used to denote this fact:
f,(TT)== (5)
The incorporation of density measurements therefore depends on the assumptions that can be 
made about the composition. Since the simulation starts at the input accountancy tank, where 
composition is known, and works forwards through the plant, individual components can be 
traced as far as the first ‘hidden inventory’. This can be achieved by adding mass balances 
pertaining to acid molarity, U and unsp (unspecified: for all other components) to the 
simulation. Plutonium concentration can now be confirmed using the density measurements. 
A similar process can be applied after the first cycle, and so on, provided that the composition 
can be assumed at the start of each set of tanks. Tools in Toolbox 4 4 is intended to obtain the 
information required.
3.7 The Individual Tools
Each tool is outlined here; a more detailed description is given in Appendix 5. The 
introduction to Appendix 5 also contains descriptions of two methods that are used extensively 
by the tools: Cusum detection and recursive least squares (RLS). These tools read from and 
write to the Real-Time Database: for ease of reference. Appendix 4 tabulates some of its fields.
Toolbox 1 : Estimation of bulk transfers into/out of a buffer tank.
Toolbox 1 contains two tools. Tool la  is for normal batch tanks whilst Tool lb  is for 
accountancy tanks. The description here is of Tool la. Estimation would be based on changes 
in tank volume. This is straightforward if the transfer is to or from another buffer tank as 
opposed to a feeding/receiving tank. It is also straightforward if the time taken to transfer 
to/from a feeding/receiving tank is alwavs relatively small. Note the emphasis is on the word 
‘always’ since this is up to the operators. If this is not the case then a more sophisticated 
approach is needed (Toolbox 3).
The automatic estimation of a volume change might not be that straightforward: noise might be 
present on the volume measurements and the transfer might ‘taper’ asymptotically (i.e. take a 
long time to finish). Hence it is unlikely that the most appropriate algorithm can be specified 
without reference to actual data. The method proposed here was developed with reference to 
TRP batch transfer data [14] and should be close to what is required. It combines the concept 
of the standard Shewhart control chart [22, 23] with RLS estimation. An RLS estimate of 
volume, V, is produced (i.e. Vris) to filter the ‘noise’. This estimate is delayed slightly to
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improve the detection of abrupt changes and the errors (V -  
and upper control limits:
Upper Control Limit: V - Vris > FuC^ x 
Lower Control Limit V - Vris < FlCTx
Vris) are then tested against lower
(6)
(7)
where nominally 0 % is the standard deviation of (V -  Vris), and Fu & F l specify the maximum 
allowable deviation of the data. A change is detected when V intercepts either control limit. 
Figures 7a & 7b show the algorithm detecting the start and stop points of a transfer out: the 
centre line, Vris, is enveloped by upper and lower control lines, which increase significantly 
when a change occurs. Both the points identified in Figure 7a have been obtained by first 
detecting a change, selecting the next data point in time (as in Figure 7b), then working 
backwards through the time series, V, to find the most likely turning point.
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Figure 7: a) Yris enveloped by upper and lower control limits during a typical transfer
with points detected as shown; b) close-up of start of transfer showing data 
point that is chosen prior to tracing backwards
Toolbox 2: Generates nominal plutonium inventories for the solvent-extraction cvcles and for 
the concentrator.
The authors have been told [9] that tools would be provided that produce these inventories on 
the basis of the declared operation.
Toolbox 3: Estimation of bulk flow rate - receiving/feeding tanks onlv.
An estimate of the continuous flow rate into a tank (for a receiving tank) or out of a tank (for a 
feeding tank) would be obtained by observing changes in its volume. This method would work 
in tandem with Tool 1, which would account for those other changes in volume, in the same 
tank, caused by transfers to/from buffer tanks. If metering device outputs are available on the 
continuous flow lines, this data could be used instead. Tool 3, and in the medium term Tool 
7b, outputs would then provide assurances about the accuracy of this data.
Toolbox 3 contains two tools, which, when combined together, estimate flow rate. Tool 3a 
identifies the individual fill/empty cycles in each tank. Tool 3b analyses each cycle after it has
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been identified. By definition, Tool 3a is applied continuously to the incoming data, whilst 
Tool 3b is invoked by the Executive (Decision 1) once a cycle. A separate copy of a. would be 
executing all the time for every receiving/feeding tank. Thus in operation several copies of 
Tool 3 would be running concurrently. The overview here will be for a receiving tank. The 
equations for a feeding tank would be very similar.
Let the volume in the tank, at any time t, be V, the flow rate in be hn and out be Lut- Then 
dV
—  =  -  f o u t (8)
Over a single cycle it is normal for the flow rate into the tank to remain fairly constant so that, 
without loss of generality,
A. (9)
where a\ is a constant over cycle i. The output is somewhat different:
f 0 ; t otherwise
where ts.i and tf,i are the times that the i^ transfer starts and finishes. The purpose of Tool 3 is
to estimate f\n\ out flow rate gout is estimated as a bonus. There are four stages:
Tool 3a: identification of a single cycle (i.e. fill then empty) and hence of times ts.i, tfj ;
Tool 3b:
1. estimation of Oi;
2. estimation of gout!
3. estimation of Afin.
Single Cvcle Identification
Parameter cxi is only estimated whilst fout is assumed to be zero. Thus the key points in the 
cycle are tf.i.j (some time after output has stopped), tg,i (the time at which output starts) and tfj 
(Figure 8). In practice it is difficult to detect ts,i and a time slightly later, is identified
instead. Point identification is via RLS and the Cusum test.
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Figure 8: Fill/empty cycle
Estimation of (Xi
The aim is to estimate parameter % over the time period t: < t < where time ts,i is not
known. There are various ways of doing this: the crudest is to perform RLS estimation over a 
time period, starting sometime after tfj.i and finishing sometime before when it is fairly 
certain that there isn’t any output taking place; more sophisticated versions avoid making this 
assumption by estimating parameters oti , ts.i, C.i ^od p over the time period t: 
where fS o u t d t
(11)
i.e. an average flow rate out, p, is assumed for the very small time period t: < t<  In the
latter, Equation 7 is solved to provide volume estimates V, which can be compared with the 
measurements taken from the tank. Estimation is then achieved by choosing those parameters 
that minimise the cumulative sum of the differences squared:
m ^  ^
Errsum = ( 12)
i= I
where:
V = tank volume
meas — measurement value sim — simulated value
Simulated annealing is used to identify these parameters.
Estimation of Flow out
Numerical differentiation is performed over the time interval t: . < t<  .. Alternatively the
flow rate can be obtained by looking at the tank downstream.
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Estimation of Afin
This flow out estimation is then used in the estimation of Afin over the time interval 
t: <t^.. Even during normal operation it is likely that the flow into/out of a
feeding/receiving tank will deviate significantly from OQ. An observer is used as the estimator 
(see Toolbox 7).
Toolbox 4: Estimation of the X and acid components in the continuous stream into a receiving 
tank.
Toolbox 4 contains a single tool: an estimate of the concentration of X flowing into a receiving 
tank would be obtained by observing changes in its level & density. The acid concentration 
would then be inferred from equation 3 because the plutonium concentration would have been 
obtained from the simulation and constant (near zero?) values could be assumed for all the 
other components.
Toolbox 5: Plant simulations.
The methodology uses simulations in many different guises. Toolbox 5 encompasses those 
that are what one might call ‘straight forward simulations’. Starting from the input 
accountancy tank and provided that estimates of the inter-tank volume transfers are available, it 
is straightforward to simulate the flow of material through the plant until it reaches the first 
‘hidden inventory’ (a solvent-extraction cycle). This cycle would be modelled as a ‘black 
box’, where the steady state plutonium inventory would be available from another source (Tool 
2). The plutonium/uranium split would also be mirrored in the simulation. On the uranium 
side, the simulation would stop once the uranium has passed through the receiving tank and 
one buffer tank. On the plutonium side the simulation would be more extensive. The 
simulation would continue on through the next set of tanks and so on until the concentrator is 
reached. As with the cycles, the concentrator could largely be viewed as a ‘black box’, where 
the steady state plutonium inventory would be available from another source (Tool 2).
For computational simplicity the process area should not be simulated as a whole, but instead 
each tank set and process unit should be simulated separately as individual segments. Each 
segment would be composed of one or more discrete units with zero-inventory connections. If 
it is anticipated that there might ‘normally’ be shipper/receiver differences between two tanks 
caused by pipe ‘hold-up’, then simple hold-up models should be included in the simulation to 
accommodate small amounts of carry-over. At present it is envisaged that Toolbox 5 would 
contain a single tool, which would be called with an argument that identifies the segment to be 
simulated. The implementors might prefer to have tools that simulate each segment separately.
There are therefore two types of model, one that pertain to tanks and one that pertains to 
‘hidden’ inventories like solvent-extraction cycles and the concentrator. The tank simulation is 
composed of a number of materials balances like Equation 2 i.e.
^  = (13)dt
The solvent-extraction cycle model is based on the steady state follower approach. This 
involves the formation of pairs of equations, one to accommodate changes in the process flow 
sheet and one to accommodate deviations from the nominal value. The first pair models the 
plutonium inventory:
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= (14)
= 4  -  fo... [ f « L  (15)at
where Inom is the nominal plutonium hold-up of the cycle, I is its actual ‘current value’, T is a 
time constant obtained during commissioning (Need only be known approximately) and Ihinv is 
a second inventory that models the deviations. A second pair models the uranium inventory. 
If it is assumed that the plant is operating to flow sheet,
d l
^  = 0 = > [P « L ,= ------- -— (16)
dt L
That is the flow rate of plutonium leaving the cycle could be calculated provided that the bulk 
flow rate out is both known and compatible with the flow sheet (i.e. equations 14 & 16 need to 
be solved; equations 14 & 15 would need to be solved otherwise). A similar equation holds for 
the uranium. In the absence of a more sophisticated estimator [7], a similar approach could be 
adopted for the concentrator.
Thus all that are required are the inter-unit flow rates, which is the function of Tools 1 & 3, and 
nominal hold-ups, which is the function of Tool 2.
Toolbox 6: Disagreement detection.
Detectors are used:
a) to identify disagreements in single data streams: their general location and approximate 
time span (Tool 6a);
b) to detect disagreements between simulation and plant measurements: start time, location 
(usually open-ended i.e. no stop time -  Tool 6b);
c) to detect disagreements between data streams (Tool 6c).
The way in which an incident would be detected would depend on its location and on when it 
occurred in the relevant operational cycles. Table 2 indicates most of those possibilities 
associated with tanks. Thus these possibilities would be detected using either a) or b) above. 
Item c) would be used when looking at, for instance the change in the U/Pu ratio across Cycle
1. Figures A.6 & A.7 in Case 1, Appendix 6 shows a typical output that one might expect from 
a detector. Detection is deemed to be positive if the test variable deviates from zero 
excessively.
Having detected a disagreement, it is important that this fact is recorded so that a system 
response can be generated. A large part of Tool 6 is therefore devoted to the generation of 
appropriate data objects: on detection a sub-event is created and the reasons for its creation are 
attached as symptoms.
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Location : T im e a) b)
Receiving tank; 
whilst only receiving
flow rate in error upstream
Receiving tank to a buffer tank: 
during a transfer
buffer tank level predicted high
Buffer Tank: no operations buffer tank level predicted high
Buffer tank to a buffer tank: during 
a transfer
buffer tank level predicted high
Buffer tank to a feeding tank: 
during a tiansfer
feeding tank level predicted low
Feeding tank: whilst only feeding flow rate out error downstream
Table 2: Application of detector categories a) & b) to tanks
Toolbox 7: Model-Based Reasoning (data reconciliation)
Toolbox 7 contains tools to support the reasoning processes, which are co-ordinated by the 
Executive. The Toolbox is divided into three compartments: 7a for the short term, 7b for the 
medium term, and 7c for corroboration and event generation. The main outputs from Tools 7a 
and 7b are diagnoses that explain the symptoms attached to the sub-events created by the 
detectors.
Compartment ‘a’
As written, Compartment ‘a’ contains a single tool. Tool 7a, which is based on a number of 
observers that examine different ways of redistributing material, one scenario per observer. An 
implementation that specifies a separate tool for each observer (Tool 7a-1 etc.) is equally 
acceptable. Observers [12] aie a particular kind of focused simulation in which a model 
prediction is ‘driven’ (in time) towards a specified variable (i.e. a target) by manipulating 
another specified variable. Here they focus on a single plant component. Manipulated 
variables pertain to concentrations or flow rates, and depend on the plant component involved. 
When certain disagreements are detected, the Executive invokes each observer in turn (Tool 
7a) and tests (Tool 6a) are applied to determine whether this manipulation would explain the 
disagreement. Time histories of the key variables and a score, which quantifies the relative 
importance/likelihood of that particular scenario, are then output as ‘diagnoses o f sub-events’. 
Case 1 in Appendix 6 is an example of what might be observed. Here three observers are used 
to examine three routes that might explain disagreements between the simulation and both the 
volume and density measurements in a receiving tank. The first observer involves movement 
to hidden inventory, the second manipulation of both plutonium concentration and molarity in 
the input stream, and the third plutonium concentration and ‘unspecified’.
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Compartment ‘b ’
Evaluation over the medium term is different because here the focus is on the development of a 
gradual mismatch between prediction and plant data. In reality there will always be 
mismatches even if the plant is operating normally. This is primarily because of the difficulties 
in estimating flow rates accurately with the net effect that the simulation will always gradually 
distribute material differently to the real plant. To correct for this, and at the same time, to be 
in a position to detect and diagnose an event that occurs gradually, the entire plant is analysed 
as one. That is the focus is macroscopic rather than microscopic. Simulations are now based 
solely on plutonium balances to minimise the complexity of the problem and Tool 7b is 
designed to redistribute plutonium over time to achieve an agreement. If an agreement can 
only be obtained by a large, contained redistribution, then this is marked as an issue in need of 
investigation.
An example of a medium term evaluation is given as Case 4 in Appendix 6. Here 
approximately 0.005 SQ/hr is taken from a buffer tank. A disagreement between simulation 
and plant data slowly builds up in the product accountancy tank until, after perhaps two or 
three days, it is eventually detected and the problem located to the buffer tank.
Compartment ‘c ’
Compartment ‘c ’ contains a number of mles sets and search strategies, which enable it to 
perform many different functions. Based on an ‘expert system’ approach, it is flexible and can 
evolve with operational experience and when new instrumentation becomes available. The 
functions that are envisaged at present include corroboration, correlation in time and temporal 
reasoning. The compartment is accessed via procedures. Tools 7c-1 and 7c-2. Tool 7c-1 
executes most of the functions contained in the compartment, Tool 7c-2 executes that sub-set 
that pertains to temporal reasoning.
Tool 7c-1
Diagnoses pertaining to individual sub-events would be corroborated by examining the statuses 
of the process units involved. This information would be obtained by Tool 8. Sub-events 
would be correlated in time to see if they pertain to the same event, and event objects would be 
generated for the most appropriate by examining their scores. Temporal reasoning would also 
be applied to combine events in time.
Tool7c-2
Temporal reasoning would be applied to combine events in time.
Toolbox 8: Confirmation of Operational Unit Statuses
The operational statuses of the various process units can be monitored to see if they are steady 
or fluctuating. Although pulsed columns can exhibit transient/erratic behaviour, this is of little 
interest because only the receiving tank is observed, and here such effects would not normally 
be seen. Thus the focus is on major changes that affect, for instance, neutron detectors or the 
flow rate of the product out of a cycle. Clearly the extent that this data can be used depends on 
what is made available. There would be two types of data-stream: Boolean, pertaining to 
operational alarms, and analogue, pertaining, for instance, to inactive feeds. Boolean signals
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can be written directly into the Real-Time Database, whilst analogue signals need to be pre- 
processed using Tool 8 so that either I (increasing), S (steady) or D (decreasing) is recorded.
3.8 Specification of Follow-up Actions
Follow-up actions are attached to event descriptions. A particular list of actions would be read 
when its associated event was written to the Operational History Database. This list might seek 
more infomiation, which, on writing to the various databases, might initiate more evaluations 
and so on. For instance a follow-up action might involve the taking of samples, the reporting 
of which would trigger a re- evaluation based on their analyses.
3.9 To Conclude
The functional description has described how the evaluation would focus on the flow of 
material through tanks sets separated by ‘hidden inventories’, cycles and the concentrator. In 
addition there would be re-work tanks. Key features that distinguish the various sets of tanks 
include:
® a significant difference in plutonium concentration between them;
• the liquor in the first set is made up of many components;
• a greater variation in acid molarity in the tanks after the concentrator.
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4. IMPLEMENTATION
Any implementation would centre around two databases: the Real-Time Database, consisting 
of all measured and some calculated variables at all time points, and the Operational History 
Database, containing the system’s perception of plant operation and providing a means of 
storing data in another form than that with time stamping. Data would also be available in 
conventional databases (figure 1) such as a database containing information about samples. 
Both the evaluation system and user interfaces would then interact with these databases. 
Although each of the evaluation tools can be implemented separately, with appropriate 
graphical interfaces provided, it is assumed that minimal inspector interaction is required so it 
is envisaged that some form of real-time software process, an Executive, would schedule the 
tools with minimal ‘visible’ outputs.
The purpose of this section is to repeat aspects of the previous section but from an 
implementation point of view.
4.1 Real-Time Data Collection and Analysis
Volume, densitv and temperature measurements would be received on a regular basis and 
written into the Real-Time Database. Software processes (Tools 1 & 3a) would operate 
continuously with the database. Tool 1 would estimate the batch (volume) transfers into and 
out of the various tanks, whilst Tool 3a would identify when a fill/empty cycle has been 
completed. Data pertaining to batch transfers would be entered into both the Real-Time 
Database and the Operational History Database, whilst data pertaining to a continuous 
feed/receive cycle would be entered into the Operational History Database.
Where flow metering data is available, these would also be entered into the Real-Time 
Database as would the Boolean outputs (alarm or not) from neutron and XRF detectors. Real­
time data, pertaining to the concentrator heating element and the flow rates of inactive feeds, 
would be analysed in real-time and only the direction of a significant change (i.e. up or down) 
would be entered into the Real-Time Database (Tool 8).
4.2 Events
An event can be represented by a class of data object that has a description and set of sub­
events associated with it. Each sub-event would have a set of sub-classes representing its 
possible diagnoses and symptoms. For instance a brief description, location, times at which the 
event started and stopped, its time history and so on can be stored in a database. Two 
examples of how the data object might be constructed are given in Appendix 8.
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4.3 The Executive
The Executive is a software device that would co-ordinate the evaluation by executing scripts
in response to signals that tell it that certain activities have been completed (See Appendix 3).
The main signal/script combinations are listed below.
1. Detection of the end of a fill/empty cycle would trigger the execution of a script that 
would invoke Tool 3b (the other part of Tool 3), followed by Tool 4, which calls Tool 5 
solely for the process unit upstream, followed by Tool 6a. Data pertaining to the 
continuous transfers (i.e. outputs from Tool 3b) would be entered into the Real-Time 
Database and those pertaining to batch transfers would be entered into the Operational 
History Database. Tool 6a would output a signal if there were any significant changes in 
the continuous flow rate.
2. On receipt of a signal from Tool 6a, the Executive would invoke a script that would seek 
short-term assurances by executing a number of observer/detector combinations (Tools 
7a/6a) that look at specific ways in which these changes might be explained. Tool 7c 
would then be invoked to assess these explanations.
3. On positive change in volume of a rework tank (if monitored), confirm that it has been 
received from the appropriate tank; on negative change in volume of a rework tank (if 
monitored), confirm that it has been exported to the appropriate tank.
4. Chemical composition data for a particular tank set would be estimated by executing the 
appropriate simulation whenever its last buffer tank is emptied. Execution of Tool 6b 
would follow this.
5. On receipt of a signal from Tool 6b, the Executive would invoke a script that would seek 
short-term assurances by executing a number of observer/detector combinations (Tools 
7a/6b) that look at specific ways in which these changes might be explained. Tool 7c 
would then be invoked to assess these explanations.
6. A timer would trigger the script that seeks medium term assurances, perhaps every one or 
two days.
7. When input accountancy tank laboratory results are obtained, a script would be invoked 
to update various real-time database fields.
8. A signal would be received from the Samples Database whenever relevant sample data is 
entered. This would trigger a script that seeks both short and medium term assurances.
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4.4 The databases
It is assumed that there would be integrating software that would connect the tools together, 
co-ordinate input/output and interact with the inspector.
4.4.1 Nomenclature / Conventions
The plant is divided into a number of areas called segments. Each segment contains a number 
of plant units that are connected together. Each connection has a unique path identifier (path 
id) associated with it, e.g. c01t04 (i.e. cycle 1 to tank 4), together with two transfer data 
streams. Stream 1 (path id) describes the time history of the material entering the connection 
from the upstream process unit, whilst Stream2(path id) describes the time history of material 
entering/leaving the connection along a path other than through the normal exit into the 
downstream plant unit. An input data stream is then formed from these two transfer data 
streams; although the Stream2 flow rate can be positive or negative, both the Stream 1 and 
Input Stream flow rates must be positive. A diversion from the upstream unit would appear in 
Stream2.
A similar naming convention is used for transfers to/from hidden inventory e.g. tOlhOl and for 
measurement errors e.g. VOl is used to denote an error in tank_l volume. Use is also made of 
the ‘wild card’ symbol * e.g. t**h** denotes tank ‘not specified’ to hidden inventory ‘not 
specified’.
Both transfer data streams conform to the following format;
Time (t),
Bulk flow rate (f), Bulk density (p j ,
Acid conc. ([IT]), Pu conc. ([Pu]), U cone. ([U]), Other conc. ([unsp])
Stream 2
Stream 1 Downstream Unit
Figure 9: Data streams
If appropriate data is available that pertains to ‘off-path’ units, then this data would be included 
explicitly in the database, path identifiers would be assigned and the ‘branching’ would take 
place via Stream 1 & Stream2. Otherwise these units would be classed as hidden inventories.
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4.4.2 The Real-Time Database
That part of the Real-Time Database dedicated to, say. Tank 1 would look something like that 
shown in Table 3. Note that the streams to pertain to the connection upstream. A list of typical 
variables is given in Appendix 4.
Tank 1
Time Volum e Density Temp. State 1 ... Stream 1 Stream ! and so o n __
f [Pu]i„ f [PuJin
0
15
30
45
60
75
Table 3: Examples of Real-Time Database fields
The Real-Time Database would include the flow histories of material imported from the input 
accountancy tank and exported from the product accountancy tank. It would also store the 
states associated with the simulations to enable them to be executed from any instance of time. 
As shown, the database is viewed as being flat i.e. 2-dimensional. Although space savings 
could be made by changing the structure of the database, this is for the implementers to decide. 
Here the database is kept simple. An important feature is that when a new row (i.e. time 
interval) is created, it is filled with values indicating ‘not known’ and NOT zero.
4.4.3 The Operational History Database
The Operational History Database contains that information that is not time-stamped and is 
hence most likely to be based on data objects. There would be three categories of object: 
pertaining to declared operation, to events and to process units.
As required by the reasoning processes, part of the declared operation might be represented by 
data objects that describe the statuses of certain parts of the plant. For instance, the declared- 
operation::cycle_l object might look like:
declared operation: :cycle_l
status = ( ‘loaded’ ‘SAP’ ‘empty’) ; changed from empty to SAP to loaded 
times = (t312 ti) ; times at which status is deemed to have changed
where perhaps the current and past two statuses are stored.
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An event might be represented by a class of object that has a set of sub-classes representing its 
possible diagnoses and symptoms:
event_id Gevent_ids:
event_id : ; event_description = 
event_id:: sub-events = (sub-event_idl)
where sub-event_idl is an instance of the Sub-event object, which has attributes:
diagnoses = (diagnosis_idl) 
scores = (1)
symptoms = (symptom_idl)
diagnosis =
score =
link-with =
link-type =
where diagnosis_idl is an instance of the sub-class, sub-diagnosis, which has attributes:
sub-diagnosis ::path-type = 
sub-diagnosis: :path-id = 
sub-diagnosis: :quantity =
and symptom_idl is an instance of a sub-class with attributes:
error-in = 
path-id = 
start-time = 
stop-time -
Key data and the most recent history of individual plant units might be represented by the class 
of objects, unit, with attributes;
Unit„id =
Tank_type = "bujferjtank’
Tank_description = 'batchjtransfef 
Calibration_multiplicative„error = 
event_ids =
fill_times = (start time, end time), (start time, end time) and so on. 
empty_times = 
volume_transfers = 
mass_transfers =
But again this would be a decision for the system implementers.
It is assumed that data pertaining to samples would reside in a database elsewhere. A bridge 
would have to be constructed to this other database and synchronisation established so that the 
system is notified whenever relevant data is entered.
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4.5 Simulations
The simulations are ‘driven’ by data streams that describe transfer time histories. Prior to the 
execution of the simulation, appropriate data streams would be formed by
® extracting & rationalising the relevant data from the real-time database;
• superimposing any hypothesised scenarios onto the individual data streams.
Relevant data streams for the hypothesised scenarios would be obtained from the list of events 
and also from any sub-events, specifically identified but not yet entered onto the list.
The computer simulation is central to a number of the tools. Essentially consisting of materials 
balances and hence of ordinary differential equations, the simulation would be produced using 
a differential equation solver. The basic structure of a differential equation solver is shown in 
Figure 10. The inputs would consist of a start time, ts, a stop time, tf, a time increment At, and 
a time vector of input variables, u(t). Incremental time At, a sub-multiple of the data collection 
period (Tc), would be pre-specified. The form of Initial Condition Generator would depend on 
the particular application. Two vectors are output at every time step t (= ts+iAt): the state 
vector x(t) (i.e. the variables that are differentiated) and y(t) consisting of any other variables 
that might be of interest.
x(t), y(t), t: ts<t< tfts, t f , At, u ( t )
d X (t) Y(t)
X(t) U(t) FLAG
ENDSTART
Initial
Condition
Generator
Differential Equation Solver
MODEL
Figure 10: Computer Simulation Data Flows
The simplest form of differential equation solver, the order Euler, is described here whilst, 
in practice a marginally more complicated 4^ order Runge-Kutta might be more practicable. 
The algorithm is then as follows:
Start; 
get x(ts); 
t=ts;
LOOP until t>tf:
dX
dt
call model with FLAG=1, U(t)=u(t), X(t)=x(t) to obtain
x(t+At)=x(t)+-^^ At ;
dt
t=t+At;
call model with FLAG=3, U(t)=u(t), X(t)=x(t) to obtain y(t)=Y(t).
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5. SOME COMMENTS
5.1 Exploiting the Self-Validating Properties of Tank Level/Density Instrumentation
It is well-known that the level/density measurement system has a propensity to be self­
validating because the two key dip-tube pressure signals are highly correlated. To reduce the 
complexity of the analysis system, and because it is sensible anyway, it would be preferable 
that faults internal to level/dip-tube instrumentation should be isolated separately. Adherence 
to the recently proposed standard on SEVA sensors might be beneficial here.
It might also be worth considering whether other instrumentation might be capable of 
outputting their own diagnostics.
5.2 Plant interruptions, data spikes and so on
Although Tool 3 can be designed to accommodate intermittent operation, Tool 2 is likely to be 
less flexible with the net effect that material is likely to move to and from hidden inventory, 
transiently. Tool 7c is designed to identify and ‘remove’ these events from the Operational 
History Database whilst Tool 6 is designed to ignore very short term transients like data spikes.
5.3 Relationship with DIE/DIV
The approach relies on process models and hence on detailed knowledge of both the topology 
of the plant and of key parameters. Some of this knowledge would be verified through 
DIE/DIV. Thus it would contribute to the specification of the DIE/DIV processes; what to 
verify, when to verify, priorities for verification and so on. It would also ensure that any 
undeclared alterations to the plant are detected once they affect plant operation.
5.4 Relationship with Near Real Time Materials Accountancy
This somewhat depends on the form of NRTMA system installed, for instance on the 
frequency at which balances are closed and on whether any resolution tools are included. 
Although there is obviously a degree of overlap, the two approaches are essentially 
complimentary. There are clearly similarities that are inherent because both make use of 
plutonium balances, although usually over different time-scales. However the system 
described here provides features that are explicitly different:
• it makes use of additional relationships:
-  bulk & acid balances;
-  physical relationships between variables;
• it reasons at a more microscopic level;
• it has a diagnostic capability based on the structure and function of the plant as opposed 
to one based on materials balances over entire MBAs.
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In essence it is able to detect & diagnose certain incidents that an NRTMA system cannot, and 
in a more timely manner (e.g. as in Appendix 4). However the level of detail that is required to 
achieve this makes it cumbersome to use for longer term incidents like biases in KMP 
instrumentation and here NRTMA is more suitable. In addition the simplicity of the basic 
NRTMA approach makes it amenable to statistical analysis, the same cannot be said for the 
approach described here.
The main contribution that this approach would give, explicitly, to any NRTMA system is that 
the inspector’s understanding of the contents of the plant at any instance of time increase 
would be enhanced.
5.5 Frequency of Decision Making
Although the system would be collecting data continuously, the analysis would be most 
effective if carried out over a variety of time periods:
•  visibility issues would obviously be addressed virtually in real-time although follow-up 
activities are likely to depend on the gathering of further evidence;
•  some decisions would be affected by delayed receipt of data, for instance, by samples 
undergoing laboratory analyses;
•  the detection of small biases and the like would benefit from an additional assessment of 
data pertaining to a longer period of time, perhaps over the duration of an entire 
campaign of 12-15 days.
5.6 Software Requirements
For purposes of quality assurance, it is important that the computer programs that form the 
collection, analysis and presentation aspects of the system should be properly software 
engineered. In particular there is a need to decompose the various aspects of the system 
monitoring tasks in a modular fashion. The current stage merely seeks to examine the overall 
concepts, detailed software specification is defeiTed until later.
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6. CONCLUSIONS
This report has outlined a methodology for confirming that a facility is operating in a way 
declared by the operator. It is largely unproven, based on software developments that are 
evolving all the time, and would require an extensive programme of work to ensure its success 
on a commercial facility (see below). Considerable thought has gone into ensuring that, having 
invested so much in its implementation, the evaluation tools can be evolved so that the system 
matches up to expectations. Thus there has been considerable emphasis on the kernel, 
composed of data stored in two databases, and hence on the quality of the data collection 
system. It is important that appropriate data is collected; although the analytical tools can 
evolve, the data cannot i.e. one cannot go back and collect the same data again. Similarly it is 
important that both the structure of the databases and the specification of their numerous data 
fields are carefully thought about; it is difficult to re-build a database once it has started to be 
used.
Results from various case studies have demonstrated that the application of such a concept 
would provide assurances that the plant is operating as declared. These case studies have 
focused on demonstrating how the system would work rather than on measuring the system’s 
ability to detect and isolate a particular incident. This is partly because quantitative results 
would be misleading unless they were based on data that look like real data, which we do not 
have, and partly because of a lack of resources.
6.1 Recommended Route To Implementation
The system outlined here has been developed with implementation in mind. Since this type of 
system has never been implemented before, it is important that it is structured in a way that 
facilitates testing, feedback and further development (i.e. evolution). Certain aspects are easier 
to change than others. Going from the most inflexible to the least inflexible, these are listed 
below:
the collection of measurement data; 
the representation of collected data in databases; 
the representation of other data in data bases; 
the specification of data to be stored in the databases;
outlines of the types of method (procedure) that will interact with the database; 
user interface development tools; 
the methods; 
user interfaces.
This evolutionary process would involve the testing of alternative versions of the tools.
There are three strands to the implementation: data collection and pre-processing, database and 
user interface construction, and the tools described here. Although all three do not need to start 
at the same time some degree of concurrency is essential. The kind of overlap that is 
anticipated is shown in Table 4 below.
UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA 35
SRDP-R279
Period 1 2 3 4 5
Plant commissioning phase Water
Runs
Uranium Runs Low Bum-up 
Runs
Data collection and pre-processing
Database/user interface construction
The tools
Table 4: Implementation
6.1.1 Data Collection and Pre-processing
The form of the data, what it looks like and how it is stored, can have a considerable effect on 
the design of the tools. In particular data compression is a major issue; information lost as a 
result of incorrect pre-processing can never be retrieved. It is therefore important that data 
storage receives proper consideration. As a first step the profiles of individual instruments 
should be recorded and analysed, with the end use in mind, as early as possible. Here some 
degree of testing of the tools will be necessary. The implementers need not wait for the plant 
to become operational to obtain these profiles, data obtained from test facilities and during the 
various stages of commissioning could be analysed to enable the system to be developed in a 
sensible manner.
Work on providing the level/density instruments with a self-validating capability should be 
carried out in parallel. Considerable expertise in developing software for these instruments 
already exists at Ispra who also have the facilities for testing the product.
6.1.2 Database/User Interface Construction
There are a number of different types of database on the market. In selecting an appropriate 
database it is important to appreciate that the requirements here are somewhat different to the 
requirements for which most of these products were developed. In particular with the so-called 
‘real-time databases’, which have data compression, display and archiving schemes. The 
emphasis is often on data presentation rather than on providing a bridge to an automatic 
analysis capability.
6.1.3 The Tools
Various versions of the individual tools are proposed to accommodate the fact that it is not 
possible to design the various analysis tools without testing using realistic data. Real data is 
needed to both develop and test the approach. The analytical procedures are being developed 
on the basis of simulations. Since there is a considerable difference between simulated data 
and reality, it is important that the tools should be tested and refined using real-data. A 
programme of activities should be organised to provide the appropriate data. Initially this 
might come from the THAME facility at Ispra or from water tests at RRP. Later on, the 
opportunity should be taken to collect data at each stage of commissioning.
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APPENDIX 1: ACCESSING REDUNDANT INFORMATION
Redundant information pertaining to plant operation can take two forms: derived from physical 
redundancy and analytical redundancy. Physical redundancy derives from there existing 
multiple sensors, which is uncommon in reprocessing plants. Analytical redundancy exploits 
the inherent static and dynamic relationships among the measured variables. In other words 
one makes use of a mathematical model. Three typical simple models are given as examples 
below.
1. Consider the masses of liquor in two connected tanks, tanks i & i+1, when a batch is 
transferred between them with no ‘carry-over’:
Mass o f batch output = Mass o f batch imported into
from exporting tank receiving tank
Mass f a t  _ end_ o f _ transfer) = Mass^ (at_ beginning _  o f _ transfer) -  Mass_ transferred 
Mass-^^ {at_ end__ o f_  transfer) = Mass-^^ (at_ beginning _ o f_  transfer) + M ass_ transferred
Thus a measured change in level in a particular tank can be corroborated by looking for 
corresponding changes in neighbouring tanks.
2. The relationship between level and the flow rates in and out of a tank that is 
exporting/importing continuously is governed by
Mass{t) -  Mass{0) + £  (flow _ rate_ m(t) -  flow _ rate_ out{t)) dt
Thus a change in the level in a tank can be coiToborated if its net flow rate is measured.
3. Consider the masses of liquor in two tanks, tanks i & i+1, where there are now continuous 
transfers both in & out of either of them; assume once more that there is a constant hold-up in 
the inter-connecting pipe, the following mass balances can be formed:
M assft) = MassfO) + j^flow_ ra te_ in ft) -flow_rate_in._^_ft) dt 
Mass.,^ .^  it) = Mass.^^ (0) + ^Jlow _ rate_ (r)- flo w _  rate_ out-^  ^{t) dt
Once again the levels in the two tanks will be related, this time through the common variable
flow_rate_ini+].
In practice, accurate measurements of individual flow rates might not be available and a tank 
might be importing and exporting at the same time making simple level comparison difficult. 
Whilst keeping to the same principles, it is more sensible to reason about the models more 
explicitly. Amongst the numerous model-based detection and diagnostic techniques that have 
been developed to reason about models (see, for instance, references 17-19), a number have 
been developed with the specific needs of monitoring for nuclear safeguards in mind (see, for 
instance, references 20 & 21).
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APPENDIX 2: ASSURANCES IN OTHER AREAS
A2.1 Accountancy tanks
A few years ago now, Euratom announced that they were developing a system that would 
obtain additional assurances about the operation of the input and output accountancy tanks[l 1]. 
The approach was essentially one of pattern matching where the actual volume history was 
compared against templates. Such an approach would integrate well with the overall system 
proposed here. Unfortunately the authors are unaware of the current situation so cannot 
comment further.
A2.2 Plutonium  N itrate  Product Storage A rea
This area has not been considered because it has been examined, extensively, elsewhere [13]. 
Unfortunately the objectives behind that work were somewhat different to those that were 
specified for the system outlined in this report. A somewhat simpler approach (see 
Recommendation 4 in [14]) would be more appropriate, but this would require further 
development.
A2.3 Finishing P lan t
The tanks containing solutions at the start of this plant can be treated in a similar way to those 
in the process plant. The instmmentation available in other parts of the plant can largely 
consist of neutron detectors, weighing devices, environmental temperature sensors and 
environmental relative humidity sensors, all of which would be of interest to a data evaluation 
system. BNFL report considerable success with their neutron detector-based PIMS/FissTrack 
based systems for plant monitoring [15], and there is a clear synergy with the approach 
described here. Although its use as a safeguards tool appears to be contentious [16] and further 
development work would be required so that it could be integrated with the evaluation tools, it 
is clear that additional assurances might be got. One possible (untested) approach is broadly 
outlined below:
Tool 5: driven by Operator Declarations -  Category B, by the feed flow rate (Tool 3) and by 
weighings, a simple plant simulation composed of mass balances would be executed to predict 
the instantaneous mass distribution of material throughout the plant.
Tool 6: this mass distribution would be compared with that estimated by the on-line 
PIMS/FissTrack System and any disagreements would be signalled.
Tool 7: taking into account environmental temperature and relative humidity, a model-based 
diagnostic system would hypothesise reasons for these disagreements.
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APPENDIX 3: EXECUTIVE DECISIONS
The Tools are co-ordinated by the Executive, the precise form of which would depend on the 
software platform installed.
A3.1 Decision Boxes
Decision Box 1
(In practice this link is likely to be included in Tool 3a. It is shown as a separate box to enable 
the reader to see a key (asyncronous) feature of the system).
When Tool 3a-1 outputs ‘tank_id, ts.i, tf,i %
Tool 3b-1 (tank id, tstart”  tg^  ,tanish “  lf,i )
Decision Box 2
When the buffer tank upstream of the cycle feeding tank is emptied,
Tool5(Segment_id = Tank_set upstream,
tstart = tg,i, pertaining to this tank 
tfinish = tf,i pertaining to this tank )
Tool 6b
When the buffer tank with the longest nominal cycle time completes a cycle,
wait until all Tool la  procedures that pertain to the tank_set upstream output ‘no 
transfer’, Tool5( Segment„id = ‘Tank_set upstream’,
tstart = tg,i, pertaining to this tank 
t f m i s h  = tf.i pertaining to this tank )
TooI6b
Decision Box 3
When input accountancy tank laboratory results are obtained, 
update the following real-time database fields:
Stream 1 of the buffer tank downstream of the accountancy tank: 
f, Ps, [Pu], [U], [IT], [unsp] .
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A3.2 Short-term assurances
When ( Tool 6a-1 outputs a non-empty set sub-event_ids ) &
( sub-event_ids pertain to a receiving tank),
V sub-event„id e  sub-event„ids,
tstart = sub-event„id:: symptoms ::start_time
tfinish = sub-e vent_id : : symptoms : : stop_time
Segm ented = unit-upstream(sub-event_id::symptoms::path_id)
if 3 symptom_id e sub-event_ids;:symptoms : symptom_id::error-in = ‘Flow’
[ I h i n v ]  = Tool 7a(Segm entJd, ‘H iddenjnventory’, t s t a r t ,  t f m i s h )
Tool 6a-2(Ihinv, tstart, tfmish, sub-eventjds)
[Pu, H"^ ] = Tool 7a(Segment_id, ‘Pu/H^_out’, tstart, tfmish)
Tool 6a-3((Pu, H^), t s t a r t ,  t f m i s h ,  sub-oventjds)
[Pu, unsp] = Tool 7a(Segment_id, ‘Pu/unsp_out’, tstart, tfmish)
Tool 6a-4((Pu, unsp), tstart, tfmish, sub-event_ids)
else
[Pu] = Tool 7a(Segment„id, ‘Interpret Pu’, t s t a r t ,  t f m i s h )  
Tool 6a-5(Pu, t s t a r t ,  t f m i s h ,  sub-eventJds)
[H^] = Tool 7a(Segment_id, ‘Interpret H^’, t s t a r t ,  t f m i s h )  
Tool 6a-5(H^, t s t a r t ,  t f m i s h ,  sub-eventJds)
[unsp] = Tool 7a(Segment„id, ‘Interpret unsp’, tstart, tfmish) 
Tool 6a-5(unsp, t s t a r t ,  t f m i s h ,  sub-eventjds)
end
Tool 7c(sub-event J d s )
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When (Tool 6b-1 outputs a non-empty set sub-event_ids) or
( (Tool 6a-1 outputs a non-empty set sub-event_ids ) &
( sub-eventjds pertain to a feeding tank) ),
V sub-eventJd e  sub-eventjds,
Segment J d  = The id of the Tank set that contains the tank 
tstart = sub-event J d :  :sym ptom Jdl : :start-time 
tfmish = sub-event J d :  :sym ptom Jdl : :stop-time 
unit_downstream(sub-eventJd::symptoms::error-in) —> unitd
tfm  — 0  ,
found = .nil.
Tool 7a(Segm entJd, Transfer„To_Hinv’, tstart, tfinish) -+ [ts, tf, f] 
merge(unitd Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream with f)
revised_stream e  revised„streams 
path_id pertaining to unitd -+ rev ised jd  e rev ised jds 
Tool5(Segm entJd, ts, tf, revisedjds, revised_streams)
[measurement_predictions] 
Tool 6b-2(SegmentJd, ts, tf, measurement_predictions, sub-eventjd , f)
success
if success —> tf = min(tf, tfm), found = .t,
% Repeat for observer J y p e  = ‘Transfer_In’
Tool 7a ^  [ts, tf, f]
merge —> revised_stream e  revised_streams
path_id pertaining to buffer tank -»  rev ised jd  e  rev ised jds
TooI5 -+ [measurement_predictions]
Tool 6b-2 -+ success
if success -+ tf = min(tf, tfm), found = ,t.
% Repeat for ‘Addition_of_Acid’
Tool 7a ^  [ts, tf, f, c]
merge —> revised_stream g revised_streams 
p a th jd  pertaining to unitd -+ rev ised jd  e  rev ised jds 
Tools —> [measurement„predictions]
Tool 6b-2 -+ success
if success -+ tf = min(tf, tfm), found = .t.
% Repeat for ‘Addition_of_Pu’
Tool 7a [ts, tf, f, c]
merge —> revised_stream g revised„streams 
p a th jd  pertaining to unitd —> rev ised jd  g  rev isedjds 
Tools -+ [measurement_predictions]
Tool 6b-2 —> success
if success —> tf = min(tf, tfm), found = .t.
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% If all observers fail, mark as a measurement error 
if not( found)
sub-event_id: diagnoses = (d iagnosisjd l) 
sub-event_id: ;symptom_id 1 : : start-time = 
sub-e vent_id : : sy m p to m jd  1 : : stop-time =
end
% Continue to search
if call was from procedure 6b-1 & tf < tfmish
Tool5(Segment_id, tf, tfmish, {}, {}) —> [measurement_predictions] 
Tool 6b-1 (Segm ented, tf, tfinish, measurement„predictions)
sub-event_id
end
end {sub-event_id loop} 
Tool 7c(sub-event„ids)
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A3.3 Medium-term assurances
When timer = specified_time,
Period_id = p erio d jd  + 1
[problem_unit error redistributions ] = Tool7b(Period_id, tstart, tfmish) 
if problem„unit = null
else
redistribute(tstart, tfmish, redistributions)
Tool 7b-4
create a sub-event, sub-eventjd  E medium-term-sub-event_ids: 
diagnoses = (d iagnosisjd l) 
symptoms = (sym ptom jd l)
d iagnosisjd l has a sub-diagnosis sd_idl which is a sub-class: 
path-type = ‘flow’ 
path-id = if error<0 then
path: problem_unit to hidden inv
else
the same path in reverse
sym ptom jd  is a sub-class:
error-in = ‘redistribution’ 
path-id = problem_unit 
stop-time = tfmish
Tool 7c(medium-term-sub-event„ids)
end
Increase specifiedjim e by N days.
NB If problem_unit contains more than one item (i.e. points to a more general area), use
a special name.
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A3.4 Analysing sample data
When data pertaining to a relevant sample is written to the sample database,
get time = tsampie , T an k jd , [Pu]s, [U]s, [H’^ ls, [unsp]s, p s , T ; 
update density con elation ;
obtain from real-time database for time = tsampiei Mbuik, Mpu, Mu, Madd, Munsp ; 
substitution-with-acid? = .false. ;
if \Mp^ -  > Ikg  then substitution-with-acid? = .true. ;
obtain from Tank„id;:fill-times the time, tg, at which the tank was previously started to 
be filled;
overwrite all the Mpu, Mu, Madd, Munsp entries in the real-time database, for T an k jd , 
for the time period t; ts < t < tsampie:
and so on ; 
if substitution-with-acid?
then
Segment J d  = The id of the Tank set that contains the tank
Tool 7a(Segm entJd, ‘Substitution__with_acid’, t s ,  t s a m p i e )  —> [ t s ,  tf, f]
create a sub-event, sub-eventJd g medium-term-sub-event J d s  : 
diagnoses = (d iagnosisjd l) 
symptoms = (sym ptom jd l)
d iagnosisjd l has a sub-diagnosis s d jd l  which is a sub-class: 
path-type = measurement_error
path-id = s**
quantity = see test above 
sym ptom jd  is a sub-class:
error-in = sample
path-id = Derived on the basis of T ankJd  
stop-time = t s a m p i e
merge(Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream with f)
revised_stream e revised_streams 
p a th jd  pertaining to input to T a n k jd  —> rev ised jd  g rev ised jds 
Tools(Segm entJd, ts, tf, revisedjds, revised_streams) —>
[measurement_preds] 
Tool 6b-2(SegmentJd, ts, tf, measurement„preds, sub-eventjd , f)
success
end
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Examine the medium term up to time tsampie-
Start time, tstart = tsampie -  3*24*60 (i.e. 3 days)
[problem„unit error redistributions] = Tool7b-l (tstart, tsampie)
if probiem_unit = null
redistribute(tstart, tfmish, redistributions)
else
create a sub-event, sub-event_id e  medium-term-sub-eventjds: 
diagnoses = (d iagnosisjd l) 
symptoms = (sym ptom jd l)
d iagnosisjd l has a sub-diagnosis s d jd l  which is a sub-class; 
path-type = ‘flow’ 
path-id = if error<0 then
path: problem_unit to hidden inv
else
the same path in reverse
sym ptom jd  is a sub-class:
error-in = ‘redistribution’ 
path-id = problem_unit 
stop-time = tfmish
Tool 7 c(medium-term-sub-e vent J d s )
end
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A3.5 Local procedures
procedure redistribute (tstart, trmich. redistributions)
V redistribution e redistributions, 
if redistribution ^  0
from the appropriate database, obtain the total Pu transferred out of this unit 
over the time period : tstart ^  t < tfmish Mpu 
calculate % correction: redistribution/Mpu
apply this correction to the associated volume transfers in the databases
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APPENDIX 4: SOME DATABASE FIELDS
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APPENDIX 5: THE TOOLBOXES
Toolbox 1: Estimation of transfers into/out of a buffer tank.
Toolbox 2: Generates nominal plutonium inventories for the solvent-extraction 
cycles and for the concentrator
Toolbox 3: Estimation of bulk flow rate -  receiving/feeding tanks only.
Toolbox 4: Estimation of the X and acid components in the continuous stream into 
a receiving tank.
Toolbox 5: Plant simulations.
Toolbox 6: Disagreement detection.
Toolbox 7: Model-based reasoning.
Toolbox 8: Confirmation of Operational Unit Statuses
Table 1 (repeated)
A5.1 Recursive least squares
A Recursive Least Squares (RLS) algorithm [22] is used to estimate the gradient, m, and 
constant, c of a straight line [i.e. m,c : y; = mzi + c] as follows:
^ n + l ~ "t" P n+I ^ n+1 {  y n+1  "  ^ n + I )
where :
y  =  h ^ x  +  n
k  =  [ z l f
X = [m c f
n - noise
P n + l  -  P n  -  P n  K + J  (  1  +  n + I P n  P n  h ^ n + I
To apply this, Po = ^  * 2x2 identity matrix and Xq has m = 0 and c = the first data point. It is 
necessary to reset the RLS calculation every time a point of change is detected. This is easily 
achieved by simply resetting Pn-i to its initial value and setting X to have m = 0 and c = value 
of process mean at this point.
AS.2 The standard Cusum test
From reference 23, expressions for the Upper Cusum (C"^ ) and the Lower Cusum (C), when
applied to a normalised data point — , are as follows:
CT:
CÎ = max
X .
0, —  -  (/J-o + K) + Qti 
CT;
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C = max
X:0, - K ) ~ - ^  + C,._i
where \io is the target process mean, Gi is the standard deviation and K is a constant.
If either Ci'*’ or Cf exceed appropriate tolerances, then the process mean is deemed to be 
changing. This procedure is often represented by a V-mask (Figure 11) which is applied at 
every point of the data; if one of the arms of the V-mask intercepts a data point then a change 
in the mean is deemed to have taken place. Parameters H and K relate to the vertical height and 
the angle of the arms of the V-mask respectively. If K = 0 the arms are at right angles. 
Parameter H: 1 < H < 5.
V - mask arm®  Data Point
V-mask arm intercepts earlier data 
point - change detectec .^
\ V - mask arm
Figure 11 : Illustration of V-mask
Adapting The Cusum Test To Detect A Change In Gradient
This procedure can be modified to detect whether or not the data has deviated from a straight 
line trajectory and, approximately, at what time this has occurred. In this case po is replaced by 
mZi + c where z. - 1% and h pertains to the time at which the i*^  point was recorded.
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TOOLBOX 1: ESTIMATION OF VOLUME TRANSFERS FOR TANKS 
THAT BOTH IMPORT AND EXPORT NON-CONTINUOUSLY
T i l  Tool la :  Norm al tanks.
Inputs:
Time t
Volume V
Density p
All pertain to the exporting buffer tank.
Outputs:
To Real-Time Database:
fout —> f(downstream unit, stream 1) 
fin —> f(tank, input stream)
To Operational History Database:
if fout > 0 then ts.i, tf j , Volume_transferred tank object
if fin > 0 then tgj, tf j , Volume„transferred -A upstream tank object
This tool would be executing all the time. The procedure, which is outlined below, contains a 
number of refinements. It is recommended that the first version omits Stages 4 (i.e. assume a 
constant a), 7 & 8. Subsequent versions (with Stage 4 or 7 & 8 or 4, 7 & 8) can then be tried 
to see whether the added complexity brings extra benefit.
The procedure makes use of the following:
a ring buffer p (of size 2400 = 10 hours ?) 
a shuffle buffer me (of size 5 ?)
variable tranfers initialised with the first data point collected 
variable ojfset initialised at 0
parameters s^uspend (typically 20), Fy, , X (typically 0.1), toi, Ng 
{Fu and Fl are typically integers < 6 and need not be equal)
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1. Receive data point from database and place in ring buffer, p:(t, V, p) p e p
2. Apply RLS algorithm to V -»  (m, c)
3. Pop (m, c) into the bottom of the shuffle buffer, me and collect (m’, c ’) which pops out of 
the top as a consequence of doing this.
4. Update the estimate of the mean square error of the data:
5. Calculate the upper control limit (UCL) and lower control limit (LCL):
V = m' t + d 
U C L = V  + (jFy
LCL = V - a F ^
6. Test for change in direction
If V > UCL
% Increase detected
Suspend both UCL and LCL tests for Psuspend data points.
Reset RLS: m —> 0 ; c —> V ; Pn —^ Pol
(p m ’ c ’) points
end
R V < L C L
% Decrease detected
Suspend both UCL and LCL tests for s^uspend data points.
Reset RLS : m —> 0 ; c —> V ; Pn —^ Poj
(p m ’ c ’) points
end
7. When (p m ’ c ’) written to points, generate estimates for intercept on the basis of the last 
two points (i.e. do nothing if only one element in points:
size = size-of(points)
If size > 1
using the last two points stored i.e. (r,. VJ /?,■ c,), ( ,^-i P.-i U-i)-
C. — C:
A n t  —
' i  ’" /- I  
m ,. -  m ,._ i 
Knt ="î/Ant+^t
end
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2 j/V
8. Obtain (VJ„t -  V) for each of the -^ d a ta  points e  p whose times are just before t = t^t and
N
each of the - ^ d a ta  points £ p just after t = tint- Hence find the data point with the smallest
(Vint -  V)^ and place the previous data point from p (i.e. one with position i.i) into the array 
transfers at position (Li-offset). Pass position i to Stage(9).
9. When position i received, construct a transfer pair from points stored in transfers:
ii = 0
for jj = l;[size(transfers)-l]
if sign(mjj e transfers) ^ sign(m(jj+i) e transfers) 
ii = ii +1
pair(ii) = transfers(jj) ; i.e. pass the point located at jj
end
ifii = 2
% have a transfer pair 
last_point -  last entry in transfers 
ii = 0
clear transfers 
transfers(l) = last_point 
offset = i - 2
% pass pair to stage 10 
pair —> stage(lO)
end
if ii < 2 and jj = size(transfers)-1
% no pair available in transfers 
ii = 0;
end
end
10. When pair received, calculate volumes transferred etc.: 
Volume_transferred = Volumc2 -  Volume^ ;
Mass_transferred = Density2 * Volume2 - Densityi * Volume^ ;
ff.>Volume. — Volume, . . _  . . . f ^flow rate =  1 where AT  = At * int
AT V At
and At is the integration
time step of the computer simulation;
{ f i n  ~  f o u t  ~  0 ,
for the period of time t: < t < t \  + AT where r*,. is the last time point in the
database before ts,i, 
if flow rate > 0 then 
fin = flow rate
else
fout = flow rate
end }.
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T1.2 Tool lb: The input accountancy and product accountancy tanks
Little can be written about this particular tool until the precise mode of operation of each tank 
is known. Conventional accountancy data would be used when it became available:
When accountancy data is written to the conventional inspector’s database, 
obtain times transfer started and stopped: t% , ti 
obtain values at start of transfer: V olum eD ensity i 
obtain values at end of transfer: Volume2, Densitya
Then as per Step 10. above
Obtain the chemical composition of the solution transferred, [Pu] etc.
Then
Vt: ti < t < t2 , [Pu] ^  [Pu] (downstream unit, stream 1) etc.
Prior to receiving this data, estimates would be obtained, probably as per Tool la. Chemical 
compositions would be assumed to be the same as for the previous batch.
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TOOLBOX 2: GENERATES NOMINAL PLUTONIUM INVENTORIES 
FOR THE SOLVENT-EXTRACTION CYCLES AND FOR THE 
CONCENTRATOR
Inputs:
Outputs:
To Real-Time Database: nominal inventory
To Operational History Database:
The authors have been told that Tool 2 is to be developed elsewhere. Presumably the operator 
will make available correlations for estimating the plutonium inventories in each of the cycles 
and the concentrator. These correlations might depend on a flow sheet as declared as part of 
the Declared Operation or might depend on measured variables, which will have to be placed 
in the real time database. Tool 2 will evaluate the correlations and output to the Real-Time 
Database.
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TOOLBOX 3: ESTIMATION OF BULK FLOW RATE 
RECEIVING/FEEDING TANKS ONLY.
Inputs: Volume 
Outputs:
To Real-Time Database:
fout f  (downstream unit, stream 1)
fin f  (receiving/feeding tank, input stream)
To Operational History Database;
oti, ts,i, tf,i receiving/feeding tank object
T3.1 Tool 3a Procedure.
Tool 3a continuously records the incoming data in a buffer; emptying the data stored within 
whenever the start of a new cycle is detected. It is recommended that the first version omits 
Stages 4, 5 (i.e. assume a constant a), and 6. Stage 6 can be replaced with Stages 5 and 6 from
Tool 1 (i.e. use the combined Shewhart/RLS detector). Subsequent versions can then be tried to
see whether the added complexity can be justified in terms of the improved performance.
The procedure makes use of the following:
a shuffle buffer me (of size 5 ?)
a shuffle buffer std (of size 5 ?)
a dynamic buffer cycle
record = 1  @ t -  0, recording flag for cycles
switch = flow ‘switching time’ of cycle
type = 1 for receiving tank
type = -1 for feeding tank
parameters: Tlsuspend (typically 20)
1. Receive data point from database, (t, V, p)
2. Apply RLS algorithm to V —> (m,c)
3. Pop (m,c) into the bottom of the shuffle buffer, me and collect (m’,c’) which pops out of 
the top as a consequence of doing this.
4. Calculate standard deviation of V —> G
5. Pop G into the bottom of the shuffle buffer, std and collect g ’ which pops out of the top as 
a consequence of doing this.
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6. Apply CUSUM algorithm to ( a ’, m ’, c ’, t, V).
if point of change detected by CUSUM 
-> (m% c’,t ,  V)
Reset RLS: m -A 0 ; c -A V >Po
Reset standard deviation: Ng = N -  Nd ; Vmean = 0 
Suspend CUSUM test for s^uspend data points
else
m ’ = 0 
c ’ = 0
^  (m% c \  t, V)
end
7. Re-calculate record on basis of m ’ and tank type.
If type < 0
% feeding tank, record = -1 if peak 
If m ’ > 0
record = record * sign(m’) * -1
end
end
if type > 0
% receiving tank, record = -1 if trough 
if m ’ < 0
record = record * sign(m’)
end
end
8. Dependent on the type of tank, a trough or a peak will indicated that the flow has switched. 
Keep this time for tool 3B.
If type < 0
% feeding tank, trough detected 
If m ’ < 0
t -A switch
end
end
if type > 0
% receiving tank, peak detected 
ifm ’ > 0
t —> switch
end
end
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9. Record cycle if record < 0. Feeding tanks - peak to peak. Receiving tanks -  trough to 
trough. When starting to record new cycle, pass previous to Tool 3B.
i -  0
If record < 0
i = i+  1
if i = 1
end
% start tool 3B for previous recorded cycle 
tool3b(cycle,sv/itch ) 
clear cycle
else
% record the cycle data 
(t, V, p) cycle
% reset record to continue recording 
% switch is ‘switching time’ of cycle flows 
if type < 0
% feeding tank 
record = 1 * sign(m’) * -1
end
if type > 0
% receiving tank 
record = 1 * sign(m)
end
end
This completes the procedure description of tool 3a. Note that tool 3a technically includes 
decision 1.
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T3.2 Tool 3b Procedure
Tool 3b utilises a simulated annealing algorithm to generate the optimal solutions for the 
constant flow into, and flow switching times for, the tank. An observer is then used to correct 
the constant input flow for temporal changes. Because the simulated annealing calculates the 
average flow rate over a cycle, the average flow rate will be underestimated when temporal 
changes take place . This underestimation is therefore corrected for.
T3.2.1 Application of simulated annealing
It is recommended that in the first version stages 3 and 4 are replaced with a simple gradient 
calculation to estimate the constant flow. Stage 5 may be omitted for all versions dependent on 
if the buffer tank flows estimated by tool 1 are utilised instead.
Tool 3b receives the following data from tool 3a:
cycle’ : array containing data points ((t, V, p)) 
switch : float value for switching time of flows in tank
Tool 3a utilises simulated annealing as an optimisation function. The procedure makes use of 
the following:
variables: tc,s : cycle start time
to,f : optimisation finish time 
tf,g : initial flow time estimate 
fi,g : initial flow in estimate 
fo,g : initial flow out estimate 
tf,o : optimal flow time estimate 
fi,o : optimal flow in estimate 
fo,o : optimal flow out estimate
1. Set tc,s and to.f. tc,s = ti e  cycle’. to.f = switch
2. Normalise data in cycle’ with respect to tc,s- h = h -  tc,s, V h g cycle’. Similarly for toj:
to,f — to,f — tc,s
3. Generate initial guesses for flow in, flow out (fj,g ,fo,g). Generate initial guess for flow 
on time, (tf,g).
4. Run simulated annealing algorithm, generating optimal solution: (fj,o, fo.o, tf,o)
5. Calculate periodic flow using optimal constant flow.
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T3.2.2 Estimation of flow out via numerical differentiation
Inputs: cycle’: array containing data points ((t, V, p)).
(fi,o, fo.o, tf,o): optimal solution
Outputs: fo: flow rate out (array)
The normal tank volume equation can be re-arranged as:
f  = f .J ou t j  in
where the derivative can be differentiated, numerically by applying the symmetric form of the 
standard equation:
2h
to volume measurements with respect to time. For first time point use the standard formula:
h
and for the last point:
/ ' (x )  = 0.0 
Hence the procedure is as follows:
1. numerically differentiate V with respect to t —> dV
2. for each entry in dV calculate flow out fo
T3.2.3 Observer based flow rate correction
- = /  - /  dt
A /„= 0 .05 [V -V ]
J' _ I A, {Input_ data_ stream) + , f.^ {input_  data_ stream) > 0
I 0  , f.^{input_data_stream)<0
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T3.2.4 Suppression of Spikes
The flow out estimate from the simulated annealing algorithm is shifted in time from the actual 
flow out. This shift in time causes spikes in the observer based flow rate correction (see e.g. 
Figures 12 & 13) because the observer compensates for the mismatch between the flow outs. 
To suppress the spikes, the observer output is switched to correct flow out instead, for a 
period of time that encapsulates the estimated flow out. This new value for flow out is then 
entered in the database.
T3.2.5 Correcting for temporarv changes
Inputs: /;„ : corrected flow rate in (t,fin)
Outputs: new average flow rate (t,fi„)
The average flow rate will be underestimated when temporal changes and this leads to a raised 
plateau on the tracking error (Figure 12). To overcome this problem, the corrected flow rate 
(simulated annealing flow + tracking error) is integrated and then averaged over the entire 
cycle. Figure 13 shows how this results in the removal of the plateau in Figure 12.
Hence the procedure is as follows:
1. calculate the time interval of the flow in: At = t  ^ ~ t j  where tg and tf are the first and last 
entries in fm:
2. integrate fi„ over the interval tg to tf |  ^  -> ;
3. calculate the new average flow in: •
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Figure 12: Unadulterated tracking error from volume observer showing raised plateau.
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Figure 13: Corrected tracking error using averaged flow rate.
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T3.3 Simulated Annealing
The simulated annealing algorithm [24-29] is a method of finding optimum solutions to 
problems that have a large set of solutions, in an analogous fashion to the physical annealing of 
solids to attain minimum internal energy states. The fundamental idea is to generate a path 
through the solution space, from one solution to another nearby solution, leading ultimately to 
the optimum solution. In generating this path, solutions are chosen from the locality of the 
preceding solution by a probabilistic function of the improvement gained by this move.
Simulated annealing is very robust since it statistically guarantees finding an optimal solution 
and is ideal for problems with local minima.
The basic scheme is shown below in Figure 14:
No
Yes
STOP ^
No
Yes
A = X
K=10
K = K -  1
T < Stop Value
T, Initial values 
A. steo Y
Store Best X
Metropolis(F)
F=Function(X)
Generate nearby point, X 
From A and Y
Figure 14: Logical Description of Program 
The algorithm is constructed from components. These are:
1. The cooling schedule (manipulation of T).
2. Generation of nearby point.
3. Function to be minimised.
4. Metropolis Function.
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T3.3.1 Cooling Schedule
Since the location of the maximum is known to within a few minutes and the flow rates are 
also known from the previous cycle, the initial value of T can be low as the initial guess is 
within close proximity of the solution. Thus T = 10.
The reduction in T after each completion of the inner loop is 2.5 percent to ensure an accurate 
solution is found.
T3.3.2 Generation of nearbv point
The purpose is to produce an unbiased walk in the solution space. For each dimension of the 
solution:
î fR <= 0,5
Dgen = D 4- R^G
else
Dgen = D - R'^G
end
D = old value D^
R E (0,1)
G = step length
where:  gen ~ new value
The step length G is decreased in a similar fashion as T. This is done so that the search focuses 
on the region containing the solution.
T3.3.3 Function to be optimised
As stated earlier the function has to have either a maximum or a minimum at the correct values. 
The simplest method for doing so for this problem is for the function to be a simulation of the 
volume of the tank. The input arguments for the function are the flow rate in, the flow rate out 
and the switching time. The function will be of a linear nature. The key to the entire function 
is the cumulative sum of the differences between the simulated values generated by the 
function and the measurements taken from the tank. Below are the algorithmic representations 
of that last statement.
Errsum = Errsum  + (Vsim -  Vmeasf
where:
V = tank volume
meas — measurement value sim — simulated value 
Errsum = cumulative sum o f the differences squared
It is obvious that if the function simulated values exactly match the tank measurements then the 
cumulative sum (Errsum) will be zero.
Given that the above function will have many possible combinations of flow rates and times 
that will match the data, it was decided to concentrate upon the simulated annealing method so 
to avoid the problem of local minima.
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T3.3.4 Function to be optimised
As stated earlier the function has to have either a maximum or a minimum at the correct values. 
The simplest method for doing so for this problem is for the function to be a simulation of the 
volume of the tank. The input arguments for the function are the flow rate in, the flow rate out 
and the switching time. The function will be of a linear nature. The key to the entire function 
is the cumulative sum of the differences between the simulated values generated by the 
function and the measurements taken from the tank. Below are the algorithmic representations 
of that last statement.
Errsum = Errsum + (Vsim -  V > n e a s f
where;
V = tank volume
meas — measurement value sim — simulated value 
Errsum = cumulative sum o f the differences squared
It is obvious that if the function simulated values exactly match the tank measurements then the 
cumulative sum (Errsum) will be zero.
Given that the above function will have many possible combinations of flow rates and times 
that will match the data, it was decided to concentrate upon the simulated annealing method so 
to avoid the problem of local minima.
T3.3.5 Metropolis Function
The Metropolis function [26,29] is the key component in the Simulated Annealing Algorithm 
as it enables it to avoid local minima.
Have two points in the solution space of function f, 1 & 2. The probability of moving from 1 to 
2 is:
P {1 ^2 )  = exp( ~(f(2) - f ( l )  m  
Therefore:
Iff{2) < f(l), P ( l—>2) = exp(-vve) -  7, i.e. downhill changes are always accepted.
If/(2) > f(l), P(1 —>2) = exp(-ve), i.e. uphill changes are sometimes accepted but the larger the 
difference the less likely the change becomes.
Programmatically this can be written as:
ifR  < exp(-max(Fnew - F, 0)/T) then
X — Xfiew
F  = Fnew
end
where: x = original point x^w ~ generated point
F  = f(x) FHgty — f(^new)
R G (0,1) f(a) function to be optimised
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TOOLBOX 4: ESTIMATION OF THE X AND ACID COMPONENTS IN 
THE CONTINUOUS STREAM INTO A RECEIVING TANK.
Inputs:
From calling procedure:
ta n k jd , tstart, trmish, cycle i 
From Real-Time Database:
Volume, density, temperature,
f(Input Stream), f(Downstream unit. Stream 1)
[Pu] (process unit upstream. Input Stream) 
f (process unit upstream. Input Stream)
Outputs:
To Real-Time Database:
[X]in, [Pu], [H'^], ps Input Stream 
[Pu] Stream 1
f —> Process unit upstream, Input Stream
[Pu] Process unit upstream. Input Stream
I Process unit upstream
The concentration [X]^ is first estimated.
Tools is then invoked to estimate the Pu concentration in Stream 1, [Pu]^:
Tool 5(Segment_id, t^ tart, tfmish, [], [])
Finally the acid concentration [H^]m is estimated from:
lXl„=a,,{T)HPul„+a^.(T)*[H*l„+.....+a„^^iT)*[unsp.l„
where a(T) are temperature dependent coefficients and unsp. are all the other (unspecified)
components combined (assumed to be zero if ‘not known’).
T4.1 Estimation of the concentration [X]m
Inputs:
From calling procedure: Tank_id 
From Real-Time Database: 
fin = f(input stream)
V = Volume(Tank_id)
T = Temperature(Tank_id)
ps = Density(Tank_id)
fout = f(downstream unit. Stream 1)
Estimate [X]-„ is obtained using the observer:
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[x \ = k , { v p ^ - m ; )
f x = f m \ . X \ , „
—  f  _  f  - p
d t  ~  J outHx
where ~pg is the EWMA of px :
'PxO  +  1) =  ^ P x d )  +  (1 “  '^ )P x(0  
and Px is obtained from 
A  = Av(^) + /^ X
T4.2 Pu concentration estimation in Stream 1
Call procedure Tool 5 with
Segm ented = upstream process unit,
Mode = fixed hidden inventory,
Input data streams:
Istart — 1 — tfinish ?
Inom nominal plutonium inventory
f {process unit upstream. Input Stream}
[Pu] {process unit upstream, Input Stream}
Output data streams:
^ t .  tstart — 1 — tfinish >
f (formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream}
If f (process unit upstream, Input Stream) or
[Pu](process unit upstream. Input Stream) are ‘not known’,
then
fill forwards in time in the real-time database with the last known values. 
(Process dynamics will ameliorate the effect of errors in this assumption).
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TOOLBOX 5s SIMULATIONS.
The plant simulations contain two layers, an outer layer in which the simulation is 
specified plus an inner layer where the simulation is performed.
Predicted time histories (i.e. data streams) pertaining to two sets of variables are 
output by each of the modules: states and "measurement predictions". These 
"measurement predictions’ are those quantities that will be compared with the 
Inspector Data or the Operator’s Declaration. Each simulation can be executed over 
any specified period of time from tstart to tfinish- A base set of initial conditions (ICs) is 
formed by referring to the real-time database.
T5.1 Outer layer
From calling procedure: Plant segment ID, tstart, tfinish, revised_ids,
revised_streams
To inner layer: tstart, tfmish, ICs, input data streams, output data streams,
measurement data streams 
To calling procedure: streams: states & measurement predictions Vt: tstart < t
— Ifinish
The outer layer contains calls to separate modules that simulate the flow of material 
through each plant segment separately. Prior to the execution of the simulation, 
appropriate input data streams and output data streams are formed by
• extracting & rationalising the relevant data from the real-time database;
• superimposing any hypothesised scenarios onto the individual data streams.
The relevant data streams for the hypothesised scenarios would be available in 
event_ids and revised_streams. Both input and output data streams would be formed 
by taking into account rules governing the merging of Streams 1&2 into the input 
stream. If either f(input stream) or f(Stream 1) are ‘not known’ then that stream can 
be calculated on the basis of
/{input stream) = f{Stream \) + /{ S tr e a m ! /
where a ‘not known’ f(Stream 2) would be interpreted as zeros.
The rt database would then be updated accordingly. On the other hand if values for 
both f(input stream) and f(Stream 1) exist and
/{inpu t stream) ^  /{Stream l) + /{S tream !)
’ Assumes that there isn’t any slirinkage or expansion when streams merge. This is not a major issue 
because the simulation is based on mass balances so it is the product of volume with density that 
matters and density can be corrected to ensure that mass is conserved.
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then, a decision would have to be at the time of implementation/commissioning as to 
which was the most appropriate. If f(input stream) is selected then the input data 
stream would contain f(input stream) and the output data stream pertaining to the unit 
upstream would contain a flow rate based on
flow  rate = /(in p u t stream) -  /(S tream !)
If f(stream 1) is selected then the input data stream would contain
/low  rate — /(S tream  1) + /(S tream  !)
and the output data stream pertaining to the unit upstream would contain a flow rate 
based on f(stream 1).
Other associated variables would then be calculated by referring to a number of 
relationships. For instance the combined mass flow rate is given by
finPsi„ -  / (S trea m !)p ^(S trea m l)/(S trea m !)p /S trea m !)
Although volumetric flow rate and density are represented explicitly, it is their 
products that matter. Thus, if necessary it can be assumed that
fin -  /(S tream l)  + /(S tream !)
and the corresponding density can be calculated. Variables [Pu]m , , [U]in and
[unspjin are obtained by merging the two streams, for instance in the case of [Pu]m :
y  (stream l)[PJ/Stream  I) + /(S tream  !)[PJ^(Stream ! )
/(S tream  I) + /(S tre a m !)
[P„ \  (Stream  1) ;/(S tream  2) < 0
In addition measurement data streams are formed as required (see below).
The following states might, or might not, be included in the process unit models:
• bulk volume
• mass of acid
• mass of plutonium
• mass of uranium
• mass of unspecified stream 2 components
The formats of the various data streams then conform to the requirements of these 
process models.
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T5.2 The Various Inner Layers
From calling procedure: tstan, tfmish, ICs, input data streams, output data streams,
measurement data streams 
To calling procedure: states & measurement predictions Vt: tstart < t < tfmish
Each inner layer is composed of a differential equation solver that calls one of the 
module models. Each of the tank set modules is based on the basic tank procedure 
described next.
T5.3 The Basic Tank Procedure
From calling procedure:
Current time, t.
Current values for up to 5 states (balances): Mbuik , Mpu , Macid , Mu, Munsp
(Those states not used would simply be zeroed).
Current time values for the following variables:
T ,  f i n , , fout, [P u ] in  , [ H  ]in , [U ]m  , [ u n s p ]m
where f are volumetric flow rates, [ ] are concentrations in g/1 and T is the
measured temperature.
To calling procedure:
[Pu], [H^], [U], [unsp] evaluated at time t
evaluated at time t
dt dt dt dt dt 
The balances are as follows:
^^bulk =  f  0  — f  o
T J i n P s j „  J o u i r sdt
dt
at
= fi„ [unspl^ -  [unsp']
dt
In conjunction with the temperature, the 5 states enable the calculation of density.
The normal equation:
p,{T) = p„(T) + a,,(T)*[Pu] + a„,{T)*[H+]+.....
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can be re-arranged on the basis of:
A  (T) = p S T ) + ^ [ dpAT)* + a„,(T)* +..... ]
bulk
Then
y  _  ^hulk 
b^ulk ”  _
[Pu] = 
[//"] = 
[C/] =
V ^bulk J
M.acid
V  ^bulk J
V '^ bulk J
[unsp] =
M,unsp
\  ^butk J
T5.4 The Tank Sets
At each time step, each of the Tank Sets would be simulated by calling TANK a 
number of times. For example the sequence for a Tank Set that starts from Cycle 1 
outlet, then passes through tanks 4, 5 & 6 before exiting through Cycle 2 would be as 
follows:
receiving tank: 
call TANK with the following arguments:
T
fin
Ps.
[Pu]i,
[H li
{measurement data stream:
extracted from rt database -  receiving tank)
( input data stream:
foiTned from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream)
( input data stream:
formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream)
{input data stream:
formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream)
{input data stream:
formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream) 
[unsplin (input data stream:
formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream)
{output data stream: 
formed from
f(buffer tank. Stream 1), f(buffer tank, Stream 2) 
& f(buffer tank, Input Stream) )
lout
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buffer tank: 
call TANK with the following arguments:
T {measurement data stream:
extracted from rt database -  buffer tank] 
fin {input data stream:
formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream} 
p  {calculated locally:
from receiving tank fout, receiving tank ps & from Stream2} 
[Pu]in {calculated locally:
from receiving tank fout, receiving tank [Pu] & from Stream2} 
[H^]in {calculated locally:
from receiving tank Cut, receiving tank [H^] & from Stream2} 
[unsplin {calculated locally:
from receiving tank fout, receiving tank [unsp] & from Stream2} 
fout {output data stream:
formed from
f(feeding tank, Stream 1), f(feeding tank. Stream 2)
& f(feeding tank, input stream)}
feeding tank: 
call TANK with the following arguments:
T {measurement data stream:
extracted from rt database -  feeding tank] 
fin {input data stream:
formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream] 
{calculated locally:
from buffer tank fout, buffer tank ps & from Stream 2}
[Pu]in {calculated locally:
from buffer tank fout, buffer tank [Pu] & from Stream 2} 
[H^in {calculated locally:
from buffer tank fout, buffer tank [H^] & from Stream 2} 
[unsplin {calculated locally:
from buffer tank fout, buffer tank [unsp] & from Stream 2} 
fout {output data stream:
extracted from rt database -  f(downstream unit, Stream 1)}
Output the following measurement predictions for each tank: Vbuik, p s
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T5.5 Solvent-Extraction Stages
Inputs:
Modes:
A. fixed hidden inventory
B. floating hidden inventory
From calling procedure: tstan, tfmish 
Input data streams:
Vt: tstart — t — (-finish ,
Inom nominal plutonium inventory
fin {formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream}
[Pujin {formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream}
Output data streams:
^ t: tstart — t ^  tfinish ,
Cut {formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream}
[PuJout {formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream} ^
Outputs:
To real-time database:
^ t: tstart — t ^  tfinish ,
[Pujout {formed from Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream}^
states I, Ihinv 
To operational history database:
To calling procedure:
The nominal plutonium inventory is steady state so to accommodate dynamics, 
d l , ,
where x is a time constant obtained during commissioning. (Need only be known 
approximately). A second inventory, Cinv, is created to accommodate deviations from 
the nominal value. If a mass balance is now applied to the entire cycle:
or
at
* Mode B only 
 ^Mode A only 
 ^Mode B only
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Thus the following equations are solved:
dl,.Mode A: equation 1 and ——  = 0 => = -------------- — ;
dt ™' /» ,
Mode B: equations 1 & 2.
T5.6 Concentrator
A similar approach is proposed for the concentrator.
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TOOLBOX 6: DISAGREEMENT DETECTION.
Detectors are used:
1. to identify disagreements in a single data stream: their general location and approximate 
time span;
2. to detect disagreements between two data streams (e.g. a simulation and plant 
measurements): start time, location (usually open-ended i.e. no stop time).
Each time a new disagreement is found, a new sub-event is generated with a unique identifier. 
Symptoms (e.g. general location and approximate time-span) are then attached: sub-event_id~ 
symptoms.
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T6.1 Tool 6a: Single stream detection
Detection is achieved using procedure detect. This is called by a number of different 
procedures that focus on different data streams. In each case the results are entered into a sub­
event object.
Procedure detect
(sequence) -A [tstan, Ctop , time_profile]
Inputs: sequence
Outputs: t s t a r t ,  t s t o p ,  time_profile
Array sequence is tested for any distinctive deviations. The times at which they start & stop 
are output as well as their time profiles: tstan is rounded down to the nearest 10 minutes and 
tfmish up to the nearest 10 minutes to facilitate comparison. The procedure makes use of the 
standardised cusum.
Parameters: h -  height of vmask
k -  angle of arms of vmask 
mu -  mean of tracking error (zero)
Du -  positive detection tolerance 
D l -  lower detection tolerance 
rows, times -  a dynamic arrays
For every point in sequence (yO:
1. calculate the standardised variable: yt -  mu -A Z[ ;
2. calculate the positive and negative cusum for z;:
C^i = m ax ((C \i + Zi -  k), 0.0)
C'i = min((C‘i.i + z, 4- k), 0.0)
3. if either the positive or negative cusums exceed their respective tolerances at the i^ 
data point, i.e. C^i > Du or C'i < Dl, i —> rows; do not reset the corresponding cusum;
4. repeat for all data points;
5. analyse rows: procèss__points(rows) -4  times ;
6. search sequence and select flagged sections if times does not contain zeros:
search_sequence(sequence, times) —> time-profiles.
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Procedure process points
(rows) -A times
The input is a column vector of row numbers during which the cusum was alarming. Non- 
consecutive numbers means the alarm has stopped and another started.
Key variables: times -  a dynamic array
1. If rows contains no data, [0 0] times
2. Otherwise r o w s ( l ) p _ s t a r t .
3. Process the data in rows
for ii = 2:size(rows)
if rows(ii) -  rows(ii-l) ^ 1
% non-consecutive rows => new alarm 
[p_start rows(ii-l)] —> times 
p_start = rows(ii)
end
end
4. Returns array times. Each element in times consists of a pair of integers, a start row 
number and a stop row number for the alarm.
Procedure search-sequence
(sequence, times) time-profiles
Key variables: rg -  row at which alarm starts
rf -  row at which alarm stops 
ts -  time at which alarm starts 
tf -  time at which alarm stops 
alarm_data -  dynamic array
V (rs I'f) G times:
1. find the corresponding times in sequence tg and tf
2. round tg down to the nearest 10 minutes.
3. modify r^  to equate to tg
4. round tf up to the nearest 10 minutes.
5. modify rr to equate to tf
6. copy the relevant section from sequence into alarm_data 
% counter
p=0
for ii = rg : rf
% copy the relevant section from sequence to alarm data
p = p +1;
alarm_data(p) = sequence(ii)
end
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T6.2 Tool 6a-l Receiving tank input stream or feeding tank output stream
Inputs;
From calling procedure: Tank_id, cycle i, tstan, tfmish
From Real-Time Database:
if Tank_id e  Receiving__tanks,
[X] (input stream), 
f(input stream),
else
f(downstream unit, stream!).
Outputs:
To Real-Time Database:
To Operational History Database:
To Short-Term Assurances: sub-event ids
Main procedure
sub-event-id-created = .nil. 
sub-event_ids = {} 
if Tank_id e  Receiving_tanks,
detect([X] (input stream)) —> [tstan, tstop , magnitudes]
assign(tstan, tstop , magnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event_ids, ‘void’)
detect(f(input stream)) -a  [tstan, tstop, magnitudes]
assign(tstart, tstop , magnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event_ids, ‘void’)
else
end
detect(f(downstream unit, stream 1))
assign(tstan, tstop , magnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event_ids, ‘void’)
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Procedure assign
(tstart, tstop, magnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event_ids, with)
Assigns the results to a sub-event object. Parameter with is used to identify groups of 
diagnoses.
if not_empty(magnitudes)
V m G m agnitudes, 
if sub-event-id-created then 
V se G sub-event_ids, 
if times involved are in common with se
if not(3 se::diagnosis_id::sd_id::path-type = with)
generate-name&sub-class diagnosis_id/se::diagnosis_id 
diagnosis_id g se::diagnoses 
se::scores —> (se::scores 3)
generate-name&sub-class sd_id/se::diagnosis_id::sd_id 
fill-sub-diagnosis-in-sub-event(m, se::diagnosis_id::sd_id)
else
se::diagnosis_id whose sd_id::path-type = with d 
generate-name&sub-class
sd_id/se: :diagnosis_id: :sd„id 
[score G se: :d::scores that pertains to d] - 1 -4
se::d::scores
fill-sub-diagnosis-in-sub-event (m, d::sd_id )
end
else
create-sub-event —> sub-event_id g sub-event_ids
end
else
create-sub-event —> sub-event_id g sub-event_ids 
sub-event-id-created = .t.
end
end
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Procedure create-sub-event
(tstart, tstop , m, sub-event_ids) —> sub-event„ids
Creates a sub-event.
Produce a name: generate-name —> sub-event_id
Create object sub-event_id e  sub-event_ids: 
description = 
diagnosis =
diagnoses = (diagnosis_id) 
scores = (1)
symptoms = (symptom_id)
diagnosis_id has a sub-diagnosis sd_id which is a sub-class:
path-type = measurement_error
path-id = if m pertains to volume then so does path-
id (e.g. VOl), else p** 
quantity = obtain model prediction from the rt 
database
symptom_id is a sub-class:
error-in = Depends on the data stream
e.g. if f(input stream) then flow 
e.g. if [X](input stream) then X 
path-id = Derived on the basis of Tank_id 
start-time = tstart 
stop-time = tfinish
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T6.3 Tool 6a-2 Hidden inventory
Inputs:
From calling procedure: Ihinv, tstart, tfinish, sub-event_ids 
Outputs:
To Real-Time Database:
To Operational History Database:
To Short-Term Assurances:
Main procedure :
sub-event-id-created = .t. 
detect(Ihinv) -4 [tstart, tstop , m agnitudes]
assign(tstart, tstop , m agnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event_ids, ‘void’)
Procedure fill-sub-diagnosis-in-sub-event
(m, sub-event_id: :diagnosis_id: :sd_id)
sub-event„id::diagnosis_id::sd_id is a sub-class where:
path-type = flow
quantity = m converted to a flow rate 
path-id = c**h**
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T6.4 Tool 6a-3 Pu/H+
Inputs:
From calling procedure: Pu, , t s t a r t ,  t f m i s h ,  sub-event_ids 
Outputs:
To Real-Time Database:
To Operational History Database:
To Short-Term Assurances:
Main procedure :
sub-event-id-created = .t. 
detect(Pu) [tstart, tstop, magnitudes]
assign(tstart, tstop , magnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event„ids, ‘molarity’ ) 
detect(H^) [tstart, tstop , magnitudes]
assign(tstart, tstop , magnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event_ids, ‘Pu’)
NB Where their times overlap, molarity & Pu sub-diagnoses should pertain to the same 
diagnosis
Procedure fill-sub-diagnosis-in-sub-event
(m, sub-event_id: : diagnosis_id: : sd_id)
sub_event„id::diagnosis_id:sd_id is a sub-class where:
if H+’ ,
path-type = ‘molarity’ 
path-id = c**h** 
quantity = m 
else if ‘Pu’ ,
path-type -  Pu’
else
end
path-id = c**h** 
quantity =m
path-type = ‘unsp’ 
path-id = c**h** 
quantity =m
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T6.5 Tool 6a-4 Pu/unsp
Inputs;
From calling procedure: Ihinv, tstan, tfmish, sub-event__ids
sub-event-id-created = .t. 
detect(Pu) -> [tstan, tstop , magnitudes]
assign(tstiirt, tstop , magnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event_ids, ‘ unsp’) 
detect(unsp) [tstart, tstop , magnitudes]
assign(tstart, tstop , magnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event_ids, ‘Pu’)
NB Where their times overlap unsp & Pu sub-diagnoses should pertain to the same diagnosis
Procedure fill-sub-diagnosis-in-sub-event
(m, sub-event_id::diagnosis_id)
As for Tool 6a-3
T6.6 Tool 6a-4 Interpreters
Inputs:
From calling procedure: Y, tstan, tfmish, sub-event_ids
Main procedure :
sub-event-id-created = .t. 
detect(Y) [tstan, tstop , magnitudes]
assign(tstart, tstop , magnitudes, sub-event-id-created, sub-event_ids, ‘ void’)
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T6.7 Tool 6b: Error-based detection
Detection is achieved using procedure test. This is called by a number of different procedures 
that form an error stream on the basis of different data streams. In each case the results are 
entered into a sub-event object.
Procedure test
(error) -4  [positive, tstart, magnitude]
Array error is tested for any distinctive deviations. If positive then positive = .t. else .nil. and 
the time at which the deviations start is output as well as is their maximum value. The 
procedure makes use of the standardised cusum, where the mean of the error is nominally 
zero.
Parameters: h -  cusum decision interval
1. Form cusum arrays for error —> and C
2. Test every element of and C :
positive = .nil.
if not(positive) & IC^ I > h or ICI > h, 
positive = .t.
time associated with that particular C^ or C  —> t 
element of error at time t -> magnitude 
tstart = t -  20 minutes
3. If not(positive) return.
4. Starting at (tstart + 20), calculate the gradient for each point. If C^ alarmed, as soon as 
gradient <= 0.0, take the magnitude of the previous point from error, if C alarmed 
instead, as soon as gradient => 0.0, take the magnitude of the previous point from 
error.
Alternative test: cusum might be overly susceptible to ‘spikes’, particularly those that might 
arise because of difficulties in predicting the transients during batch transfers. In which case 
perhaps
alarm if f |error(t)| dt > -,------   r
might be more suitable. The times here pertain to the simulation and parameter x is a 
tolerance.
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T6.8 Tool 6b-l Tank-Sets: first pass
Inputs:
From calling procedure: Segment_id, tstart, tfinish, measurement-predictions
From Real-Time Database: Reference_vectors pertaining to plant Segment_id
Outputs:
To calling procedure: sub-event_ids
By extracting the appropriate values from the Real-Time Database, form reference_profiles 
corresponding to the measurement-predictions. Compare and store those that are different over 
the same period of time. Variable profile would have two columns time and the actual values.
tp = 9999999 ; sub-event-id-created = .nil. ; profile_names = {(dummy m tp) }
V profile g measurement-predictions,
form error„profile = reference„profiIe - profile 
test(error„profile) -A [positive, ts, m] 
if positive
if tp - ts > - toi (i.e. some tolerance)
truncate profile so it only pertains to the time period ts to tfmish 
(profile m ts) g profile_names 
if ts: tp - toi > ts > tp toi 
tp = min(tp , ts)
else
remove profile pertaining to tp from profile„names
Ip — Is
end
end
if profile_names {(dummy m tp)}
generate-name —> sub-event_id 
Create object sub-event_id g  sub-event_ids : 
diagnoses = (diagnosis_id)
diagnosis_id has a sub-diagnosis sd_id which is a sub-class: 
error-in = measurement 
quantity = all profiles in profile_names 
path_id = tank_id 
V profile g  profile_names & profile ^  dummy,
add-symptom-to-sub-event(profile, sub-event_id)
Procedure add-svmptom-to-sub-event 
(profile, sub-event_id)
Produce a name: generate-name —> symptom_id
symptom_id G sub-event_id:: symptoms : 
symptom_id is a sub-class:
error-in = pertains to profile 
path_id = pertains to profile 
start-time = pertains to profile
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T6.9 Tool 6b-2 Tank-Sets: second pass
Inputs:
From calling procedure:
Segment_id, tstart, tfmish, measurement-predictions, sub-event_id, variables 
From Real-Time Database: Reference_profiles pertaining to plant Segment_id 
Outputs:
To calling procedure: boolean ‘success’
By extracting the appropriate values from the Real-Time Database, form reference_profiles 
corresponding to the measurement-predictions. Then do the following:
pass = .t. , success = .nil.
V profile g measurement-predictions,
form error_profile = reference_profile - profile 
test(error_profile) —» [positive, ts, m] 
if positive —> pass = .nil.
end 
if pass
success = .true.
Produce a name: generate-name —> diagnosis_id 
V profile g  variables,
add-diagnosis-to-sub-event(profile, sub-event__id::diagnosis_id)
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Procedure add-diagnosis-to-sub-event
(m, sub-event_id::diagnosis„id)
Produce a name: generate-name —> sd_id 
Alter object sub-event„id::diagnosis_id :
sub„event_id::diagnosis_id:sd_id is a sub-class where: 
if m pertains to ‘HC’ ,
path-type = ‘acid’ 
path_id = h**t** 
quantity = m 
else if m pertains to ‘Pu’ , 
path-type = ‘Pu’ 
path_id = h**t** 
quantity = m 
else if m pertains to ‘Transfer To Hinv’ 
path-type = ‘flow’ 
path_id = t**h** 
quantity = m 
else if m pertains to ‘To Transfer In’ 
path-type = ‘Transfer In’ 
path_id = t-i**t** 
quantity = m 
else if m pertains to ‘Substitution with acid’ 
path-type = ‘Substitution’ 
path_id = t**h** 
quantity = m
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Inputs:
From Real-Time Database:
[U] and [Pu] at Cycle I inlet -4  [U]m, [Pu]m
[U] and [Pu] at Cycle 1 outlet—> [U]out, [PuJout
Outputs:
To Real-Time Database: boolean ‘normal’ —> UPu_separated
For each time record, form the test statistic, x: x  =
f - 1  - f - 1\PuJout \PuJin
- 1  Pu)i„
Filter out transient effects like load changes, y = EWMA(x) 
test(y) “ > [normal, ts, m]
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TOOLBOX 7; MODEL-BASED REASONING
The main aim is to hypothesise events, a list of which would be displayed for the inspector. 
Each hypothesis would be supported by symptoms and diagnoses.
The plant can be viewed as a number of sub-plants consisting of tank sets or process units. The 
operation of the tank sets are observable, directly, and whilst the process units are not. Each of 
the non-observable sub-plants are viewed as single process units. The underlying concept is 
based on the fact that non-observable sub-plants are sandwiched between observable sub­
plants. Thus if a disagreement in an observable sub-plant can be ‘explained’ by a material 
transfer across its external boundary, this material can hide, temporarily, in the connecting non- 
observable sub-plant. This results in two stages of analysis:
1. how can the material be re-distributed to satisfy the diagnostic criteria?;
2. can this re-distribution be corroborated by supporting evidence?
Re-distribution is examined in two different time-frames, the short term and the medium term. 
The system is not intended to be used to detect the ‘slow drip’ (e.g. a diversion of less than say
0.01 significant quantity per hour). Separate re-distribution methods are applied (tools 7a&b), 
whilst corroboration is handled by Tool 7c.
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T7.1 Compartment a: Short-term re-distribution
Re-distributes material along paths using observers. An observer is a particular kind of 
simulation in which one or more variables are varied so that the simulation predicts specified 
values. The observer then outputs time profiles pertaining to these manipulated variables. 
Clearly these variables could be varied forever, so, since any incident is likely to be finite, 
procedure tailor is invoked to truncate each of the profiles.
Observer descriptions follow on from a description of the tailor procedure. Switched 
observers are used here enabling the simulation to be executed, ‘as normal’, over specified 
periods of time.
Procedure tailor
[time_profile] —> tstart, tfmish, tailored_time_profile
Find the maximum, then zero all values < 5% of max ? Find times at which the incident starts 
and stops.
Inputs: time_profile 
Outputs: tailored_time_profile
Tool 6a already outputs a time profile of the desired shape except noise might be present at 
either end of the profile. As the mean of the tracking error is 0.0, it is sufficient at this point to 
simply zero the first and last data values in time_profile.
1. Set the first value in the time profile to 0.0.
2. Set the last value in the time profile to 0.0
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T7.1.1 Solvent extraction cycle observers 
Inputs:
From calling procedure:
Segm entjd , observer„type, tstart, tfmish 
From Real-Time Database: 
see below.
The simulation is a slightly modified version of that in Tool 5. The simulation is executed 
some Tinitiai minutes before tstan to allow the observer to ‘settle’ before the incident of interest 
occurs. The procedure call takes the form:
Inputs:
Segment„id = process unit, 
observer_type,
tstart “ Tinitiai,
tstart,
tfmish,
Ihinv, {Ut time = tstart ” Tinitiai}
Input data streams:
^ t. tstart — t ^  tfmish ,
Inom nominal plutonium inventory 
fin {Input Stream}
[Pujin {Input Stream}
Output data streams:
t .  t s t a r t  —  t  ^  t f m i s h  ,
fout {receiving tank: Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream}
[Pujout {receiving tank: Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream}
[X]out {receiving tank: Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream}
[unsp]out{receiving tank: Stream 1, Stream 2 & Input Stream}
Outputs:
To calling procedure:
^ t. tstart — t ^  tfmish ,
[Pujout {if Observer_type = Pu/H^ or Pu/unsp out}
{if Observer_type = Pu/lT  out}
[unsp]out{if Observer_type = Pu/unsp out} 
state Ihinv
The equations are the same as those given in the appropriate part of Tool 5 (Solvent Extraction 
Stages - Mode B) but with modifications as given below.
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Observer type = Hidden inventory 
Execute from t =  tstart ~ Tinitiai'
I f  t C  tstart ,
— T i n i t i a i )  "  h , i n v \
else
Then
(i.e. observe H^) 
(i.e. freeze H^)
[Pul [ X U  - a A T ) * U  - (P)*[unspl
^Pu(T)
To calling procedure:
tailor( Ihinv )
(i.e. instead of output data stream)
Observer type = Pu/H^ out
E x e c u t e  from t  — tstart ~ Tinitiai-
[ P u j o u t  T i n i t i a i )  W^/iv]
-  O ^ P u ( T ) * [ P i i L i  -  ( ^ u n s p ( T ) * [ t f n S p l
LTTla. =
To calling procedure:
tailor( [PuJout ) 
tailor( [H^aur)
(i.e. observe Pu)
Observer type = Pu/unsp out
Execute from t = tstart -  Tinitiai-
[P^lour /^«nv]
lXLt-^Pu(T)HPi^Lt-^,AT)HH-l
^ur.,(T)
[unsplat =
To calling procedure:
tailor( [Pujout ) 
tailor( [ u n s p lJ
(i.e. observe Pu)
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Observer type = Interpret Pu
Execute from t = tstan - Tinitiai- 
If t < tstart ,
(i.e. observe H+)
else
lout 1- Jout start
Then
------------------------------S J n ------------------------
To calling procedure:
tailor( Puout )
Observer type = Interpret
Execute from t = tstan - Tinitiai-
lXU-o ;p„ ( T)* [P uU -a (T) * l un sp l
[H*l.
To calling procedure:
tailor( [ H ^ I J
Observer type = Interpret unsp 
Execute from t = tstan - Tinitiai-
[unspU =
[ X U - a , „ ( m P u U
To calling procedure:
tailor( [ u n s p lJ
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T7.1.2 Tank set observers 
Inputs:
From calling procedure:
Plant segm entjd , observerjype, tstan, tfmish, sub-eventJds 
From Real-Time Database: 
volume, density
M p u , M acid -A MpnMacu : (substitution with acid only)
Outputs:
To calling procedure:
a stream (see individual observers)
The simulation is a slightly modified version of that in Tool 5. The simulation is executed 
some Tinitiai minutes before tstan to allow the observer to ‘settle’ before the incident of interest 
occurs. The procedure call is the same as that for Tool 5 but with extra parameters, 
observerjype and Tinitiai- The equations are the same as those given in the appropriate part of 
Tool 5 but with modifications as given below.
Observer tvpe = Transfer To Hinv 
Execute from t = tstan - Tmidai- 
If t ^  tstart ,
Qo,„ = 0.05[v„,„ -  Û it]  (i e. observe Vtuik)
^  _  [  Q o u l  ’ Q o u t  ~  ^
^™'io.o , a . , < o
Form vector AV-r for t: tstart ^  t < tfmish :
AVt(0 = f àQout dt
Apply one-sided Cusum test to detect & obtain times of incident:
Negative-Cusum(AV^ ) -> [ts, tf]
n  =
fout^fouXoutput__data_stream)^Q^^^
-A new_ stream
end
To calling procedure: tailor(new_stream)
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Observer type = Transfer In
Execute from t = tstan - Tiniüai-
If t ^  tstait 1
(i.e. observe Mbuik)
W
f  ^ j f i n  {input_ data_ stream) + —^  ^  {input_  data_ stream) > 0
A. -  i p .
0 , {inputs data_ stream) < 0
new__ stream
end
To calling procedure:
tailor(new_stream)
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Observer type = Addition of Acid 
Execute from t = tstan - T,nitiai.
If  t  — tstart )
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(i.e. observe Mbuik)
W.,
0.0 < 0
[/?n2 = 1 0 0 * [Â -P .]
A , = A .( r )  + «„ ,(r)* [H *]a
dMibulk  _
dt
dMacid
dt
finPs;, ~  foutPs +  
f b ^ n - foul\.H^] +
w——, [H^lj —> new_stream{\), new_stream{2) 
Ph
end
To calling procedure:
tailor(new_stream( 1 )) 
tailor(new_stream(2))
(i.e. observe ps)
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Observer type = Addition of Pu
Execute from t = tstan - Tinidai-
If t ^  tstart )
W = 0.05 /^bulk i^bulk ]
|0.0 < 0
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(i.e. observe Mbuik)
[P w ] ,= 1 0 0 * [Â -A ]
P „  =  P . À T )  +  ( X p , { T ) * l P u \
dM,bulk
d t
“ -  f in P s ,„  -  f o u t P s  +
dM
dt
W
^ - ^ - U P u \ - L \ P u \ +
W J P u \
Ph 
end
To calling procedure:
, {P u \ new_stream{\), new_stream{2)
tailor(new_stream(l))
tailor(new_stream(2))
(i.e. observe ps)
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Observer type = Substitution with acid
Execute from t = tstan - Tjnitiai-
If I ^  Istart ?
=
0^.0 ,w „ < o
(i.e. observe M?u)
(i.e. observe Madd)
dM,bulk _
dt
dM
finPst„ foutPs
W \Pu\
= A m .  - f o u X P n ] - ^ ^dt p ,
d M ^ .; ,  .  . . T + 1  f  r i u + 1 , ^ o u X ^ ' ^ \ d d
dt Ps.
w— [H ]^ ut new_stream{\), new_stream{2)
Ps
end
To calling procedure:
tailor(new_stream( 1 )) 
tailor(new_stream(2))
Concentrator observers
The solvent extraction cycle observers in the absence of any specific details pertaining to the 
concentrator.
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T7.2 Compartment b: Medium-term assurances
Compartment b contains a number of tools (7b-1, 7b-2, 7b-3, 7b-4 & 7b-5) some of which are 
co-ordinated by a main procedure Tool 7b. All make use of all of the data available in the 
Real-Time and Operational History Databases.
T7.2.1 Tool 7b
Inputs:
From calling procedure: Period^, tstan, tfmish
From Real Time Data base:
V tank e intemaLtanks u  product_accountancy_tank:
V at t = tstart
V at t= tfinish 
Concentrator:
Mpu at t = tstan for each Period
^  t '  t s t a r t  —  t  t f m i s h ,  [ P u ] o u t
V cycle G solvent extraction cycles,
Mpu at t = tstan for each Period
^  t .  t s t a r t  —  t  C  t f m i s h ,  [ P t l J o u t  
^  t ,  t s t a r t  —  t  <  t f m i s h
f(tank, input stream) —> fm 
f(downstream unit, stream 1) -> fout
V tanks g intemaLtanks u  product„accountancy_tank:
^  t. tstart — t tfmish , [Pu] at time t
From Operational History Database: Table-Flows , Table-Errors 
Outputs:
To calling procedure: problem_unit, errout, redistributions
A simple plutonium mass balance based simulation (Tool 7b-1) is executed over a time period 
pertaining to the medium term (tstan to tfmish) and final inventory predictions are compared with 
those derived from the databases to obtain the error vector, e. If significant errors exist then 
their associated unit identifier is placed in Units. There are now three possibilities: no 
significant errors, errors that pertain to a buffer tank, and errors that relate to elsewhere.
Table-Flows: contains a copy of all the flow rate data that pertains to the last 7 periods [i.e. 
probably 7 (tstan t^ imsh) ] ■
Table-Errors: contains a copy of all the error data that pertains to the last 7 periods, Periodj-e to 
Period.
UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA 109
SRDP-R279
Main Procedure
Shift columns of Table-Flows one column left (i.e. lose the oldest column);
Insert current flow rate data (i.e. pertaining to Period_i) into the right column of Table-Flows.
Tool 7b-1 —> [Units, e] 
nul —> problem_unit
If Bunit e  Units: unit is the last but one tank in the entire plant simulated,
% problem is in the area of a feeding tank / process unit/ receiving tank 
% or the last but one tank
take-samples 
Tool7b-3 —> Units
unit starting from the first tank in the plant, then 
unit is the last process unit g Units 
errout = e(unit identifier that pertains to last but one tank)
T(unit) = 2* errout 
Units -> problem_unit
else if Bunit g Units: unit is the product accountancy tank,
% material in wrong tank
take-samples 
Tool7b-3 Units
unit starting from the first tank in the plant, then 
unit is the last process unit g Units 
errout = e(unit identifier that pertains to the product accountancy tank) 
x(unit) = 2* errout 
Units problem„unit
else if Units is not empty,
% problem is with a buffer tank
Vunit G Units, find unit: Cunit is a maximum 
T(unit) = 2*e(unit) 
errout = e(unit) 
unit —> problem_unit
end
Tool 7b-2(e) [problem„unit, error, redistributions]
Vunit, reset T(unit)
Procedure take-samples 
advise_user(“take samples”)
wait until advised that this sample data has entered the samples database
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T7.2.2 Tool 7b-1 Simulate and compare
Obtain initial conditions pertaining to the start of Periodi-e from the Real-Time Database.
For k = 1 to 7, 
j = i - 7 + k
1. Execute the simulation over Periodj to obtain for each unit.
2. V unit e  internal_tanks u  product_accountancy_tank,
form the error e(unit): = V \P u \ -
where V  (the volume measured) and [Pu] (the plutonium concentration 
estimate) are obtained from the real-time database.
V unit G cycles u  concentrator: 
form the error e(unit):
where the inventories are obtained from the real-time database (the sums of
both the nominal and hidden inventories).
3. Write eunit into the appropriate row of the k^ column of Table-Errors.
Test Table-Errors against a specified inventory tolerance for each unit, T(unit): apply the 
Cusum test to each unit over 7 periods with h = T(unit), k = ??
Simulation
V units G intemaLtanks u  product_accountancy„tank u  cycles u  concentrator: 
at
Obtain the flow rates from the appropriate columns of Table-Flows.
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T.7.2.3Tool 7b-2 Medium Term Re-distribution
A simple procedure then redistributes material along paths on the basis of a number of 
assumptions:
1. the inventory in each tank or process unit can only be in error by a specified amount;
2. no material can be redistributed upstream from the first tank i.e. material flow 
measurements from the input accountancy vessel are assumed to be perfect;
3. for similar reasons, no material may be redistributed downstream from the product 
accountancy tank.
Let denote the incremental plutonium mass redistribution forwards from the unit and let 
= 0. Starting at the product accountancy tank and ending at the tank immediately 
downstream of the input accountancy tank:
1. calculate the total error in the tank by summing the error in the tank with the
material carried forward:
u^nit ^mit
2. calculate the material carried forward out of the upstream tank/process unit:
3. revise the error on the basis of a backward redistribution:
^imit ^unit unit upstream
4. total redistribution forwards from unit, .
If the first tank is reached and = 0.0 then
else
[ , ...] -a redistributions
redistribute forwards. Starting at the tank immediately downstream of the input 
accountancy tank and ending at the product accountancy tank:
1. negate the effect of the ‘backward’ calculation: = ë„,„ +
2. calculate forwards instead, AM„„„ = max(0,ai>j(ê„„„ ) - 1„„,, ) * sign(e^ i^, )
3. revise the error on the basis of this redistribution:
4. total redistribution forwards from unit is now,
[ ^  redistributions
end
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T7.2.4 Tool 7b-3 Evaluation following on from sampling
Suppose that the following Pu concentrations are available: Pu{Tank-,t.), Pu{Tank.,tj), .... 
Obtain associated Pu concentrations from the real-time database, Pu(Tank.,t.), Pu{Tankj,tj), 
and form error vector, e rro r:
error, Pu{ Tankf, f j -  Pu{Tank;, f, )
Working from the first tank forwards identify the first tank, tank^ : errork > accuracy of sample 
data, then {all tanks/process units upstream from tankk until, but not including that upstream 
tank in which a sample has been taken i.e. an errorj exists} e  Units. If Units = {}, then Units = 
{ concentrator feeding tank , concentrator , concentrator receiving tank }.
T7.2.5 Tool 7b-4 Identification of svstematic multiplicative errors 
This tool is based on the approach devised by Howell & Miller [30].
Inputs:
From calling procedure: tstan, tfmish 
From Real-Time Database:
As for Tool 7b
From Operational History Database: data object Tank-set_id, an instance of Tank-sets
There are a number of preparatory stages that must be carried out before appropriate software 
can be developed. These involve specifying a number of simulations and deriving qualitative 
reasoning tables. This information would then be programmed in procedures.
Preparatory stages
Generate tables to relate a qualitative vector, which describes the disagreements, to a set of 
qualitative vectors that represent possible bias patterns. To do this, identify which tank 
volumes are to be used in the estimation of which flow rates (e.g. as in Table A7.1) and hence 
construct the tank-set equations. Form matrix A and produce a set of square matrices by 
eliminating columns. Invert each of these and operate on the disagreement vector to obtain sets 
of equations that relate the biases to the disagreements. A separate table is now obtained by 
analysing each set separately. These tables are stored as part of the tank-set_id object i.e. tank- 
set_id:: tables.
Produce a volume-based simulation for each tank-set:
Sim(tank-set_id, tstan, tfmish) VoIume_estimates
Produce a simple plant simulation, which propagates [Pu] down the plant (as opposed to uses 
[Pu] values stored in the Real-time Database):
Sim(‘overall’, tstan, tfmish) M?u , [Pu] estimates in the product accountancy tank
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The algorithm
V tank-set_id g tank-sets,
Sim(tank-set_id, tstart, tfinish) Volume„estimates 
qualitative-compare(Volume_measurements, Volume_estimates) —>
error{tank-set_id} (i.e. a qualitative vector), V _error 
Table(tank-set_id, e rro r) -> BIASES
Order-bias-combinations(BIASES) BIAS-COM BINATIONS
starting with the most likely bias_com bination g  BIAS-COM BINATIONS: 
if unique-solution?(bias_combination) then
least-squares(bias_combination) —> bias„values 
if eval-unique(bias_values) = .t. then next tank-set„id
else
quantify-bias-combination(tank-set_id, bias_com bination)
—> bias_values 
if eval-non-unique(bias_values) = .t. then next tank-set_id 
try another bias-combination
Procedure qualitative-comnare
(tank-set_id, Volume„measurements, Volume_estimates) —>
e rro r  {tank-set_id} (i.e. a qualitative vector), V _error {tank-set_id}
V tank G tank-set_id:: tanks
d = voIum e_m easurem ents(tank) -  volume_estimates(tank)
if Id! < tank-set_id: : tolerance 
d = 0
end
error(tank) = sign(d)
V__error(tank) = d
The function sign(x) returns +1 if d is positive, -1 if d is negative and 0 is d is zero. This 
function produces the qualitative vector error {tank-set_id}.
Procedure Table
(tank-set_id, e rro r) biases
Obtain the set BIASES from the ‘union’ of the outputs from the separate tables tank- 
set id::tables.
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Procedure Order-bias-combinations
(BIASES) BIAS-COMBINATIONS
By comparing individual elements across the combinations, first choose those combinations 
with the most common, specified elements, repeat but include unspecified elements specified 
with their most likely sign, then choose the next most common and so on until all the 
unspecified elements have been specified with all possible values.
Procedure unique-solution?
(bias-combination)
If the bias contains at least one zero element, then answer is always non-unique.
Procedure least-squares
(bias_combination) —> bias_values
Evaluate the biases using the least squares algorithm. Using matrix A, remove those columns 
whose element in bias„combination is estimated to be zero. Generate co-variance matrix D. 
Solve using least squares: [B^D^B] B^D V__errors bias_values.
Procedure eval-unique 
(bias_ values)
Re-run both simulations with bias„values:
Sim(tank-set_id, bias_values, tstart, tfmish) Volume„estimates 
Sim(‘overair,bias_vaIues, tstart, tfinish) Mpu , 
qualitative-compare(Volume_measuremeints, Volume_estimates) —>
e rro r {tank-set_id} (i.e. a qualitative vector), V„error{tank-set_id} 
If every element in V _error < tolerance and MPu matches samples then solution is good.
Procedure quantifv-bias-combination
(tank-set_id, bias_combination) —> bias_values
Called when solution is non-unique. The elements of bias_combination are repeatedly 
changed until the Pu concentration in the product accountancy tank correlates with that 
measured. Establish two bounds to the search:
least-squares({£r, 0, 0 ,..., 0}) -A bv_r 
least-squares({0, 0 ,..., 0, £f}) ^  bv_f
Based on bias_combination, iterate:
[bias_combination(l) + bias_combination(last element)] = bv_r(l) + b_f(last element)
until Pu concentration in the product accountancy tank correlates with that measured. Return 
these valus as bias values.
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Procedure e val-non-unique
(tank-set_id, bias_values)
Re-run both simulations with bias_values:
Sim(tank-set_id, bias_values, tstart, tfmish) -> VoIume_estimates 
Sim(‘overall’,bias_values, tstart, tfmish) ^  Mpu, 
qualitative-compare(Volume_measurements, Volume_estimates) —>
e rro r {tank-set__id} (i.e. a qualitative vector), V__error{tank-set_id] 
If every element in V _erro r < tank-set_id: Tolerance and MPu matches samples then return .t.
T7.2.6 Tool 7b-5 Flow meter calibration
Flow meters installed in the solvent-extraction area apparently [6] have low accuracy but high 
precision. They could therefore be calibrated from the flow rate data generated by Tool 3 and 
conoborated by Tool 7b-4.
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T7.3 Compartment c: Corroboration and event generation
Inputs:
From calling procedure: sub-event_ids
Individual sub-events would be analysed further to corroborate their diagnoses. Sub-events 
would then be correlated in time. Event objects would then be generated for the most 
appropriate. The most appropriate would be chosen on the basis of its score. Finally temporal 
reasoning would be applied to combine events in time. Two procedures invoke various rule- 
bases:
T7.3.1 tool 7c-1
V s e sub-event_ids: corroborate individual sub-events 
correlate sub-events in time 
make-events(sub-event„ids)
combine events in time
T7.3.2 Tool7c-2 
combine events in time
These tools make use of procedure confirm.
Procedure confiim (feature status)
This tool examines the relevant feature in the Real-Time Database to confirm that its activity is 
as declared by ‘status’ and returns True or False (see Tool 8). Relevant features include:
• the flow rate of a particular stream;
• the Boolean output of a neutron detector.
T7.3.3 Corroboration of individual sub-event ids
A rule-base would be provided to guide the corroboration. Being heuristic, rules would be 
added with operational experience. Examples are given below. Procedures denoted by 
(confirm feature status) access data created by Tool 8 and return a Boolean True/False.
Inputs:
From calling procedure: Sub-event„id 
Rules are applied at a diagnosis level 
Form an array sy containing all the symptoms of sub-event_id
V d e sub~event_id::diagnoses
form an array sd containing all the sub-diagnoses of d
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form an array paths containing all path_id pertaining to sd 
score is the appropriate element of sub-event„id:: scores
if Bp G paths, which pertains to a solvent-extraction cycle
cycle_id is that cycle that pertains to p
solex-rule-base(sy, d, p, cycle_id, score) —> score
score replaces the appropriate element in sub-event_id:: scores
else
if Bp G paths, which pertains to a tank
tank-rule-base(sy, d, p, score) —> score
score replaces the appropriate element in sub-event_id:: scores
end
Solex-rule-base 
Example 1
Based on assumption: relevant acid flow meters aie accessed
The feed into a receiving tank would consist of an acid stream into which separated products 
had been added. The flow rate of the acid stream should remain constant unless the operator 
has changed cycle operation:
If
(confirm (stream-flowrate (cycle_id acid_out)) constant) 
then
score = score - 1 
Example 2
Based on assumption: neutron-detectors are accessed 
If
then
not(confirm (neutron-detectors cycle_id) normal)
(advise ‘ abnormal_operation ’ cycle_id) 
score = score + 1
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Example 3
Based on assumption: XRF-detectors are accessed 
If
not(confirm (XRF cycle_id) normal)
then
(advise ‘abnormal_operation’ cycle„id) 
score = score + 1
Example 4 
if
the time periods of any of the symptoms e  sy overlap a time period in declared- 
operational : :cycle_id in which the status changed to ‘loaded’
& 3 s e sd: s::path-id = ‘c**h**’ or ‘h**c**’ (i.e. pertaining to cycle_id)
then
score = score + 2
Tank-rule-base
Example 5 
if
the time periods of any of the symptoms g sy overlap a time period in declared- 
operational: :tank_id in which the status is ‘shut-down’
& 3 s G sd: s::path-id = ‘t**h**’ (i.e. pertaining to tank_id)
then
score = score + 2 ?
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T7.3.4 Con’elate sub-events in time
Example 6
A problem exists with Tool 3. A diversion during normal filling of receiving tank (tankjd)
would generate two sub-events because the simulated annealing approach ‘smooths’ the effect.
Correlate in time to combine these.
Obtain from operational database: tank_id::rtank::empty_times ((tsi tn) (ts2 tf2)....)
3 sel, se2 e  sub-event_ids:
a symptom si of sel::symptoms has 
path-id = p i, 
error-in = ‘flow’, 
start-time = tl  & 
stop-time = t2 
a symptom s2 of se2::symptoms has 
path-id = p2, 
error-in -  ‘flow’, 
start-time = t3 & 
stop-time = t4,
tl  < t3 ,
(t3 t4) e  ((tsi tfi) (ts2tf2)....),
then
end
sel::link-with = se2 
sel::link-type = ‘primary-effect’ 
se2::link-with = sel 
se2:: link-type = ‘secondary-effect’
120 UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA
SRDP-R279
T7.3.5 Make Events
Remove all sub-events with link-type = ‘secondary-effect’ from sub-events 
Group the remaining sub-events into sub-sets:
if two or more sub-events are linked (i.e. via link-with)
and have link-type = ‘primary-effect’ 
then put in the same sub-set
else put in separate sub-sets
V sub-set: make-event(sub-set) event_id g event_ids
Procedure make-event
(sub-event„ids) event_id
The most likely sub-event/diagnosis would be chosen by looking through all the scores of all 
the sub-events g  sub-event_ids for that diagnosis with the largest score:
V s G sub-event_ids,
find that diagnosis, d, that pertains to max(s::scores) 
s:-.diagnosis = d 
s::score = max(s:: scores)
Produce a name: generate-name —> event_id 
Create object event„id g  event_ids:
description = name on the basis of path-id & path-type 
sub-events = (sub-event_ids)
T7.3.6 Combining events in time 
Example 7
If
and
and
and
then
Beventl: event_description = “solex_hinv” ,
event l::path_id = x, 
quantity = qi
start_time ~ ti , stop_time « t% .
3event2: event_description = “solex_hinv” ,
event2::path_id = x, 
quantity = q j
start„time ~ t ] , stop_time = t4 .
\t2 —13\ < some tolerance,
im.
(combine event 1 event2)
< some tolerance
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TOOLBOX 8; CONFIRMATION OF OPERATIONAL UNIT STATUSES
Certain measurements are continuously monitored to detect any change in operation: I 
(increasing), S (steady) or D (decreasing) are recorded in the Real-Time Database. Although a 
single tool is discussed here, a number of tools tailored for separate data streams would be 
more likely.
n
Input: data point d„ e  d at time  ^”  y  
Outputs: status at time t
Parameters:
[I mean of variable (initially the instrument output)
k angle of arms of vmask
Du positive detection tolerance
D l negative detection tolerance
f instrument output frequency (outputs/minute)
A detection procedure is positioned in between the instrument output and the real-time 
database. This procedure makes use of the standardised cusum.
Each time a new point arrives:
calculate the standardised variable («/„ - / / ) —> y,- 
calculate the positive and negative cusum for y. :
C/ = max((C^j +yi -A:),0.o)
Cr = min((c;ii -f- y, + A:),0.0)
If C; > Du
‘F —> status 
else if < D l
‘D ’ —> status
else
‘S’ status 
If C; > Du or Cr > Du ,
feed_change = search_data(i,ti,yi,y), 
reset the cusum —> = 0 & C]' = 0, = y..
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Procedure search datari.ti.V;. \ )
Finds the approximate start and stop times for each change. Start time is approximated to ten 
minutes before change detected, stop time, ten minutes after change detected.
Inputs: i, y,, and y 
Outputs: ys, yr
Parameters: s -  points to start 
f -  points to stop 
ts -  time at which section starts 
tf -  time at which section stops
Calculate start and stop times; ts = h - 10.0, tf 
Round ts and tf to the nearest 10 minutes. 
Calculate s to equate to ts 
Calculate f  to equate to tf
ti +  10.0.
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Appendix 6: Case studies
A6.1 Introduction
In producing these examples, our remit was to examine overall performance without spending 
too much time on methods development. The computer simulation on which these results are 
based was crude. The procedures that were applied, were not optimised to reflect the fact that 
real plant data would look different. The results presented below should be viewed with this 
understanding in mind.
The simulation was of a reprocessing plant with two cycles and a concentrator and hence had 
the following segments:
1. tank-set 1 consisting of four tanks after the input accountancy tank
2. cycle 1
3. tank-set 2 consisting of three tanks
4. cycle 2
5. tank-set 3 consisting of three tanks
6. concentrator
7. tank-set 4 consisting of two tanks, the second of which is the product accountancy tank.
Figure 15 gives volume and density histories for each tank over the four days covered by the 
simulation, and for the ‘base’ case. Thus the first four rows pertain to Tank-set 1 i.e. Tanks 1- 
4, the next three pertain to Tank-set 2 i.e. Tanks 5-7 and so on. If Tool 7b was to be applied to 
this data then the table of errors, generated by comparing the simulation with plant data, would 
look something like that shown in Table 6, and the re-distribution (after four days) would look 
something like that shown in Table 7.
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Figure 15: Volume (litres) and density transients (g/1) in all tanks over 5000 minutes.
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1 day(0-1500) 2 days (0-2600) 3 days (0-4400) 4 days (0-5500)
Tank 1 0.01 0.21 0.65 0.71
Tank 2 -9.60 -9.81 -9.98 -9.96
Tank 3 -0.04 -0.01 -0.37 -0.47
Tank 4 -6.51 -6.41 -8.33 -8.76
Solex 1 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
Tank 5 -1.19 0.39 -4.13 -3.46
Tank 6 1.50 0.73 0.26 -0.06
Tank 7 -7.26 -6.26 -4.84 -4.75
Solex 2 0.19 0.21 0.06 0.06
T anks -38.99 -43.28 -75.09 -118.18
Tank 9 1.09 1.88 -5.75 -9.06
Tank 10 18.16 86.10 142.47 191.05
Concentrator -0.75 -2.27 -1.24 3.14
Tank 11 1.56 10.80 18.04 22.60
Tank 12 -51.44 -51.64 -150.71 -61.99
Table 6: showing errors increasing over 4 days
Error Redistribution
Tank 1 0.71 0.71
Tank 2 -9.96 -9.96
Tank 3 -0.47 -0.47
Tank 4 -8.76 -8.76
Solex 1 -0.01 -0.01
Tank 5 -3.46 -3.46
Tank 6 -0.06 -0.06
Tank 7 -4.75 -4.75
Solex 2 0.06 0.06
T an k s -118.18 -36.19
Tank 9 -9.06 50.00
Tank 10 191.05 50.00
Concentrator 3.14 3.14
Tank 11 22.60 10.61
Tank 12 -61.99 -50.00
Table 7: Re-distribution If Performed Once At End Of 4 Days
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A.6.2 Case 1: A brup t diversion from  the Cycle 2 outlet
This section describes the procedures that would ensue if 20 litre of 30 g/1 Pu concentration 
solution was to be ‘taken’, at a constant rate over 60 minutes, from the Cycle 2 outlet. It is 
assumed that the molaiity remains constant at the exit of this cycle. This movement is 
characterised by a temporary reduction in liquor entering the receiving tank (Tank 8).
Figures 16 & 17 show the level and density plots that might be observed: note the incident. 
This data would be entered into the Real-time Database and analysed by Tools 3&4 (Figures 
17 & 18) that would result in the output of flow-rate data to the database and trigger the 
sequence below:
Tank Set 3. Tool 6
Figures 18 & 19 show an irregularity for about 60 minutes from about 1600 minutes. 
This is detected by Tool 6 (Figures 20-22) on the basis of the spike shown in Figure 22. 
The ‘start’ and ‘stop’ times and time history pertaining to the flow rate are extracted 
automatically and a sub-event is created to represent the story so far.
Tool 7a
Three observers are now invoked ‘in-parallel’: one looks at the possibility of a transfer 
to hidden inventory (Figure 23), one looks at the possibility of a change in Pu 
concentration and acid molarity (Figures 24 & 25), simultaneously and one performs a 
similar function with Pu concentration and Unspecified (Figures 26 & 27). 
(Simultaneous actions might be needed to satisfy both volume and density 
measurements).
Tool 6
The various deviations are now detected and scores are attached to each of the three 
possibilities, which aie entered as sub-event diagnoses. The movement to hidden 
inventory scores highest because it involves only one deviation. Note also that it has 
estimated the total movement to be about 600 gms.
Tool 7c
Corroborates the favoured diagnosis by confirming that the flow rate of the relevant 
inactive feed didn’t change during that period. Also that the cycle appears to be 
operating normally because the neutron detectors and XRF measurements are normal. 
If the health of the dip-tube system is also okay then
=> conclude that there is a disagreement from 1600 -  1660 minutes
=> create an event to describe this in the Operational History Database.
The alternative explanations, either as generated by the other observers or pertaining to the fact 
that the volume sensor could have developed a bias over the hour, are still available in the 
Operational History Database if required.
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Follow-up:
Check to see if anything happened in Cycle 2.
If the dip-tube system does not have a health indicator, verify the performance of the sensor 
output by comparing the various dip-tube pressure signals.
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Figures 16 & 17: Tank 8 volume (litres) & density (g/1)
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Figures 18 & 19: Tank 8 observer outputs: flow rate error (1/min) and X (g/1)
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Top: positive test signal (detected if I signal I > some threshold)
Middle: negative test signal (detected if I signal I > some threshold)
Bottom: input signal
Figures 20 - 22: Tank 8 detectors
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Figure 23: Hidden inventory using observer_type = Hidden inventory
Timo, mlninoi
Figure 24: Pu concentration using observer_type = Pu/Acid
Tlmo, mlnulos
Figure 25: Acid molarity using observer„type = Pu/Acid
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Figure 26: Unspecified using observer_type = Pu/unsp
Figure 27 : Pu concentration using observer_type = Pu/unsp
UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA 133
SRDP-R279
A.6.3 Case 2: Temporary increase in Cycle 2 holdup
This section describes the procedures that would ensue if about 600 gms of plutonium was to 
‘disappear’ for a period of about 12 hours, then re-appear (Figure 28). This movement is 
characterised by a reduction in the density of the liquor in the receiving tank. It is difficult to 
attribute fluctuations in density with fluctuations in plutonium concentration because density 
might also fluctuate as a result of changes in acid molarity and in the concentrations of other 
components. As a consequence of this detection must be relatively insensitive and diagnosis 
must accommodate the various possibilities.
Tank Set 3. Tool 4
Tool 4 would be applied every receiving tank fill/empty cycle. Figure 29 shows what would be 
obtained: a pair of symmetrical irregularities, the first, a negative spike, the second a positive 
spike.
Tank Set 3. Tool 6a
The tolerances in Tool 6a would be set sufficiently large so that it ignores normal fluctuations 
in density. If these spikes were to be detected then the ‘start’ and ‘stop’ times and time history 
pertaining to the two spikes would be extracted automatically and a sub-event would be created 
to represent each spike separately.
Tool 7a
Three interpreters are now invoked ‘in-parallel’: one determines that change in Pu 
concentration that would cause the variation (Figure 30), one determines the change in acid 
molarity (Figure 31) and one the change in ‘unspecified’ (Figure 32).
Tool 6a
The various deviations are now detected and descriptions & scores are attached to each of the 
three possibilities as part of their sub-event diagnoses. The scores are based on what is most 
likely: a change in Pu concentration will score highest if the spikes are large enough.
Tool 7c
Initially two separate events are created on the basis of the highest scores. They are then 
combined together to produce an event (‘temporary increase in Cycle 2 hold-up’), which 
requires no follow-up.
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Figure 28: Transient change in Cycle 2 hold-up of plutonium (gms)
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Figure 29: X-Observer Output For Cycle 2 Receiving Tank
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Figure 30: Variation in Pu Concentration Required
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Figure 31: Variation in Acid Molarity Required
136 UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA
SRDP-R279
5
4
e
§
0
1
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1600 2000
Time, minutes
Figure 32: Variation in Unsp Concentration Required
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A.6.4 Case 3: Abrupt diversion from Tank 8 during export
This section describes the procedures that would ensue if 20 litre of 30 g/1 Pu concentration 
solution was to be ‘taken’, at a constant rate, over 15 minutes from the receiving tank located 
in Tank Set 3, and whilst the tank is being emptied. It is assumed that the molarity remains 
constant at the exit of this cycle. Depending on which level data is used to estimate transfers 
between the receiving and buffer tanks, either the movement would be characterised by a 
reduction in liquor transferred to the batch tank. Tank 9, or in an increase in liquor left in Tank 
8. Either situation would be detected by Tool 6b.
Tank Set 3. Tool 3
Figure 33 shows the observer output. Nothing would be detected by Tool 6a in this signal.
Tank Set 3. Tool 5
Figure 34 shows the level plot that might be observed in Tank 8 together with its estimate, 
where the measurement is the dashed line. Note the divergence from about 940 minutes.
Tool 6b
Figures 35 - 37 show the error signal that is input into the detector together with the two 
CUSUM (boolean) outputs. A ‘start’ time at about 920 (minutes) and time history starting 
from about 900 (minutes) are extracted automatically and a sub-event is created to represent 
the story so far.
Tool 7a
Up to four observers would now be invoked ‘in-parallel’ : the first looks at the possibility of a 
transfer oig to hidden inventory, whilst the other three look at the possibilities of various forms 
of addition: plutonium nitrate solution as per the tank upstream, plutonium nitrate solution of a 
different concentration or acid. In each case a material movement is obtained. Since material 
is known to be leaving, here only the first would be meaningful (Figure 38). Note the ‘spikes’ 
that ‘confuse’ the picture. These result from the likely temporal mismatch between simulation 
and reality during the start and finish of batch transfers. A simple procedure is used to extract 
the average flow rate out, including its start and stop times, from the plot. This is based on the 
integral of the flow rate (Figure 39), which has estimated the total movement to be about 20 1.
Tool 5
The effect of making this movement is now examined by incorporating each one in turn into 
the simulation.
Tool 6
The effects are tested and the successful movement is entered as a sub-event diagnosis.
Tool 7c
An event is created to describe this in the Operational History Database.
Tool 7b
It is also worth pointing out that, depending on tolerances, and if the event has not been 
accommodated in the simulation before Tool 7b is invoked, Table ** might be output by Tool
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Error
Tank 1 0.16
Tank 2 -9.64
T an k s -0.16
Tank 4 -5.30
Solex 1 0.00
Tank 5 -1.88
Tank 6 0.29
T ank? -6.30
Solex 2 -0.17
Tank 8 607.24
Tank 9 3.83
Tank 10 -4.66
Concentrator 0.49
Tank 11 4.54
Tank 12 -76.98
Table 8; Out flow diversion on tank 8, single cycle simulation
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Figure 33: Tool 3 Observer Output For Tank 8
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Figure 34: Tank 8 Volume (litres) Prediction & Measurements (Dashed)
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Figures 35-37: Tank 8 Input To Tool 6b, Positive & Negative Cusum Outputs
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Figure 38: Observed flow rate to hidden inventory
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Figure 39: Integral of flow rate to hidden inventory
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A.6.5 Case 4: Slower diversion from buffer tank 9
Case 4 describes the procedures that would ensue if 0.02 1/min of 30 g/1 Pu concentration 
solution was to be continually ‘taken’ from the buffer tank after Cycle 2. Depending on the 
tolerances specified, a disagreement would arise in Tool 7b-1 within a few days (Table 9). 
Tool7b-2 would be then look at the redistribution of these errors and identify the problem to 
the correct buffer tank (Table 10).
Tool 7b-l
1 day(0-1500) 2 days (0-2600) 3 days (0-4400) 4 days (0-5500)
Tank 1 0.17 0.25 0.50 0.48
Tank 2 -9.26 -9.10 -9.14 -9.22
Tank 3 -0.19 -0.09 -0.38 -0.36
Tank 4 -6.70 -6.62 -7.25 -7.55
Solex 1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.00
Tank 5 0.47 1.44 -1.87 -0.93
Tank 6 -0.39 0.51 -0.31 -0.48
Tank 7 -8.60 -8.61 -7.94 -8.10
Solex 2 0,11 0.06 -0.02 -0.18
Tank 8 49.00 93.79 154.93 163.48
Tank 9 497.15 868.45 1442.33 1819.11
Tank 10 93.04 215.09 374.42 473.31
Concentrator -0.15 0.01 -0.40 5.76
Tank 11 1.98 12.37 20.63 25.18
Tank 12 -47.84 -20.38 -85.78 -22.29
Tool 7b-2
Table 9: Plutonium mass disagreements: simulated.vs.measured
Error Redistribution
Tank 1 0.48 0.48
Tank 2 -9.22 -9.22
Tank 3 -0.36 -0.36
Tank 4 -7.55 -7.55
Solex 1 -0.00 -0.00
Tank 5 -0.93 -0.93
Tank 6 -0.48 4.72
Tank 7 -8.10 50.00
Solex 2 -0.18 50.00
Tank 8 163.48 50.00
Tank 9 1819.11 2242.24
Tank 10 473.31 50.00
Concentrator 5.76 5.76
Tank 11 25.18 25.18
Tank 12 -22.29 -22.29
Table 10: Tank 9 constant diversion
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A.6.6 Case 5: Slower diversion from the inlet of Tank 8
Case 4 describes the procedures that would ensue if 0.02 1/min of 30 g/1 Pu concentration 
solution was to be continually ‘taken’ from the Cycle 2 outlet. Depending on the tolerances 
specified, a disagreement would arise in Tool 7b-1 within a few days. At this point samples 
would have to be analysed to locate the area of concern.
Tool 7b
Table 11 shows the build-up in error in Tank 12 over four days. The build-up in Tank 12 would 
trigger the collection of samples (Table 12), which would be compared with the simulation 
results. This would point to the problem lying in the vicinity of the Cycle 2 feed tank, Cycle 2 
itself and the Cycle 2 receiving tank. Redistribution (Table 13) would then be applied on the 
basis that the problem is with the mid-unit (i.e. the cycle itself). Appropriate flow rate 
correction teims would be generated and applied to the real-time database and an event would 
be generated that would point to the general vicinity.
1 day(G-I500) 2 days (0-2600) 3 days (0-4400) 4 days (0-5500)
Tank 1 0.24 0.30 0.52 0.72
Tank 2 -8.51 -8.61 -8.58 -8.52
T anks -0.21 -0.23 -0.23 -0.54
Tank 4 -6.57 -6.65 -7.18 -7.39
Solex 1 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
Tank 5 0.59 1.18 -1.91 -1.45
Tank 6 -1.00 0.22 -0.55 -0.55
Tank? -8.46 -7.87 -7.29 -8.05
Solex 2 0.02 -0.00 -0.06 -0.24
Tank 8 -27.38 -42.92 -109.76 -153.40
Tank 9 2.08 1.11 1.78 2.80
Tank 10 11.33 78.88 129.04 173.69
Concentrator -1.70 -3.54 -1.35 5.09
Tank 11 11.45 6.33 19.98 18.75
Tank 12 130.08 512.59 1180.83 1852.60
Table 11 : Diversion tank 8
Sample Simulated
Tank 3 2.00 2.00
Tank 6 7.00 6.9992
Tank 9 31.45 31.98
Tank 12 221.78 226.61
Table 12; Sample data
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Error Redistribution
Tank 1 0.72 0.72
Tank 2 -8.52 -8.52
Tank 3 -0.54 -0.54
Tank 4 -7.39 -7.39
Solex 1 -0.00 -0.00
Tank 5 -1.45 -1.45
Tank 6 -0.55 -0.55
T ank? -8.05 -8.05
Solex 2 -0.24 1599.29
T an k s -153,40 50.00
Tank 9 2.80 50.00
Tank 10 173.69 50.00
Concentrator 5.09 50.00
Tank 11 18.75 50.00
Tank 12 1852.60 50.00
Table 13; Redistribution after 4 days on the basis of the sample data
UK Safeguards Support for the IAEA 145
SRDP-R279
A.6.7 Case 6: Substitution Of Solution With Acid
A relatively large quantity of solution, (50 litres at 31.0 g/litre = 1550 gms of Pu) is 
replaced in the buffer tank upstream of the concentrator with the same quantity of 
nitric acid and of the same density (50 litres of 2.32 molarity). In theory if the switch 
is made ‘cleanly’ no change in either level or density should be observed in the tank. 
In practice the chance of achieving this must be very small so some variation is likely 
to be observed. There are probably many different ways in which the buffer tank 
level & density might vary so here we assume the worst case: that it is not obvious 
that it is not just process noise in which case considerable reliance would have to be 
placed on corroborating evidence. Although there would be various short-term effects 
on the units downstream, these would not be detectable , so detection would be based 
on observing the medium-term effects through the plutonium balance (Tool 7b), 
Table 14 shows the results obtained from Tool 7b over the day of the incident plus the 
following day. The incident took place in the early afternoon. Note that the error in 
tank 12 takes time to build-up as material (or lack of it) has to travel through the rest 
of the plant.
End of day 1 End of day 2
Tank 1 0.19 0.39
Tank 2 -9.40 -9.37
Tank 3 -0.04 -0.09
Tank 4 -3.94 -4.26
Solex 1 -0.01 -0.01
Tank 5 -0.04 2.71
Tank 6 -0.60 -0.19
T an k ? -6.58 -7.75
Solex 2 -0.23 -0,33
Tank 8 -32.87 -50.86
Tank 9 3.71 0.22
Tank 10 -2.82 7.45
Concentrator 7.21 0.27
Tank 11 4.82 9.06
Tank 12 970.50 1539.33
Table 14: Tool 7b Errors
Tool 7b
The build-up in Tank 12 would trigger the collection of samples, which would be 
compared with the simulation results. Depending on timing, this might provide 
evidence that a substitution has occurred, and then again, it might not. Either way the 
problem would be located as lying in the vicinity of the Concentrator feed tank, the 
Concentrator itself and the Concentrator receiving tank. Redistribution would then be 
applied on the basis that the problem is with the mid-unit (i.e. the Concentrator). 
Appropriate flow rate correction terms would be generated and applied to the real­
time database and an event would be generated that would point to the general 
vicinity.
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APPENDIX 7: SYSTEMATIC MULTIPLICATIVE BIASES IN TANKS
A number of test cases were examined to show the effect of multiplicative errors and how 
Tool7b-4 locates them. A plant simulation was first executed to produce a set of real plant 
data including the real tank volume and the real plutonium inventory for each tank. A set of 
multiplicative errors was now hypothesised and applied to this data to produce a set of plant 
data. This plant data was then analysed to estimate the flow rates through the plant, which 
was input into the plant simulation to predict tank volumes and plutonium inventories.
Table 15 indicates which tank volumes were used in the estimation of the various flow rates. 
The differences between the real tank volumes and the tank volumes, and between the Tank 12 
real plutonium inventory and the plutonium inventory, were tabulated at the end of each day. 
This was repeated for a number of different of error sets (Tables 16-24). The differences were 
now analysed by Tool 7b-4 on the basis of one set of daily measurements. Some of the results 
are given in Tables 25-28. Finally a test case was performed that involved more than one set of 
measurements and the results are given in Table A7.14.
The following test cases were generated:
a) the clean (i.e. unbiased) case (Table 16)
b) 4-1% on Tank 8 only (Table 17)
c) 4-1% on Tank 9 only (Table 18)
d) 4-1% on Tank 10 only (Table 19)
e) 4-1% on Tank 3 only (Table 20)
f) Tank 8: 4-5%, Tanks 9 & 10: -5%  only (Table 21)
g) 4-1% on the tank, -1% on the 2"^, and so on (Tables 22 & 23)
h) 4-1 % on all the tanks (Table 24)
Notes:
1. Tank 12 is the product accountancy tank.
2. The plutonium inventories in the solvent extraction cycles and in the concentrator are maintained constant.
3. There is perfect sampling (i.e. ail the solution is returned) and no evaporation.
Case a)
A no bias case was performed to give an indication of the magnitude of the disagreements that 
arise when only random errors are imposed.
Cases b) to e)
These involved only one bias. In each case Tool 7b-4’s first hypothesis located the bias, 
quantification at the end of day 2 (Table 25) resulted in estimates, which when substituted back 
into the simulation eliminated the disagreements. The revised disagreements were: in case b) 
1.02 (Tank 8), in case c) 0.01 1 (Tank 8) & -0.22 1 (Tank 10), in case d) 2.04 1 (Tank 10) and in 
case e) 50.79 1 (Tank 3) & 30.33 1 (Tank 4). Note the upstream tanks (Tanks 3&4) have larger 
acceptable disagreements because the tanks are much larger.
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Case f)
A single bias hypothesis (in Tank 8) lead to an initial estimate of 9.4%, which, on re-running 
the simulation, resulted in a Tank 8 error of 21.9 1 and a Tank 12 Pu inventory error of -416.6 
gm. The hypothesis involving all three biases (in the second tank-set) was evaluated by re­
running the simulation with different error distributions until the Pu concentration in Tank 12 
agreed with that ‘measured’ (224.0). Some of the results are shown in Table 26. It can be seen 
that the output would be (5, -5, -5} if the test for convergence was to be based on Pu 
concentration , and would be about {6, -4, -4} if it was to be based on the Pu inventory. In 
practice it would depend on what is deemed to be more accurate.
Case g)
A similar approach would be adopted here. Unfortunately the software used to perform these 
evaluations could only be executed semi-automatic ally making it extremely time-consuming to 
produce a converged solution. Tables 27 and 28 gives the first two iterations, which was all 
that was generated.
Case h)
This has been included to show what might be considered to be the hardest case. The build-up 
in Tanks 1 & 12 indicate that there is a problem, other than this there is little information. It is 
important to understand that the analyses described can be performed regularly. Thus, for 
instance, a hypothesis can be made, which correlates with the day’s data, then tested against 
data collected on subsequent days. It is difficult to ‘pre-plan’ a strategy for dealing with this 
eventuality until the actual data collection process starts.
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Flow in Flow out
Tank 1 Input Acc. Tank Tank 2
Tank 2 Tank 2 Tank 2
Tank 3 Tank 2 T an k s
Tank 4 Tank 3 Tank 4
Tank 5 Tank 5 Tank 6
Tank 6 Tank 6 Tank 6
T ank? Tank 6 T ank?
T an k s Tank 8 Tank 9
Tank 9 Tank 9 Tank 9
Tank 10 Tank 9 Tank 10
Tank 11 Tank 11 Tank 11
Tank 12 Tank 11 Tank 12
Table 15 Identifies the tank volume used to estimate the flow rate
Tank End of Day 2
Tank 1 -4.87
Tank 2 -5.51
Tank 3 -5.56
Tank 4 -3.35
T an k s 0.06
Tank 6 -1.06
T ank? -1.50
T an k s -1.31
Tank 9 -0.20
Tank 10 2.27
Tank 11 -0.00
Tank 12 -2.35
Pu(Tank 12) -105.86
Table 16 No biases (i.e. the base case)
Tank End Of Day 1 End Of Day 2
Tank 1 0.21 0.24
Tank 2 -4.67 -4.64
T anks -0.16 -0.18
Tank 4 -2.81 -2.89
T anks 0.12 0.61
Tank 6 -0.10 -0.23
Tank 7 -0.94 -1.23
Tank 8 13.60 23.26
Tank 9 0.05 0.04
Tank 10 0.08 0.47
Tank 11 -0.02 -0.03
Tank 12 -1.61 -2.20
Pu(Tank 12) -132.92 -307.69
Table 17 +1% on Tank 8
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Tank End Of Day 1 End Of Day 2
Tank 1 0.21 0.24
Tank 2 -4.67 -4.64
Tank 3 -0.16 -0.18
Tank 4 -2.60 -2.47
T an k s 0.37 0.48
Tank 6 -0.10 -0.23
T ank? 4.64 4.64
Tank 8 -16.51 -26.53
Tank 9 0.13 0.12
Tank 10 16.04 26.57
Tank 11 -0.02 -0.03
Tank 12 -1.60 -2.17
Pu(Tank 12) -195.32 -148.45
Table 18 +1% on Tank 9
Tank End Of Day 1 End Of Day 2
Tank 1 0.21 0.24
Tank 2 -4.67 -4.64
Tank 3 -0.16 -0.18
Tank 4 -4.00 -3.41
T an k s -0.15 0.13
Tank 6 -0.10 -0.23
T ank? -0.59 -0.57
Tank 8 -1.96 -1.90
Tank 9 0.05 0.04
Tank 10 -14.37 -23.37
Tank 11 -0.02 -0.03
Tank 12 -1.61 -2.19
Pu(Tank 12) 408.25 729.46
Table 19 +1% on Tank 10
Tank End Of Day I End Of Day 2
Tank 1 0.21 0.24
Tank 2 -4.67 -4.64
Tank 3 -231.74 -463.36
Tank 4 230.00 383.13
Tank 5 0.54 0.54
Tank 6 -0.10 -0.23
T an k ? -1.26 -1.43
Tank 8 -1.35 -1.15
Tank 9 0.05 0.04
Tank 10 1.77 2.49
Tank 11 -0.02 -0.02
Tank 12 -1.60 -2.17
Pu(Tank 12) -138.96 -90.94
Table 20 +1% on Tank 3
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Tank End Of Day 1 End Of Day 2
Tank 1 0.09 0.14
Tank 2 -4.59 -4.66
Tank 3 -0.12 -0.28
Tank 4 -3.68 -3.80
T an k s 0.24 0.43
Tank 6 -0.26 -0.25
T ank? -0.44 -0,66
Tank 8 145.42 242.78
Tank 9 0.15 -0.02
Tank 10 0.93 1.82
Tank 11 -0.02 -0.05
Tank 12 -1.58 -2.14
Pu(Tank 12) -3387.63
Table 21 +5% on Tank 8, -5% on Tanks 9 & 10
Tank End Of Day 1 End Of Day 2
Tank 1 231.64 463.40
Tank 2 -4.71 -4.75
Tank 3 -463.28 -926.51
Tank 4 460.66 769.43
T an k s 131.85 220.21
Tank 6 -0.01 -0.00
T ank? -133.65 -221.80
Tank 8 -30.25 -50.92
Tank 9 0.17 0.30
Tank 10 29.86 51.33
Tank 11 -0.03 -0.03
Tank 12 0.82 1.17
Pu(Tank 12) 1763.94 2201.14
Table 22 +1%, followed by -1%  down the plant
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Tank Bias Flow in Flow out Flow in Flow out Inventory
1 +1 Accountancy Tank 2 1.0 0.99 t
2 -1 Tank 2 Tank 2 0.99 0.99 -
3 4-1 Tank 2 Tank 3 0.99 1.01 i
4 -1 Tank 3 Tank 4 1.01 0.99 T
Solex 1 Tank 4 T an k s 0.99 1.01 Pu g/1 decrease
5 4-1 T an k s Tank 6 1.01 0.99 t
6 -1 Tank 6 Tank 6 0.99 0.99 -
7 4-1 Tank 6 T ank? 0.99 1.01
Solex 2 T ank? Tank 8 1.01 0.99 Pu g/1 increase
8 -1 Tank 8 Tank 9 0.99 1.01 i
9 4-1 Tank 9 Tank 9 1.01 1.01 -
10 -1 Tank 9 Tank 10 1.01 0.99 T
Concentrator Tank 10 Tank 11 0.99 1.01 Pu g/1 decrease
11 4-1 Tank 11 Tank 11 1.01 1.01 -
12 -1 Tank 11 Accountancy 1.01 1.00 T
Table 23 Predicted results for Pu inventory for +1%,-1% on plant
Tank End O f Day 1 End Of Day 2
Tank 1 -231.50 -463.03
Tank 2 -4.81 -4.85
Tank 3 -0.14 -0.08
Tank 4 -2.45 -2.69
T an k s -0.45 -0.33
Tank 6 -0.01 -0.00
T ank? -1.38 -1.27
T a n k s -0.93 -2.02
Tank 9 0.17 0.30
Tank 10 1.80 3.85
Tank 11 -0.03 -0.03
Tank 12 0.83 1.17
Pu(Tank 12) 408.40 661.02
Table 24 +1% throughout plant
Tank 8 Tank 9 Tank 10 Tank 3 Alternate 
down plant
Tanks 
8, 9 &  10
4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1 4-1,-1 4-5 , -5, -5
Tank 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tank 2 0 0 0 0 -1.3500 0
Tank 3 0 0 0 0.9100 0 0
Tank 4 0 0 0 0 -1.9700 0
Tank 5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tank 6 0 0 0 0 -2.0200 0
T ank? 0 0 0 0 0 0
T an k s 0.9400 0 0 0 -2.0600 9.400
Tank 9 0 1.0836 0 0 0 0
Tank 10 0 0 0.9000 0 -1.9600 0
Tank 11 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tank 12 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 25 First attempt
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Errors {9.4, 0 ,0} {0,-10,-101 {5.-5, -5)
Tank 8 volume 21.9 -15.6 -2.1
Tank 9 volume -0.27 -0.29 -0.28
Tank 10 volume 1.57 1.74 1.66
Tank 12 Pu inv -417 783 373
Tank-set 3 Pu cone. -1.7 1.2 -0.4
Tank 12 Pu cone. 2.0 -1.1 0.0
Table 26 Results obtained for various Tank-set 3 bias distributions when biases
are {5, -5, -5}
Tank Bias Estimate Volume Error Pu error
1 0.0 -169.1147 -328.2697
2 -1.35 -5.5425 -9.6220
3 0.0 -304.4695 -597.9513
4 -1.97 1.3926 3.4211
5 0.0 -4.8161 -36.3351
6 -2.02 -1.1979 -0.3524
7 0.0 3.0166 24.4180
8 -2.06 0.0643 -14.7695
9 0.0 0.0347 9.5198
10 -1.96 2.8245 90.7659
11 0.0 -0.0323 -7.1908
12 0.0 1.1519 603.9800
Tank set Pu Actual Pu Estimate
1 2 3 4 2 2
5 6 7 7 6.998
8 9 10 31.5 31.47
11 12 224 222.89
Table 27 Evaluation of hypothesis for case g)
Tank Bias Estimate Volume Error Pu error
1 0.0 -169.11 -328.27
2 -1.35 -5.54 -9.62
3 0.0 -304.47 -597.95
4 -2.01 -14.52 -28.39
5 2.06 -4.54 -34.68
6 0.0 -1.17 0.04
7 0.91 -121.57 -867.54
8 -2.14 2.09 49.40
9 0.0 0.03 9.19
10 -1.90 4.34 140.37
11 0.0 -0.03 -7.27
12 0.0 1.15 1410.34
Tank set Pu Actual Pu Estimate
1 2 3 4 2 2
5 6 7 7 7.15
8 9 10 31.5 31.816
11 12 224 225.195
Table 28 Evaluation of 2"^ hypothesis for case g)
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APPENDIX 8: SOME EXAMPLES OF THE DATA OBJECTS CREATED
BY SOME OF THE TOOLS
Case 1 : Diversion Not During Export
tslart — 1500
tfinish =  2 0 0 0
Tool 6a-1:
Create a sub-event with name Sub~event_idl : 
diagnoses = (diagnosis_idl) 
scores = (1)
symptoms = (symptom„idl)
diagnosis_idl::sd_idl is a sub-class:
path-type = measurement_error 
path-id = V04
quantity = time profile from 1600 to 1700 (2 columns t,V)
symptom_idl is a sub-class: 
error-in -  flow 
path-id = c**t04 
start-time = 1600 
stop-time = 1700
Create a sub-event with name Sub-event_id2: 
diagnoses = (diagnosis„idl) 
scores = ( 1 )
symptoms = (symptom„idl)
diagnosis„idl::sd_idl is a sub-class:
path-type = measurement_error 
path-id = V04
quantity = time profile from 1800 to 1950 (2 columns t,V)
symptom_idl is a sub-class: 
error-in = flow 
path-id — c**t04 
start-time = 1800 
stop-time = 1950
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Tool 7a-2 followed by Tool 6a-2:
Add to sub-event Sub-event_id:
diagnoses = diagnosis_idl, diagnosis„id2, diagnosis_id3 
scores = ( 1 2 3 )
with sub-class diagnosis_id2:;sd„idl;
path-type = molarity 
path-id = c**h**
quantity = time profile of over the period 1600 - 1700
and sub-class diagnosis_id2::sd„id2: 
path-type = Pu 
path-id = c**h**
quantity = time profile of over the period 1600 - 1700
and sub-class diagnosis_id3 : : sd_id 1 : 
path-type = flow 
path-id = c**h**
quantity = time profile of flow rate to hidden inventory
Tool 7c-1:
sub-event_idl::link-with = sub-event_id2 
sub-event_id 1 : : link-type = ‘primary_effect’ 
sub-event_id2::link-with = sub-event_idl 
sub-event_id2 : : link-type = ‘secondary_effect’ 
sub-event_idl “diagnosis = diagnosis_id3 
sub-event_idl : : score = 2
Make-event event_id:
event_description = "Solex_hinv ’ 
Sub-events = (sub-event_idl)
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Case 3: Diversion During Export
tstart = 1700
tfinish =  2 2 0 0
Tool 6b-1:
Create a sub-event with name Sub-event_idl: 
diagnoses = (diagnosis_idl) 
scores = (1)
symptoms = (symptom_idl)
diagnosis_idl::sd„idl is a sub-class:
path-type = measurement_error 
path-id = V05
quantity = time profile 1890 to 2200 (2 columns t, V)
symptom_id is a sub-class: 
error-in = level 
path_id = V05 
start-time = 1890 
stop-time = 2000
Tool 7a-2 followed by Tool 6a-2:
Add to sub-event Sub-event_id:
diagnoses = (diagnosis_idl, diagnosis_id2)
with sub-class diagnosis_id2::sd_id2: 
path-type = flow 
path-id = t04h04
quantity = time profile 1890 to 2200 (2 columns t, V)
Tool 7c-1:
sub-event_idl::diagnosis = diagnosis_id2 
sub-event_idl::score = 3
Make-event event_id:
event_description = ‘T a n k jiin v ’ 
Sub-events = (sub-event_id)
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